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350 MAIN STREET ASSOCIATION, : 
dba THE BLACK PEARL, a non- : Di strict Court No 7676 
profit corporation, FOUR : 
FORTY-NINE, dba THE CLUB, a : Judge Homer Wilkinson 
non-profit corporation, and : 
JEROME PATRICK SCHOLTZ, an : I 
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PROGKEtSSI VI I ri.SUKAWiJh COMPANY, : 
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c o n s t i t u t e s new m a t t e r t o which t h i s u; • +: p r f>si«iH s .ippi-' i I i ini: ". 
r e p l y . 
The Brief of the Respondent also presents cases in support of 
respondent's position from which, respondent claims, the present 
case is not distinguishable. The cases respondent cites, however, 
are clearly and easily distinguishable from the present case and 
this reply will succinctly state the distinction. 
For the Court's convenience, each case cited herein is 
reproduced in the Addendum hereto. 
POINT I. UNDER THE MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE 
CHAPTER OF THE UTAH INSURANCE CODE AND UNDER 
THE SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE INSURANCE 
POLICY IN ISSUE, THE RESPONDENT HAS NO 
SUBROGATION RIGHTS WHICH THE APPELLANT COULD 
HAVE PREJUDICED. 
The respondent (referred to hereafter as "Progressive") 
maintains that it is entitled to return of the funds it paid 
appellant under its automobile policy because the appellant 
"prejudiced Progressive's subrogation rights against the parties 
legally responsible for her injuries" and "such conduct 
constitutes a breach of the insurance contract." (Progressive's 
brief, p. 10.) Appellant's prejudicial action is said to be her 
"release of the only defendants with any ability to pay." (Id., 
p. 11). The general provision of the policy appellant purportedly 
breached is paragraph(s) 5 of Part V of the policy, which reads as 
follows: 
In the event of any payment under this policy, 
we are entitled to all the rights of recovery 
of the person to whom payment was made against 
another. That person must sign and deliver to 
us any legal papers relating to that recovery, 
do whatever else is necessary to help us 
exercise those rights and do nothing after 
loss to prejudice our rights. 
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When a person has been paid damages by us 
under this policy, and also recovers from 
another, the amount recovered from the other 
shall be held by that person in trust for us 
and reimbursed to us to that extent of our 
payment. 
(Emphasis added.) Read literally, the emphasized language of 
paragraph(s) 5 constitutes an assignment of a cause of action for 
personal injury, which is not countenanced by the law. See State 
Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Insurance Exch., 450 P.2d 458 at 
459; 450 P.2d at 460 (Justice Callister concurring.) Of course, 
the second paragraph above limits Progressive's rights to 
reimbursement to the extent of its payment and thus defines rights 
of subrogation (id.-)/ which rights are what Progressive claims. 
The issue is whether, in this case, Progressive has any rights of 
subrogation which its insured could prejudice. 
In light of the fact that the Utah Insurance Code and 
specific provisions regarding uninsured motorist and no-fault 
coverage are controlling, the language of Progressive's policy 
does not constitute the last words on the matters in issue. 
Progressive cannot write a policy that is more restrictive than 
the statutes allow, nor one which deviates from the statutes' 
provisions, and expect it to be enforced. Indeed, paragraph 11 of 
Part V - General Provisions of Progressive's policy conforms its 
terms to the state's statutes. 
A. Uninsured Motorists Coverage 
Progressive relies on Shepherd v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. 
Co., 607 F.Supp. 75 (D.C. Miss. 1985), as illustrative. The 
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insured in Shepherd released her claims for injury in an 
automobile accident in return for $10,000 in settlement and then 
brought suit against her own insurer for uninsured motorist 
coverage over the amount of her settlement, which settlement she 
claimed did not compensate her for her damages. The insurer 
sought summary judgment on the grounds that Shepherd's execution 
of a covenant not to sue the motorist responsible for her injuries 
violated provisions of its contract's uninsured motorist 
provisions and abrogated its subrogation rights against the 
negligent motorist. Pertinent to the Shepherd Court's decision 
that Shepherd had abrogated her insurer's rights are the facts 
that: 
1.) the i n s u r e r ' s uninsured m o t o r i s t p r o v i s i o n s , as 
quoted by the Court, s t a t ed : 
This insurance does not apply: (a) 
to bodily injury to an insured . . . 
w i t h r e s p e c t t o which such 
insured . . . s h a l l , without wri t ten 
consen t of the company, make any 
s e t t l e m e n t w i t h any p e r s o n or 
o r g a n i z a t i o n who may be l e g a l l y 
l i a b l e therefore . . . . 
607 F.Supp. at 76; 
2.) the negligent motorist was insured and Shepherd's 
settlement with him was for the limits of his policy; and, 
3.) Shepherd was decided under the laws of Mississippi, 
which guarantee an insurer's subrogation rights in the following 
provision of the Mississippi uninsured motorist statutes: 
An insurer paying a claim under the 
endorsementor provisions required by 
section 83-11-101 shall be 
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s u b r o g a t e d t o t h e r i g h t s of the 
insured to whom such claim was paid 
a g a i n s t t h e p e r s o n caus ing such 
i n j u r y , d e a t h , or damage to the 
e x t e n t t h a t paymen t was made, 
i n c l u d i n g t h e a s s e t s of t h e 
involvent insure r . 
607 F.Supp. at 76, footnote 2. 
The above facts are pertinent to the Shepherd Court's 
decision because they reveal that Shepherd is not illustrative of 
Progressive's argument in the following ways: 
1.) There is no provision in Progressive's policy equivalent 
to the provision quoted from Shepherd's insurer's policy. 
2.) Appellant's settlements and release of claims were not 
with the uninsured, or, as in Shepherd, underinsured, motorist, 
but with other parties, and Progressive's policy clearly states in 
its uninsured motorist provisions: 
We will pay damages for bodily injury which an 
insured person is legally entitled to recover 
from the owner or operator of an uninsured 
motor vehicle up to the limit of liability as 
defined in this part. The bodily injury must 
be caused by accident and arise out of the 
ownership, maintenance or driving of the 
uninsured motor vehicle . . . . 
Progressive's policy, Part IV, Uninsured Motorists, Coverage 1, p. 
4. 
3.) Utah 's uninsured motorist s t a t u t e s do not guarantee an 
i n su re r ' s subrogation r i g h t s , as Miss i s s ipp i ' s do. 
The above-l is ted th i rd reason Shepherd i s not i l l u s t r a t i v e of 
t h i s case i s the same reason the other cases Progressive c i t e s do 
n o t s u p p o r t t h e n o t i o n t h a t P r o g r e s s i v e has a r i g h t t o 
subroga t ion under i t s uninsured mo to r i s t p r o v i s i o n s when i t s 
i n s u r e d ' s recovery i s obtained from a to r t feasor other than the 
uninsured motor i s t . The cases Progressive c i t e s were a l l decided 
in the c o u r t s of I l l i n o i s : Ackermann v. Prudential Property & 
Cas. I n c . , 83 Il l .App.3d 590, 404 N.E.2d 534 (1980); cniddgn v. 
Farmers Automobile Insurance Ass 'n , 57 111.2d 330, 312 N.E.2d 247 
(1974); Remgen Yt Midway Liquors, Inc . , 30 in.App.2d 132, 174 
N . E . 2 d 7 ( 1 9 6 1 ) . ) The I l l i n o i s I n s u r a n c e C o d e , l i k e 
M i s s i s s i p p i ' s , gua ran t ees an i n s u r e r ' s sub roga t ion r i g h t for 
payments made under uninsured m o t o r i s t coverage p r o v i s i o n s . 
Sec t ion 1 4 3 ( a ) , 111 . Rev. S t a t . , 1975, ch . 73 , p a r . 755a(3) , 
s t a t e s : 
In the event of payment to any person under 
t h e coverage r equ i red by t h i s Sec t ion and 
sub j ec t to the terms and conditions of such 
c o v e r a g e , the i n s u r e r making such payment 
s h a l l , to the extent thereof, be e n t i t l e d to 
t h e p r o c e e d s of any s e t t l e m e n t of [ s i c ] judgment r e s u l t i n g from the exercise of any 
r igh t s of recovery of such person against any 
person or organizat ion l ega l ly responsible for 
the bod i ly i n ju ry or dea th for which such 
payment i s made, i n c l u d i n g t h e p r o c e e d s 
recoverable from the asse t s of the insolvent 
[sic] i n su re r . 
Ackermann v . P r u d e n t i a l P roper ty & Cas. I n c . , supra* at 536. 
P rov i s i ons e q u i v a l e n t to those in the I l l i n o i s and Mississ ippi 
I n s u r a n c e Codes a r e a b s e n t from U t a h ' s I n s u r a n c e Code. 
P rog re s s ive does c i t e one case from a j u r i s d i c t i o n which, l ike 
Utah, does not p rov ide for subroga t ion in i t s insurance code. 
P r o g r e s s i v e s t a t e s t h a t the c a s e , Farmers I n s . Exchange v . 
Christenson, 683 P.2d 1319 (Mont. 1984), upholds "the r igh t of an 
i n s u r e r which had paid under the uninsured motorist coverage to 
subrogation where recovery is obtained from a tortfeasor other 
than the uninsured motorist." (Progressive's brieff p. 14.) The 
Christensen case, however, was one in which the insured had 
obtained no recovery from any tortfeasor, and the essence of its 
holding supports the fact that Progressive's remedy is against the 
uninsured motorist. The facts, as set forth by the Court, were as 
follows: 
On June 6, 1981, defendant Mark A. Christenson 
a p p a r e n t l y caused an accident by improperly 
o p e r a t i n g a motor v e h i c l e . K r i s t i n e N. 
H i n c k l e y , a p a s s e n g e r i n t h e v e h i c l e , 
s u s t a i n e d i n j u r i e s a s a r e s u l t of t h e 
accident . Both Christenson and Hinckley were 
m i n o r s a t t h e t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t . 
Chr i s tenson had no insurance on the vehicle 
when the accident occurred. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers) insured 
Hinckley and paid $7,000 on her claim ar i s ing 
out of t h e i n j u r i e s she s u s t a i n e d in the 
a c c i d e n t . F a r m e r s p a i d t h i s under an 
uninsured motorist provision in the Hinckley 
insurance po l icy . As required in the pol icy , 
the Hinckleys assigned the i r personal injury 
a c t i o n to Farmers as p a r t of a subrogation 
c lause . 
On February 10, 1982, Farmers f i led an act ion 
against Christenson and his parents for $7,000 
p a i d on t h e p e r s o n a l i n j u r y c l a i m . The 
Chr i s t ensons rece ived proper service of the 
c o m p l a i n t and summons. The Chr i s t ensons 
fai led to answer or take any action to defend 
a g a i n s t t h i s a c t i o n . On A p r i l 1, 1982, 
Farmers f i l e d a motion for defaul t judgment 
and on July 29, 1982, the court granted said 
motion. 
On January 11 , 1983, the Christensons f i led a 
motion to vacate the default judgment and stay 
the execution. They asserted the judgment was 
void because Farmers was an improper party in 
the ac t ion . The Hinckleys lacked the a b i l i t y 
to assign t he i r personal injury act ion via the 
subroga t ion c l ause to Farmers. Following a 
7 
hearing on their case, the court found that 
the subrogation occurred properly and that 
the default judgment was entered properly. 
683 P.2d at 1320-1321. The case did not involve a dispute between 
the insurer and its insured, as here. The dispute was between the 
insurer and the "third party" insured motorist. In its briefr 
Progressive accurately quotes the sentence in the case which 
begins, "We hold," but the holding in Farmers Ins. Exchange v. 
Christenson, in its entirety, is as follows: 
We hold tha t an uninsured motorist c a r r i e r can 
make payment t o an i n s u r e d , and when the 
i n s u r e d s e t t l e s h i s c l a i m or o b t a i n s a judgment a g a i n s t a t h i r d par ty , the c a r r i e r 
can subrogate and co l l ec t back the amount paid 
t o t h e i n s u r e d . F u r t h e r , t h e u n i n s u r e d 
motorist c a r r i e r can required tha t the act ion 
be i n s t i t u t e d in the name of the insured 
a g a i n s t the uninsured m o t o r i s t in order to 
e f f e c t u a t e the subroga t ion i n t e r e s t of the 
uninsured motorist c a r r i e r . But said act ion 
must not i m p a i r , d i m i n i s h or j e o p a r d i z e 
i n s u r e d ' s a b i l i t y to recover any damages in 
e x c e s s of t h e s u b r o g a t i o n amount. If a 
s u b r o g a t i o n o c c u r s , t h e n t h e u n i n s u r e d 
motorist c a r r i e r must, in good f a i t h , seek for 
t h e i n s u r e d any o t h e r damages ( g e n e r a l , 
s p e c i a l or p u n i t i v e ) t h a t he may not have 
received in h is payment from the c a r r i e r . 
683 P.2d a t 1322 (emphasis added.) The Christenson Court, in 
reasoning towards i t s holding, a lso stated:: 
Respondent argues tha t public policy requires 
s u b r o g a t i o n in t h i s c a s e . If t h i s Court 
p r e c l u d e d s u b r o g a t i o n of c l a i m s a g a i n s t 
uninsured m o t o r i s t s , then the uninsured 
m o t o r i s t would probably b e n e f i t . Once the 
i n s u r e d p l a i n t i f f r e c e i v e s the insurance 
compensat ion for the a c c i d e n t , i t i s l e s s 
l i k e l y he wi l l pursue l i t i g a t i o n aaajrnst the 
uninsured m o t o r i s t . Therefore , subrogation 
enhance? the chances t h a t the uninsured 
m o t o r i s t w i l l pay for h i s wrongdoing, and 
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promote the policy requiring motorists to 
carry insurance. 
As noted above, the controlling issue here is 
one of public policy, 
683 P. 2d 1321-1322 (emphasis added.) Christenson does not give 
Progressive the support Progressive's brief maintains it does. 
The case, when read in context, says nothing about subrogation of 
uninsured motorist claims in the absence of statutory provision 
for them, nor does it deal with recovery from third parties who 
are not uninsured motorists. 
B. "No-Fault" or Personal Injury Protection Coverage 
"No-fault" automobile insurance coverage is, as its name 
suggests, paid to an insured regardless of fault. No-fault 
benefits are, as progressive notes (Progressive's Brief, p. 16) 
personal injury protection (PIP) benefits. The insured pays her 
premium for no-fault coverage to insure coverage of medical 
expenses which accrue following an automobile accident. Neither 
Utah's Insurance Code nor the policy in issue in this case grant 
the insurer a subrogation right as to no-fault benefits paid. The 
Act grants a no-fault/PIP insurer a right to reimbursement from 
the insurer of a motorist tortfeasor for payments made by the 
victim's insurer which the tortfeasor's insurance paid. It does 
not mention, let alone provide for, the no-fault/PIP insurer's 
subrogation as to parties whose insurance covers liability for 
acts unrelated to the operation, ownership, or maintenance of 
motor vehicles. It expressly states the "reductions" which shall 
be made from coverage: 
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Limitations, exclusions, and 
conditions to personal injury 
(1) No person who has direct benefit 
coverage under a coverage under a policy which 
includes personal injury protection may 
maintain a cause of action for general damages 
arising out of personal injuries alleged to 
have been caused by an automobile accident, 
except where the person has sustained one or 
more of the following: 
(a) death; 
(b) dismemberment; 
(c) permanent disability; 
(d) permanent disfigurement; or 
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of 
$3,000. 
(2) (a) Any insurer issuing personal injury 
protection coverage under this part may only 
exclude from this coverage benefits: 
(i) for any injury sustained by 
the injured while occupying another 
motor vehicle owned by the insured 
and not insured under the policy; 
(ii) for any injury sustained by 
any person while operating the 
insured motor vehicle without the 
express or implied consent of the 
insured or while not in lawful 
possession of the insured motor 
vehicle; or 
(iii) to any injured person, if 
the person's conduct contributed to 
his injury: 
(A) by intentionally 
causing injury to himself; 
or 
(B) while committing a felony. 
(b) The provisions of this subsection 
do not limit the exclusions which may be 
contained in other types of coverage. 
(3) The benefits payable to any injured 
person under § 31A-22-307 are reduced by: 
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(a) any benefits which that 
person receives or is entitled to 
receive as a result of an accident 
covered in this code under any 
workers' compensation or similar 
statutory plen; and 
(b) any amounts which that person 
receives or is entitled to receive 
from the United States or any of its 
agencies because he is on active 
duty in the military service. 
(4) When a person injured is also an 
insured party under any other policy, 
including those policies complying with this 
part, primary coverage is given by the policy 
insuring the motor vehicle in use during the 
accident. 
(5) Payment of the benefits provided for in 
§ 31A-22-307 shall be made on a monthly basis 
as expenses are incurred. Benefits for any 
period are overdue if they are not paid within 
30 days after the insurer receives reasonable 
proof of the fact and amount of expenses 
incurred during the period. If reasonable 
proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, 
the amount supported by reasonable proof is 
also overdue if to paid within 30 days after 
the proof is received by the insurer. If the 
insurer fails to pay the expenses when due, 
these expenses shall bear interest at the rate 
of 1 1/2% per month after the due date. The 
person entitled to the benefits may bring an 
action in contract to recover the expenses 
plus the applicable interest. If the insurer 
is required by the action to pay any overdue 
benefits and interest, the insurer is also 
required to pay a reasonable attorney's fee to 
the claimant. 
(6) Every policy providing personal injury 
protection coverage shall provide; 
(a) that where the insured under 
the policy is or would be held 
legally liable for the personal 
injuries sustained by any person to 
whom benefits required under 
personal injury protection have been 
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paid by another insurer/ including 
the Workers1 Compensation Fund of 
Utah/ the insurer of the person who 
would be held legally liable shall 
reimburse the other insurer for the 
payment, but not in excess of the 
amount of damages recoverable; and 
(b) that the issue of liability 
for that reimbursement and its 
amount shall be decided by 
mandatory, binding arbitration 
between the insurers. 
§ 31A-22-309, Utah Code Ann. (emphasis added.) The provisions 
found in paragraph 6 of Section 31A-22-309 are helpful to the 
analysis of Progressive's claims. They limit reimbursement, and 
set forth the parameters of the section, to policies providing 
personal injury protection. The defendants with whom appellant 
settled in this case were not insured by policies "providing 
personal injury protection coverage," as they were both private 
clubs, not motorists. Personal injury protection coverage is 
required under Utah law only in automobile insurance policies. 
At the time of appellant's accident and Progressive's PIP 
payment to her, the above section was codified as § 31-41-7, Utah 
Code Ann., and read as follows: 
31-41-7. Personal injuries covered-Primary 
coverage-Reduction of benefits. 
(1) The coverages described in section 31-41-6 
shall be applicable to: 
(a) Personal injuries sustained by 
the insured when injured in an 
accident in this state involving any 
motor vehicle. 
(b) Personal injuries arising out 
of automobile accidents occurring in 
this state sustained by any other 
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natural person while occupying the 
described motor vehicle with the 
consent of the insured or while a 
pedestrian if injured in a accident 
involving the described motor 
vehicle. 
(2) When a person injured is also an insured 
party under any other policy, including those 
complying with this act, primary coverage 
shall be afforded by the policy insuring the 
motor vehicle out of the use of which the 
accident arose. 
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person 
under section 31-41-6 shall be reduced by: 
(a) Any benefits which that person 
receives or is entitled to receive 
as a result of an accident covered 
in this act under any workmen's 
compensation plan or any similar 
statutory plan; and 
(b) Any amounts which that person 
receives or is entitled to receive 
from the United States or any of its 
agencies because of his or her being 
on active duty in the military 
services. 
(Emphasis added.) Section 31-41-7 contained the same provisions 
for reduction of PIP benefits as § 31A-22-309 and no provision 
whatsoever for reimbursement between insurers. 
Progressive's policy, Part 11 - Expenses for Medical Services 
to Insureds, contains no subrogation clause, stating, in its 
entirety: 
PART II - EXPENSES FOR MEDICAL 
SERVICES TO INSUREDS 
Coverage C - Medical Payments Coverage 
We will pay reasonable expenses incurred 
within one year from the date of accident for 
necessary medical and funeral services because 
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of b o d i l y i n j u r y s u s t a i n e d by an insured 
person. 
Additional Defini t ion Used in t h i s Part Only 
As used in t h i s P a r t " insured person" or 
"insured persons" mean: 
1. Any p e r s o n w h i l e occupying your 
insured car while the car i s being 
driven by you, a r e l a t i v e or another 
person if t h a t person d r ives your 
i n s u r e d c a r w i th your expressed 
permission. 
Exclusions 
This coverage does not apply for bodily injury 
to any person: 
1. s u s t a i n e d w h i l e occupy ing your 
i n s u r e d c a r when used t o c a r r y 
persons for a fee . This exclusion 
does not apply to shared-expense car 
pools whose members are on the way 
t o or from t h e same p l a c e of 
employment. 
2. s u s t a i n e d w h i l e o c c u p y i n g any 
v e h i c l e while located for use as a 
residence or premises. 
3 . s u s t a i n e d w h i l e o c c u p y i n g a 
mo to r i zed v e h i c l e with l e s s than 
four wheels. 
4. sustained while occupying or through 
being s t ruck by any veh ic l e , other 
t h a n your i n s u r e d c a r , which i s 
owned by or furnished or avai lable 
f o r r e g u l a r u s e by you or a 
r e l a t i v e . 
5 . sustained while occupying a vehicle 
o the r than a p r iva te passenger car 
whi le the vehicle i s being used in 
t h e bus ines s or occupat ion of an 
insured person. 
6. o c c u r r i n g d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e of 
employment i f benef i ts are payable 
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or must be provided under a Workers1 
Compensation Law or s imilar law. 
7. c a u s e d by war ( d e c l a r e d o r 
u n d e c l a r e d ) , c i v i l w a r , 
insur rec t ion , r ebe l l ion , revolut ion, 
n u c l e a r r e a c t i o n , r a d i a t i o n or 
r a d i o a c t i v e con tamina t ion , or any 
consequence of any of these . 
8. c a u s e d by t h e i n s u r e d p e r s o n ' s 
commission or a t tempt to commit a 
f e l o n y , or by the insured person 
b e i n g i n v o l v e d i n an i l l e g a l 
occupation. 
9. sustained while your insured car i s 
being operated by a person: 
a. under the minimum age to 
o b t a i n a l i c e n s e t o 
o p e r a t e a p r i v a t e 
passenger car in the s t a t e 
i n w h i c h t h e c a r i s 
l icensed. 
b . under four teen yea r s of 
age. 
10. sustained while your insured car i s 
d r i v e n in or p r e p a r i n g for any 
prearranged or organized race, speed 
contest or performance con tes t . 
Limits of L i a b i l i t y 
Regardless of the number of vehicles described 
in the Dec la ra t ions , insured persons, claims 
or p o l i c i e s , or v e h i c l e s involved in the 
accident , we wil l pay no more than the Limit 
of L i a b i l i t y shown for t h i s coverage in the 
Declara t ions for one or more persons injured 
in any one accident . 
Any amount p a i d or p a y a b l e for med i ca l 
expenses under the L i a b i l i t y or Uninsured 
Moto r i s t s Coverages of t h i s policy sha l l be 
deducted from the amounts payable under t h i s 
Pa r t . 
Other Insurance 
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I f t h e r e i s o t h e r a u t o m e d i c a l payments 
insurance on a loss covered by t h i s Pa r t , we 
wi l l pay our proport ionate share as our Limit 
of L i a b i l i t y b e a r s t o t h e t o t a l of a l l 
appl icable auto medical payments l i m i t s . 
We w i l l not be l i a b l e under t h i s pol icy for 
any medical expense paid or payable under the 
provisions of any: 
1. p r e m i s e s i n s u r a n c e p r o v i d i n g 
coverage for medical expenses. 
2. i n d i v i d u a l , b l a n k e t , or g roup 
a c c i d e n t , d i s a b i l i t y o r 
h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n . 
3 . m e d i c a l , s u r g i c a l , h o s p i t a l or 
f u n e r a l s e r v i c e s , b e n e f i t or 
reimbursement p lan , or 
4. workers ' compensation or d i s a b i l i t y 
benef i ts law or any s imilar law. 
The medical expenses for which no-faul t /PIP benef i t s have 
been paid cannot be included as an element of damages in a s u i t 
against t o r t f easo r s because the victim has recouped them from his 
own i n s u r e r . A p p e l l a n t ' s medical expenses amounted to over 
$42,000.00 when she i n i t i a t e d her s u i t a g a i n s t t he uninsured 
de fendan t , S c h o l t z , and the dramshops. Her medical expenses 
exceeded t h e f i g u r e she c l a i m e d in her compla in t , because 
P rog re s s ive had paid benef i t s which covered some of them. Her 
expenses now far exceed the amount sought in her complaint. As of 
June, 1987, they were $70,716.76. Further surgery as a r e su l t of 
the accident i s s t i l l an t i c ipa t ed . (Because the D i s t r i c t Court ' s 
n o t a t i o n on the record i n d i c a t e s t h a t the record has not been 
p resen ted to the Court, appellant includes as Appendix A hereto 
her answers t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s in which she d e l i n e a t e s her 
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injuries. The medical records which establish the injuries she 
delineates are inches thick, and, therefore, are not reproduced 
for the Court at this point. They are in the record, should the 
Court desire to peruse them, and appellant refers to them at this 
point only to clarify the severity and non-subjectivity of 
appellant's injuries.) 
C. Collision Coverage 
As with the uninsured motorist and no-fault provisions of 
Utah's Insurance Code, the provisions regarding collision coverage 
are silent as to any rights of subrogation. They do not provide, 
either, for reimbursement or for any reduction in benefits because 
of workers' compensation or military benefits. 
POINT II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSURER 
AND INSURED IN CONNECTION WITH AN UNINSURED 
MOTORIST IS ONE IN WHICH THE INSURER AND 
INSURED ARE, FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES, 
ADVERSARIES AND ONE IN WHICH THE DUTY AND 
RIGHT TO PROTECT ITS INTERESTS FALLS ON THE 
INSURER; THE INSURED CANNOT BE SAID TO HAVE 
"PREJUDICED" THE INSURER'S RIGHTS BY PURSUING 
HER OWN. 
The appellant has not prejudiced any of Progressive's rights. 
As shown above, Progressive has no right to be subrogated to the 
proceeds appellant received from parties other than the uninsured 
motorist tortfeasor. Progressive has not cited one case in which 
such subrogation was allowed absent a statute specifically 
authorizing subrogation in general and/or subrogation as to 
parties other than the uninsured tortfeasor. Progressive's right 
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in a situation such as this case raises remains intact: it has 
the right to pursue subrogation against the uninsured tortfeasor. 
The trust agreement included in Progressive's policy, under 
the uninsured motorist coverage provision, includes the following 
paragraph: 
If we ask you in writing, you will take 
necessary or appropriate action, through a 
representative designated by us, to recover 
payment as damages from the responsible person 
or organization; if there is a recovery, then 
we shall be reimbursed out of the recovery for 
expenses, costs and attorney's fees incurred 
in connection with this recovery. 
Part IV - Uninsured Motorists, Trust Agreement, paragraph 4, p. 5. 
Although Progressive's agent states in his affidavit that 
appellant's counsel Joseph E. Tesch requested Progressive's 
permission to represent its rights in appellant's lawsuit, and 
Progressive's brief state that it was appellant's counsel Robert 
D. Moore who made such a request, there is no documentation of 
such request and the facts suggest none was made. In any event, 
Progressive did not ask "in writing," as provided in its policy, 
or take any steps to protect its own interests in the case until 
appellant had pursued it for over two years. If any prejudice to 
Progressive's rights has occurred, the prejudice is of 
Progressive's own making. 
In Lvon v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, 480 P.2d 
739 (Utah 1971) (overruled on other grounds, Beck v. Farmers Ins. 
Exhange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), at 798 footnote 1.), the Court 
discussed the relationship between an insurer and the insured for 
whom it provides uninsured motorist coverage in the context of 
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plaintiff's contention that she should be awarded damages for her 
insurer's failure to bargain with or settle her claims against it 
after she had obtained judgment against an uninsured motorist who 
caused her injuries. The Court addressed the contention as 
follows: 
Finally, plaintiff contends that the trial 
court should have awarded her damages for 
Hartford's failure to bargain with her or 
settle her claim. She concedes that there is 
no case in point but asserts that this court 
should analogize her situation to that where a 
liability insurer refuses in bad faith to 
settle a claim with third parties within the 
policy limits and a judgment in excess of the 
policy limits is rendered against the insured. 
She reasons that by Hartford's failure to 
bargain, she was compelled to incur legal 
expenses for which she is entitled to be 
compensated. 
Plaintiff's analogy is untenable because of 
the distinction in the relationship between a 
liability insurer and its insured and that 
between the insurer and its insured LQ 
connection with an uninsured motorist. In the 
former situation, the insurer must act in good 
faith and be as zealous in protecting the 
interests Qf the jngurefl as it would be in 
regard to its own. In the latter situation, 
the insured and the insurer are, in effect and 
practically speaking, adversaries. 
480 P.2d at 745 (emphasis added.) Given the adversarial 
relationship between insurer and insured in this situation, the 
insured has no more duty to protect the insured's interests than 
the insurer has to protect the insured's. Hartford points out 
that the insurer's obligation to perform does not arise until 
there is a legal determination of the liability of the uninsured 
motorist. Id. Progressive's policy states: 
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We will pay damages for bodily injury which an 
insured person is legally entitled to recover 
from the owner or operator of an uninsured 
motor vehicle up to the limit of liability as 
defined in this part* The bodily injury must 
be caused by accident and arise out of the 
ownership/ maintenance or driving of the 
uninsured motor vehicle* Pete rmination 
whether an insured person is legally entitled 
to recover damages or the amount of damages 
shall be made by agreement between the insured 
person and us* If no agreement is reached, 
the decision will be made by arbitration* 
Such arbitration must be demanded within one 
year after the date of the accident* If suit 
is brought to determine legal liability or 
damages without our written consent, we are 
not bound by any resulting judgment. 
Part IV - Uninsured Motorists, Coverage 1, p. 4. As in Hartford, 
Progressive's obligation to appellant did not arise until there 
was a determination that she was legally entitled to recover 
damages from the uninsured motorist. Further, under the terms of 
its own policy, Progressive attempts to retain control over the 
determination. 
Because of the adversarial nature of the insurer-insured-
uninsured motorist triangle, the insurer is allowed to intervene 
in its insured's action against the uninsured motorist. Lima v. 
Chambers. 657 P.2d 279 (Utah 1982). Intervention allows the 
insurer to protect its rights by raising the issues of the 
uninsured's liability, the damages flowing therefrom, whether its 
insured will be made whole, and the attendant issues Progressive 
now seeks to raise in this appeal. Progressive did not intervene. 
Subrogation, if not specifically spelled out in statutory 
provisions is an equitable concept. Progressive, as its own 
agent's affidavit establishes, knew of appellant's lawsuit well in 
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advance of settlement negotiations. Yet Progressive chose not to 
participate in any aspect of the case. Progressive could have 
been involved in the settlement negotiations if it had been a 
proper party to the case. In equity, Progressive cannot be 
allowed to rely on the sole efforts of the appellant to effectuate 
a recovery and appear at the conclusion of her efforts to demand a 
claimed subrogation. Even where subrogation and full 
reimbursement regardless of the extent of the insured's recovery 
are mandated by statute, as they are in workers' compensation 
insurance cases, the insurer is required to contribute to the 
effort entailed in the recovery by paying its share of the costs 
thereof, including attorney's fees. Section 35-1-62 of the 
Workers' Compensation Act of Utah sets forth the right of an 
injured worker to an action for damages against a third person who 
caused his injuries. The action is in addition to the benefits 
the workers' employer's compensation insurer pays the worker. In 
case of recovery from the third person, the worker must reimburse 
its employer's insurer in full for all benefits received, but the 
insurer must bear the reasonable expenses of the worker's action. 
Section 35-1-62 states: 
If any recovery is obtained against such third 
person it shall be disbursed as follows: 
(1) The reasonable expense of the action, 
including attorneys' fees, shall be paid and 
charged proportionately against the parties as 
their interests may appear. Any such fee 
chargeable to the employer or carrier is to be 
a credit upon any fee payable by the injured 
employee or, in the case of death, by the 
dependents, for any recovery had against the 
third party. 
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(2) The person liable for compensation 
payments shall be reimbursed in full for all 
payments made less the proportionate share of 
costs and attorneys' fees provided for in 
subsection (1), 
(3) The balance shall be paid to the injured 
employee or his heirs in case of death, to be 
applied to reduce or satisfy in full any 
obligation thereafter accruing against the 
person liable for compensation. 
(emphasis added.) Section 35-1-62 abrogates the common law 
feature of equitable subrogation which requires that the insured 
must be made whole before the insurer's right of subrogation 
arises. Lyon v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, aimta* 
spoke of this equitable feature as follows: 
Since subrogation is an offspring of equity, 
equitable principles apply, even when the 
subrogation is based on contract, except as 
modified by specific provisions in the 
contract. In the absence of express terms to 
the contrary, the insured is entitled to be 
made whole before the insurer may recover any 
portion of the recovery from the tort-feasor. 
If the one responsible has paid the full 
extent of the loss, the insured should not 
claim both sums, and the insurer may then 
assert its claim to subrogation. 
480 P.2d at 744, 745. Even as § 35-1-62 precludes any question as 
to the wholeness of the victim's recovery, it nevertheless 
requires the insurer to share the costs of the recovery, thus 
emphasizing the unfairness inherent in allowing an insurer to do 
nothing to effectuate recovery and subsequently assert a right of 
full subrogation. 
Equity refutes Progressive's right of subrogation in this 
case. Appellant has set forth in her brief the facts which prove 
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her recovery from the private club defendants has not made her 
whole and she will not repeat them here. Nevertheless, if 
subrogation is allowed Progressive, equity demands that appellant 
receive reasonable remuneration for the efforts and costs, 
including attorney's fees, the expenditure of which resulted in 
the settlements in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Under Utah law, Progressive has no right to the subrogation 
it seeks. Given that fact and the adversarial relationship 
between insurer and insured in an uninsured motorist claim 
context, appellant had no duty to protect Progressive's interests 
and did not, and in fact could not, breach her insurance policy by 
prejudicing Progressive's "rights.", 
DATED this I day of Jigjb, 0988. 
R6beut D. Moore 
J4~ 
Foseph E. 
Tesch 
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APPENDIX A 
ANSWERS TO DEFENDANT 350 MAIN 
STREET ASSOCIATION, DBA THE BLACK 
PEARL'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES 
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Clark of Summit Counts 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JANET HIGHAM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
350 MAIN STREET ASSOCIATION, 
dba THE BLACK PEARL, a non-
profit corporation, FOUR 
FOURTY NINE dba THE CLUB, 
a non-profit corporation, 
and JEROME PATRICK SCHULTZ, 
an individual, 
Defendants. 
ANSWERS TO DEFENDANT 
350 MAIN STREET ASSOCIATION, 
DBA THE BLACK PEARL'S 
FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES 
C i v i l No. 7676 
The plaintiff's injuries from the accident referred 
to in her complaint were extensive and the records, charges, 
expenses and paperwork the care of them generated and continue 
to generate were equally extensive. Therefore, the plaintiff's 
answers to these interrogatories are based on facts of which 
the plaintiff is currently aware. The answers are subject to 
modification and supplementation as further information is made 
known to the plaintiff and the documents necessary for discovery 
known to the plaintiff and the documents necessary for discovery 
are examined and analized. 
INTERRQ(gATQRY MO, 1, Please state your full name, date of 
birth, and present address. 
ANSWER: Janet M. Higham, June 22, 1932; P.O. Box 1833, 
304 Norfolk, Park City, Utah 84062. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 2, State each and every fact upon which 
you intend to rely to prove the allegations set forth in paragraphs 
16, 17, 18, and 19 of count 2 of your complaint. 
ANSWER: The facts upon which plaintiff relied in making 
the allegations set forth in paragraph 16, 17, 18 and 19 of her 
complaint include but are not limited to the following information: 
a. The statement given to Detective Lloyd D. Evans 
at the time of the accident by John Knox, the passenger in defendant 
Schultz's vehicle. 
b. The statement given to patrolman R.L. Clayton 
the morning following the accident by Ann K. "Chris11 Gorham, 
coatroom attendant at the Black Pearl on the evening of the accident. 
c. The statements given to Patrolman R.L. Clayton 
the morning following the accdient by Stuart T. Brown and James 
Wheble. 
d. the complaint filed by Patrolman R.L. Clayton 
against defendant Schultz. 
e. Statements made by defendant Schultz at the 
time of his prosecution for driving while intoxicated. 
The plaintiff will respond regarding facts on which 
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she intends to rely after further discovery. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3, Set forth exactly what injuries you 
claim you received as a result of this accident, 
ANSWER: The best record of plaintiff's injuries is contained 
in her medical records. The effects of the injuries are continuing 
and the full extent of them is as yet unknown. A summary of 
her injuries includes the following: 
Plaintiff suffered right leg and ankle pain, thorasic 
spine pain and some abdominal pain following the accident. She 
suffered a subtalar dislocation on the right with an open fracture 
of the right patella. She had stellate laceration of the forehead 
and eyelids. She had a widened mediastinum on chest x-rays following 
the accident. She had a compression fracture of T6 and fractures 
of ribs 2-5 on the right. She had an equivocal paritoneal lavage 
with 80f000 red cells upon arrival at the Holy Cross Hospital. 
She suffered a right pneumothorax and developed respiratory embar-
rassment requiring placement of a right sided chest tube. She 
suffered a massive retroperitoneal hemmorage, and laceration 
of the inferior vena cava and portal vein, as well as a crush 
injury to the pancreas with a pelvic hematoma. She also suffered 
a partial laceration of the pancreas. Plaintiff had an open 
fracture dislocation of the right subtalar joint, and an open 
comminuted fracture of the patella and open comminuted fracture 
of the right lateral femoral condyle with complete disruption 
of the patellar mechanisim. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4. Have you been hospitalized as a result 
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of the injuries received in this accident? 
ANSWER: Yesf plaintiff has been hospitalized as a result 
of the injuries received in this accident. Her injuries are 
continuing in nature and further hospitalization may be anticipated. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5. If sor for each period of hospitalization, 
state: 
a. The name and address of the hospital; 
b. The inclusive dates of hospitalization; 
c. The purpose for each hospitalization; 
d. The total charge for each such hospitalization. 
ANSWER: To date, the plaintiff has been treated or examined 
in each of the following hospitals for the injuries alleged in 
her complaint: 1. Holy Cross Hospital, 1045 Past 
1st South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
Dates Q£ Treatment; 
March 2, 1983 through April 3, 1983. The 
plaintiff was treated for multiple trauma as a result of the 
auto accident. The total charge for the hospitalization was 
$32,646.49. 
April 6, 1983, through April 9, 1983. The 
plaintiff was treated for an obstructed pancreatic fistula caused 
by the auto accident. The total charge for the hospitalization 
was $1,457.55. 
April 19, 1983 through April 29, 1983. The 
plaintiff was treated for persistent failure to heal of the pancreatic 
fistula caused by the auto accident. The total charge for the 
hospitalization was $7,861.81. 
May 23, 1983, through May 31, 1983. The 
plaintiff was hospitalized for treatment of post traumatic chondro-
malacia secondary to multiple trauma sustained in the auto accident. 
The total charge for the hospitalization was $2,858.13. 
January 24, 1984, through January 26, 1984. 
The plaintiff underwent surgery on her leg which was required 
because of complications of the injuries she suffered to her 
right leg in the auto accident. The total charge for the hospital-
ization was $984.19. 
2. St. Benedict's Hospital, 5475 South 5th East 
Ogden, Utah. 
Dates of Treatment; 
July 15, and 16, 1983. The plaintiff was 
hospitalized for plastic surgery on scars caused by the avulsion 
injury to her forehead and both upper eyelids which she suffered 
in the auto accident. The total charge for the hospitalization 
was $937.91. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 6. State whether you have been treated 
by any doctors, physical therapists, or anyone practicing the 
healing arts for injuries received in this accident. 
ANSWER; Yes, plaintiff has been and continues to be treated 
by doctors for injuries received in this accident. 
INTERROGATORY NO 7. if so, for each such person, state: 
a. His name, address and specialty; 
b. Each date of examination and treatment; 
c. The type of examination and treatment; 
6. The total charge to date for examination 
and treatment. 
ANSWER: To date, the plaintiff has been treated by the 
following doctors: 
1. Chad Halverson, M.D., Holy Cross Hospital, 
145 East 100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84112; 
Dates of treatment: 
March 3, 1983, exploratory laparotomy. The reason 
for the treatment was that the plaintiff was the victim of multiple 
trauma due to the accident complained of. The total charge for 
treatment was $2,593.00. 
March 7, 1983. Treatment for the subclavian area. 
The reason for the treatment was damage to the area under her 
clavicle which resulted from the auto accident. The total charge 
was $55.00. 
March 8, 1983. Treatment of damage to the internal 
jugular line. The reason for the treatment was damage which 
resulted from the auto accident. The total charge was $55.00. 
March 8, 1983, to April 1, 1983. The treatment 
was hyperalimentation required because of plaintifffs inability 
to ingest sufficient nutrients as a result of the traumas of 
the auto accident. The total charge for which was $625.00. 
March 24, 1983. Dr. Halverson performed reopening 
of lap incision required because of the traumas of the auto accident. 
The total charge was $100.00. 
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March 24, 1983. Exploration of drain site to 
stop hemmorage. The plaintiff was found lying in a pool of blood 
flowing from her lateral Penrose drain which was placed during 
the exploratory laparotomy of March 2, 1983, following the auto 
accident. The total charge for treatment was $243.00. 
April 7, 1983, tube fistulotomy. Plaintiff's 
pancreatic fistula, caused by the trauma of the auto accident, 
was obstructed. The total charge for treatment was $166.00. 
April 21, 1983. Pancreaticojejunostomy by Roux-
en-y. Plaintiff underwent this treatment because of persistent 
failure to heal of her pancreatic fistula caused by the auto 
accident. The total charge was $1,837.00. 
2. Robert A. Place, M.D. (TS-CDS), 1055 East 3900 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84117. 
Dates of Treatment; 
March 3, 1983. Physical examination and consultation 
with Dr. Halverson. The reason for the treatment was because 
of the trauma the plaintiff suffered in the accident. Dr. Place 
did not charge the plaintiff for the treatment. 
3. Peter A. Hashisaki, M.D. (ID) 50 North Medical 
Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah 84132. 
Dates Qf Treatment; 
March 21, 1983. Physical examination and consultation 
for Dr. Halverson. Following the exploratory laparotomy performed 
by Dr. Halverson, the plaintiff developed a fever. Dr. Hashisaki 
examined her to discover the cause of the fever. The total charge 
for examination was $303.00. 
4. Gary R. Zeluff, M.D. (OOS) 1002 East South Temple, 
#303f Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84102. 
Petes <?£ Treatment; 
March 3, 1983. Irrigation and debribement, partial 
patellectomy and open repair of quadracepts mechanism, irrigation 
debribement and reduction with deltoid repair of right subtalar 
joint. The reason for the treatment was the multiple trauma 
with an open fracture dislocation of the right subtalar joint, 
open comminuted fracture of the right patella and open comminuted 
fracture right femural condyle with complete disruption of the 
patellar mechanisim suffered in the auto accident complained 
of. The total charge for treatment was $2,000.00. 
May 23, 1983. Treatment of post traumatic chondro-
malacia secondary to multiple trauma sustained in the auto accident. 
The total charge for treatment was $1,780.00. 
January 1, 1984. Arthroscopy with patella shave 
and lateral retinacular release. The reason for this treatment 
was post traumatic chondromalacia secondary to the multiple trauma 
and patellum quad mechanisim disruption sustained in the auto 
accident. The total charge for treatment was $1,180.00. 
5. Larry K. Patton, M.D., 324 Tenth Avenue, 
#228, Salt Lake City, Utah 84113. 
Date? of Treatment; 
March 3 , 1983. Closure of forehead wound wi th 
l o c a l advancement f laps and fu l l th ickness skin g r a f t s , c losure 
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of the bilateral upper eyelid lacerations, full thickness skin 
grafts to the left upper lid. This treatment was given to the 
plaintiff because of an avulsion injury to the forehead, including 
both upper eye lids, suffered in the auto accident complained 
of. Plaintiff will supplement this response with the amount 
of the total charge for treatment as soon as the record of the 
charge is found. 
6. John E. Keiter, M.D., (PS)f 3905 Harrison Boulevard, 
Ogden, Utah 84403. 
Dates Qt Treatment; 
July 15, 1983, plastic surgery on scars caused 
by the injury to the forehead and both upper eyelids plaintiff 
suffered in the auto accident complained of. The total charge 
of treatment was $1,560.00. 
7. Joseph A Schoenhals, M.D., 1002 East South Temple, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
Dates of Treatment: 
March 3,5,8,9,10,11,14,16,18,19,20,22,23 and 28. 
Dr. Schoenhals is a pulmonary specialist who inserted a chesttube 
in the plaintiff to repair the right pneumothorax and followed 
her with care for pulmonary complaints during her initial hospital-
ization at Holy Cross in March 1983. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8. State whether you or any of your agents 
or authorized representatives have obtained medical reports from 
any of the individuals referred to in the immediately preceding 
interrogatory. 
34 
ANSWER: Neither plaintiff nor her agents or authorized 
representatives has, to date, obtained medical reports from any 
of the individuals referred to in the immediately preceding inter-
rogatory other than a letter from Dr. John E. Keiterf M.D., a 
copy of which is attached as Exhibit #1. Requests for said records 
have been made and upon request from counsel for defendant after 
receipt of the records they will be made available for examination 
and copy. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 9. If so, state as follows: 
a. The name and address oE the person supplying 
the report; 
b. The name and address of the person having 
custody of the report; 
c* The date of the report; 
d* If you will do so without a Request for 
Production, please attach a copy of such report to your Answers 
to these interrogatories. 
ANSWER: See answer to interrogatory no. 8. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10. List each and every other out-of-pocket 
expense not heretofore mentioned that you claim as a result of 
this accident. 
ANSWER: The plaintiff incurred expenses including, but 
not limited to, the costs of transportation to and from hospitals, 
doctors and other imperative appearances during the period in 
which she was incapable of driving; dental expenses for problems 
which arose because of her injuries and because of the special 
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diet on which she was placed during the period when her pancreatic 
fistula was draining her body of three to four thousand calories 
a day; expenses for equipment and supplies she needed to perform 
her physical therapy; the expenses for canes and special shoes 
necessary because of her leg injuries. These expenses continue 
to accrue as the plaintiff continues to suffer the effects of 
the accident. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11. Were any x-rays taken to aid in the 
determination of the extent and nature of your injuries or to 
reveal the progress of your injuries or to reveal the progress 
of your recovery? 
ANSWER: X-rays were taken to aid in the determination 
of the extent and nature of plaintiff's injuries. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12. If sof for each such procedure, state: 
a. The name and address of the person who took 
the x-rays; 
b. The time and place the x-rays were taken; 
c. The parts of your body x-rayed. 
ANSWER: X-rays taken of which plaintiff at present has 
record include: 
a. Valley Radiologists, 1002 East South 
Temple, Suite 102, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
b. X-rays were taken on May 3, 1983, May 
4, 1983, and May 5, 1983. 
c. The parts of the body x-rayed were the 
abdomen, the chest, the femur, the cervical spine, the legs and 
the soft tissue of the neck. 
INTERROGATORY NO 13, Were you disabled as a result of the 
accident? 
ANSWER: Plaintiff was disabled as a result of the accident. 
INTEfiRQQATQRY flQ. 14. If so, state: 
a. A description of the disability; 
b. The percentage of disability, if you have 
received such a rating and if such rating was made, by whom and 
his address; 
c. Whether the disability is temporary or permanent; 
and if temporary, when it is expected to terminate. 
ANSWER: The plaintiff's disabilities are physical, affecting 
her internal organs and her right leg. No rating of her disabilities 
has as yet been made. She was temporarily totally disabled from 
March 3, 1983, to August 22, 1983. She is as yet disabled to 
the extent that she cannot resume her position as Nursing Supervisor 
at McKay Dee Hospital. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 15, Do you claim lost wages or income as 
a result of the injuries you suffered? 
ANSWER: Plaintiff claims lost wages as a result of the 
injuries she suffered. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 16. If so, State: 
a. The names and addresses of all employers and the 
nature of employment since the date of injury; 
b. The rate of pay at each place of employment; 
c. The name and address of your immediate supervisor 
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at each place of employment; 
d. The time lost at each place of employment as a 
result of **he injuries; 
e. The total claimed lost income to date. 
f. If you will do so without a Motion to Produce, 
please attach copies of plaintifffs federal income tax returns 
for the five (5) years immediately preceding the accident. 
ANSWER: 1. a. I.H.C. Hospitals Inc., McKay Dee Hospital 
Center, Ogden, Utah. 
b. $1,198.45 per month 
c. The plaintiff has not been able to return 
to work at the McKay Dee Hospital since the time of the accident. 
d. Nursing supervisor. The plaintiff hp^ 
full responsibility over approximately 1,000 nurses at this hospital. 
The hospital has approximately 360 beds. The responsibility 
included staffing of the entire hospital, including such duties 
as coordinating nursing staff requirements of operating room. etc. 
2. a. Granite School District, 340 East 3545 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
b. $1,630.00 per month 
c. Plaintiff could not work during the 
months of March, April, May, June, July and August of 1983. 
d. The plaintiff is a full-time instructor 
in areas of health occupation and nurses aids. Her duties are 
to instruct students. The plaintiff's Federal income tax returns 
for the five years immediately preceding the accident are attached 
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as Exhibit #2. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 17. Do you claim your future earning capacity 
has been impai red? 
ANSWER: Plaintiff's future earning capacity has been impaired. 
The full extent of the impairment is at present unknown. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 18. If SO, state: 
a. The amount claimed for such future loss; 
b. The basis upon which such computation is made. 
ANSWER: See answer to Interrogatory No. 17. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 19. State whether plaintiff has been hospitalized 
during his lifetime as a result of any injury or illness, other 
than that described in plaintiff's Complaint. 
ANSWER: The plaintiff has been hospitalized during her 
lifetime as a result of injury and illness other than that described 
in her complaint. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 20. If so, in each instance, state: 
a. The name and address of the hospital; 
b. The name and address of the doctors who treated 
plaintiff; 
c. How the injury or illness was incurred; 
d. The nature and extent of the injury or illness; 
e. Any disability which plaintiff sustained as a 
result of said injuries or illness; 
f. Whether a claim or a lawsuit was filed as a result 
thereof; 
g. If a claim was filed, the person or firm against 
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whom the claim was made; 
h. If a lawsuit was filedf where said lawsuit was 
filed, the name and caption of said lawsuitf and the court in 
which it was filed. 
ANSWER: During her lifetime, the plaintiff has been hospital-
ized as a result of injury or illness in the following hospitals: 
1. Magic Valley Memorial Hospital, Twin Falls, 
Idaho, The plaintiff was hospitalized for three months in 1956 
because she had polio. She does not recall the treating physicians. 
She incurred polio from nursing polio victims in Idaho, where 
she had gone upon hearing of a need for nurses. Idaho had received 
an ineffective batch of vaccine that year and consequently many 
Idahoans contracted polio. The illness was abortive in nature, 
and plaintiff recovered. The illness did cause some right intercostal 
narrowing of plaintiff's chest muscles which remained. No claim 
or lawsuit was filed as a result of this occurrence. 
2. Hill Air Force Base Military Hospital. The 
plaintiff was hospitalized in 1962 for gall bladder surgery. 
She does not recall the treating physicians. The plaintiff's 
gall bladder had created gall stones and the gall bladder was 
infected. The plaintiff underwent major surgery with no complications 
and no residual effects. No claim or law suit was filed as a 
result of this surgery. 
3. McKay Dee Hospital, 3939 Harrison Boulevard, 
Ogden, Utah. The plaintiff was hospitalized in 1965 for treatment 
of an ovarian cyst. The doctor who treated her was Thomas M. Feeny, 
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3905 Harrison Boulevard, Ogden, Utah 84403. The medical records 
will reveal what is known of the cause of the ovarian cyst and 
the nature and extent of the problem. The plaintiff did not 
sustain any disability as a result of it and no claim or law 
suit was filed. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 21, State whether or not plaintiff has ever 
filed a claim for medical expenses or compensation as a result 
of an industrial injury. 
ANSWER: Plaintiff has not filed a claim for medical expenses 
or compensation as a result of an industrial injury. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 22. If sof for each instancef state: 
a. the name and address of the employer; 
b. when said injuries were incurred; 
c. the names and addresses of the doctors who treated 
the plaintiff; 
d. the nature and extent of the injuries. 
ANSWER: See answer to interrogatory No. 21. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 23. Please state whether plaintiff was suffering 
from any illness or physical disability immediately prior to 
the accident described in plaintiff's Complaint. 
ANSWER: Plaintiff was not suffering from any illness or 
physical disability immediately prior to the accident described 
in her Complaint. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 24. If so, state the nature and type of 
each illness or disability. 
ANSWER: See answer to interrogatory no. 23. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 25. State whether plaintiff has suffered 
any injuries, or incurred any illness after the accident referred 
to in plaintiff's complaint. 
ANSWER: Plaintiff has not suffered any injuries or incurred 
any illness after the accident. Some of the injuries she suffered 
in the accident have recurrent effects. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 26. If so, for each illness or injury, state: 
a. the date it occurred; 
b. where and how it occurred; 
c. the nature and extent of the injury or illness; 
d. the name and address of the doctors and physicians 
who have treated the plaintiff; 
e. whether any lawsuit was brought against any person 
by reason of the illness or injury, and if so, the name of the 
court wherein the lawsuit was brought, the name of the parties, 
and the name of the case, and whether said lawsuit was tried 
or settled. 
ANSWER: See answer to interrogatory No. 25. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 27. Was any personal property damaged as 
a result of the accident herein? 
ANSWER: The plaintiff's 1981 Buick Skylark two door automobile 
was damaged as a result of the accident. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 28. If so, state as follows: 
a. Itemize each piece of property damaged and the 
damage to that property. 
b. The name and address of all individuals having 
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made estimates or repairs; 
c. Whether each piece of property has been repaired, 
and if sof the actual amount expended for the repairs; 
d. If you will do so without a Request for Production, 
please attach a copy of each and all repair invoices or estimates 
of repair to your Answers to these interrogatories. 
ANSWER: a. The 1981 Buick Skylark was damaged beyond 
repair. 
b. No estimates or repairs were made on the 1981 
Buick Skylark, other than the estimated cost of repair made by 
the reporting officer at the scene of the accident, which was 
$5,000.00. 
c. The 1981 Buick Skylark has not been repaired. 
d. See answer "c;: above. 
INTERROGATORY NO 29. State the name and address of each person 
known to the plaintiff or plaintiff's representatives who knows 
anything concerning the facts of the incident described in plaintiff's 
Complaint. 
ANSWERt Persons known to plaintiff at present to know 
facts regarding the accident include the paramedics at the scene 
of the accident, the doctors and nurses who treated her, the 
personnel of the life-flight helicopter in which she was flown 
to Holy Cross's emergency room and the following: 
Lise Kelley, 143 Stonewall, Memphis, Tennissee, 38104, 
phone 901-274-2916. 
Patrolman R. L. Clayton, 1825 Paunsdale Drive, Sandy, 
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Utah. 
Detective Lloyd D. Evans, Park City Police Department, 
Park City, Utah. 
Patrolman L.G. Witt, Park City Police Department, Park 
City, Utah. 
Robert Kelley, 143 Stonewall, Memphis, Tennissee, 38104, 
phone 901-274-2916. 
Martin J. Wiesheier, 2661 North Dayton, Chicago, Illinois, 
60614, phone 312-248-5152. 
Woodie, a guitarist with the Ace Pancakes, a band based 
in Denver. 
John Knox, 3750 Summit, Casper, Wyoming, phone 307-235-6017. 
Mike McCauley, 3650 Jasmine, West Valley City, Utah, 
phone 801-966-6385. 
H.H. Tony Cate, 300 Norfolk Avenue, Park City, Utah, 
649-6253. 
James Wheble, 918 Woodside, Park City, Utah 
Kristen Gorham, 60 Rossi Hill, Park City, Utah 
Stuart Brown, 917 Empire, Park City, Utah. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 30, Please state whether any photographs 
or diagrams were made of the accident or the accident scene or 
anything involved in the accident. 
ANSWER; Detective Lloyd D. Evans, Park City Police Department, 
photographed the accident scene. Detective Evans has custody 
of the photographs. They depict the vehicles involved in the 
accident after it occurred and the roadway on which the accident 
(n so 
occurred. Patrolman R.L. Clayton, 1825 Faunsdale Drive, Sandy, 
Utah, made a diagram of what happened at the time of the accident 
as part of his Investigating Officer's Report of Traffic Accident. 
A copy of the diagram is attached hereto as Exhibit #3. Copies 
of the photographs are being made by Detective Evans and will 
be provided to defendant when they are placed in plaintiff's 
possession. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 31, If so, for each photograph or diagram, 
state: 
a. The name and address of the persons having taken 
the photograph or made the diagram; 
b. The name and address of the person having custody 
of such photographs or diagram; 
c. What each photograph or diagram depicts; 
d. If you will do so without a Motion to Produce, 
please attach copies of each such photos or diagrams to your 
Answers to these photos or diagrams to your Answers to these 
interrogatories. 
ANSWER: See answer to interrogatory no. 30. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 32. Has plaintiff or any of plaintiff's 
representatives hired any experts to determine the cause of the 
accident or to reconstruct the accident? 
ANSWER: Neither plaintiff nor any of her representatives 
has hired any experts to determine the cause of the accident 
or to reconstruct the accident as of this time but anticipate 
that the need may arise as a result of discovery which is continuing 
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and not yet completed. Counsel for the various defendants will 
be advised in a timely fashion should a determination that an 
expert will be used at trial be made. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 33. If so, state the name and address of 
each expert, his specialty, and whether written reports have 
been made to plaintiff or plaintiff's representatives concerning 
the experts findings or conclusions. 
ANSWER: See answer to interrogatory no. 32. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 34. With respect to any insurance benefits 
paid to the plaintiff pursuant to the provisions of the Utah 
No-Fault Act, set forth the following: 
a. The name or names of the insurance carrier making 
payments. 
b. The amount of payment made, in total, and 
c. The specific amount of payments made for: 
1. medical expenses, 
2. lost wages, 
3. loss of essential services, 
4. any other category of payment. 
d. Whether or not the plaintiff intends to place 
into evidence at the time of trial, expenses incurred by the 
plaintiff but paid by an insurance carrier under the Utah No-Fault 
Act. 
ANSWER: The plaintiff objects to this Interrogatory. 
Insurance benefits are not relevant to the subject matter involved 
in this action and questions regarding them do not seek information 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissable 
evidence. However, without waiving the above objection, the 
name of the insurance carrier making payments to the plaintiff 
pursuant to the provisions of the Utah No-Fault Act is Progressive 
Insurance. Plaintiff in unaware of exact amounts paid for medical 
benefits, if any, but was paid approximately $7,800 for lost 
wages (calculated at $150.00 a week for one year), and between 
$952.00 and $1,600.00 for loss of household services (calculated 
at $119.00 to $200.00 per month for eight months). The plaintiff 
will place in evidence all legally admissible evidence that will 
fairly demonstrate her special and general damages. 
DATED THIS ML Day of April, 1984. 
P HICHAM / J^NET" 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE MEv^THIS ofyffi Day of April, 1984. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: Salt Lake City, Utah 
UilJ 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy.of the 
foregoing ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES was sent this dWnday of 
April, 1984, to the following: 
Joseph E. Tesch 
TESCH & HDFNAEGEL 
30 North Main Street, Suite #2 
Heber City, Utah 84032 
Robert Felton 
SPECIALE & FELTON 
Suite 220 Coordinated Financial Center 
324 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2303 
Dale Lambert 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorney for 449, dba The Club 
900 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Gary B. Ferguson 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorney for Black Pearl 
CSB Tower, Suite #700 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
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State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Insurance Exchange 
450 P.2d 458 (Utah 1969) 
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fraudulent concealment of the facts by the 
defendant. That part of the decree is or-
dered stricken and otherwise the decision 
of the court below is affirmed. No costs 
awarded. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and CALLISTER 
and HENRIOD, JJ., concur. 
ELLETT, J., concurs in the result. 
22 Utah 2d 183 
STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, De-
fendant, Third-Party Plain-
tiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Carl R. SESSIONS, Third-Party Defendant. 
No. 11350. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 11, 1969. 
Action by injured party's insurer, as 
subrogee, against another insurer on in-
jured party's medical payments claim 
against tort-feasor. Other insurer brought 
in another party as third-party defendant. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake Coun-
ty, Bryant H. Croft, J., entered summary 
judgment determining that subrogation pro-
vision of policy was valid, and other in-
surer appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Henriod, J., held that subrogation provi-
sion was not against public policy but was 
valid and enforceable, and that evidence 
established that timely notice of subroga-
tion rights had been given. 
Affirmed. 
I. 19 A.L.R.3d 1055 (1968); Wilson v. 
Tenn. Farmers Mut. (Tenn.1966), 411 
S.W.2d 699; Tenn. Farmers Mut. Insur-
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1. Subrogation <&=>\ 
Subrogation springs from equity con-
cluding that one who has been reimbursed 
for a specific loss should not be entitled 
to a second reimbursement. 
2. Assignments <§=>24(2) 
Insurance <§=>606(l.l, 4) 
Subrogation is permitted in insurance 
field with respect to property damage and 
to medical costs, but a claim or cause of 
action for personal injuries arising out of 
tort is not assignable. 
3. Insurance <§=607 
Policy provision for subrogation 
against tort-feasor as to insured's claim for 
medical payments was not against public 
policy but was valid and enforceable. 
4. Insurance <§=>607.l(7) 
Evidence in action on claim against 
tort-feasor by injured party's insurer as 
subrogee of medical payments claim estab-
lished that timely notice of subrogation 
rights had been given to protect insurer's 
subrogation claim. 
W, Brent Wilcox of Hanson & Gar-
rett, Salt Lake City, for appellant. 
L. L. Summerhays of Strong & Hanni, 
Salt Lake City, for respondent. 
HENRIOD, Justice. 
Appeal from a summary judgment hold-
ing that a provision in an insurance policy 
for the subrogation of the insured's claim 
for medical payments against a tortfeasor 
is valid and not against public policy. Af-
firmed with costs to respondent. 
[1-4] Subrogation springs from equity 
concluding that one having been reim-
bursed for a specific loss should not be en-
titled to a second reimbursement therefor. 
This principle has been accepted in the 
insurance field with respect to property 
damage, and with respect to medical costs 
by an impressive weight of authority.1 On 
ance Co. v. Rader (Tenn.1966), 410 S.W. 
2d 171; Anderson v. Allstate Ins. Co. 
(19G6), 266 N.C. 309, 145 S.E.2d 845; 
STATE FARM MUT. INS. CO. v. FA 
Cite as 4 
the other hand it is generally conceded that 
a claim or cause of action for personal in-
juries arising out of tort is not assign-
able.2 Arguments are persuasive for and 
against any such distinction. Nonetheless, 
we presently are constrained to affirm the 
universal rule of non-assignability of per-
sonal injury' claims, but also the majority 
rule as to subrogation provisions contained 
in insurance policies with respect to medi-
cal expenses in cases such as that here. 
We have been requested to determine but 
two points: 1) Whether the policy provi-
sion is valid and enforceable, and we say it 
is, and 2) Whether timely notice of subro-
gation rights was given here in order to 
protect plaintiff's subrogation claim. The 
trial court said adequate notice was given 
and the record supports such conclusion, 
which we affirm. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and ELLETT, J., 
concur. 
CALLISTER, Justice (concurring): 
I concur with the conclusion of the ma-
jority opinion that the subrogation provi-
sion in the insurance policy is valid and 
enforceable. However, the reasons which 
support the conclusion merit discussion. 
The decisions from other jurisdictions 
which have considered the issue of the va-
lidity of a subrogation clause under medical 
payments coverage have been far from uni-
form both in reasoning and result. An ex-
cellent review of these diverse opinions 
may be found in Higgins v. Allied Ameri-
can Mutual Fire Ins. Co.1 
The cases which have invalidated the 
subrogation clause have been premised on 
:,uch. Med Serv. v. Sharpe (1954), 339 
Mich. 574, 64 N.W.2d 713; Nat. Un. Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Grimes (1967), 278 Minn. 45, 
153 N."\V.2d 152. 
2. 40 A.L.R.2d 502, I I (1955). 
1. (D.C.C.A., 1968), 237 A.2d 471. 
2. Peller v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 
220 Cal.App.2d 610, 34 Cal.Rptr. 41 
(1963); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. 
Chumbley (Mo.App.), 394 S.W.2d 418, 
19 A.L.R.3d 1043 (1965). 
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the ground that the clause in effect at-
tempted to assign a claim for personal in-
jury, and under the law of the jurisdiction 
such an assignment was invalid.2 One line 
of cases, which is supported by better rea-
soning, rejects this concept and holds that 
the subrogation clause does not constitute 
an assignment of a claim for personal in-
jury.3 The distinction between an assign-
ment and subrogation is described in 6 C. 
J.S. Assignments § 2 b(12), as follows: 
* * * subrogation presupposes an 
actual payment and satisfaction of the 
debtor claim to which the party is subro-
gated, although the remedy is kept alive 
in equity for the benefit of the one who 
made the payment under circumstances 
entitling him to contribution or indem-
nity, while assignment necessarily con-
templates the continued existence of the 
debt or claim assigned. Subrogation op-
erates only to secure contribution and 
indemnity, whereas an assignment trans-
fers the whole claim.4 
Another aspect which fortifies the validi-
ty of the subrogation clause is that the pro-
, r , cion for medical payments is in the na-
ture of an indemnity contract, i. e., it in-
demnifies the insured for medical expenses 
resulting from the accident, and the amount 
paid under the contract depends on the 
amount spent by the insured for the prop-
er care of his injuries.5 Subrogation is a 
normal incident of indemnity insurance. 
(16 Couch on Insurance 2d, § 61:8, pp. 
241-242.) 
Finally, there appears to be a valid dis-
tinction in the language of the subrogation 
clause in the instant case and that found in 
the cases where the courts have held it to 
3. See the cases cited in footnote 3 of Hig-
gins v. Allied American Mutual Fire Ins 
Co., note 1, supra; e. g. Damhesel v 
Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 
60 Ill.App.2d 279, 209 N.E.2d 876 (1965). 
4. Also see 16 Conch on Insurance 2d, § 
61:92, pp. 289-290; Kimball & Davis, 
The Extension of Insurance Subrogation, 
60 Mich.L.Rev. 841, 866-867. 
5. Damhesel v. Hardware Dealers Mutual 
Fire Ins. Co., note 3, supra. 
5 1 
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be an assignment of a cause of action for 
personal injury.6 In those cases, the insur-
ance company was subrogated to all the in-
sured's rights of recovery therefor, which 
the insured may have against any person, 
and the insured shall execute instruments 
and papers and do whatever else is neces-
sary to secure such rights. In the instant 
action, the trial court found that the sub-
rogation provision provided that upon pay-
ment of medical bills on behalf of the in-
sured, the company should be subrogated 
to the extent of such payments to the pro-
ceeds of any settlement or judgment that 
might result from the exercise of any rights 
of recovery which the injured person or 
anyone receiving such payment may have 
against any person or organisation and that 
such person should execute and deliver in-
struments and papers and do whatever else 
is necessary to secure such rights. Such 
person should do nothing after loss to prej-
udice such rights. 
In Peller v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. 
Co.7 the court rejected the argument that 
the right to subrogation was distinguish-
able from an assignment. The court ob-
served that the distinction was purely ver-
bal in that the legal effect of the policy 
provisions was the same regardless of what 
term was attached to the procedure, since 
the result was to transfer the insured's 
cause of action against a third party tort-
feasor to the insurer. In the instant case, 
even if the subrogation provision were in-
terpreted as an assignment (which this 
opinion rejects), it assigns solely the pro-
ceeds that may possibly be recovered in an 
action for personal injuries brought against 
the tortfeasor. This court has previously 
held that a court of equity will erforce 
such an assignment even though the cause 
of action was not assignable.8 
* * * Subrogation is an equitable 
device to compel the ultimate discharge 
of a debt or obligation by the one who 
6. See cases in note 2, supra. 
7. Note 2, supra. 
8. In re Behm's Estate, 117 Utah 151, 162, 
213 P.2d 657 (1950). 
in good conscience ought to pay or dis-
charge it.9 
The judgment of the trial court should 
be affirmed. 
TUCKETT, J., concurs in the concurring 
opinion of CALLISTER, J. 
O \ KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
22 Utah 2d 187 
Edward Wilson AMMERMAN, by his Guard-
ian Ad Litem, LaVerne Bruce Ammerman, 
and Eddie Soliz, Plaintiffs and Appellant, 
v. 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 11068. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 10, 1969. 
Action against insurer to recover 
amount by which judgment against in-
sured exceeded policy limits. Upon re-
mand 19 Utah 2d 261, 430 P.2d 576, the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Stewart M. Hanson, J., granted insurer's 
motion to dismiss and insured appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Callister, J., held that 
insured need not pay amount of judgment 
exceeding policy limits as condition prece-
dent to action against insurer for failure 
to settle claim within policy limits. 
Reversed and remanded. 
I. Attorney and Client <§=^ 21 
Attorneys who had represented judg-
ment creditor could represent judgment 
debtor in action against judgment debtor's 
insurer. 
9. National Farmers Union Property & Cas. 
Co. v. Farmers Insurance Group, 14 Utah 
2d 89, 92, 377 P.2d 786, 788 (1963). 
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SHEPHERD v. STATE FARM MUT. AUTO. INS. CO. 75 
Cite as 607 F.Supp.75 (D.OMU*. 1985) 
Jerome B. Steen & William C. Griffin, 
Linda SHEPHERD, Plaintiff, Steen, Reynolds, Dalehite & Currie, Jack-
son, Miss., for defendant. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant 
Civ. A. No. J84-052(KL). 
United States District Court, 
S.D. Mississippi, 
Jackson Division. 
Feb. 19, 1985. 
Insured brought action against insurer 
seeking to recover under uninsured motor-
ist provisions of policy. Both parties 
moved for summary judgment The Dis-
trict Court, Tom S. Lee, J., held that: (1) 
by executing covenant not to sue, insured 
abrogated insurer's subrogation rights, and 
(2) by executing covenant not to sue in 
violation of uninsured motorist provisions 
of policy, insured foreclosed her right to 
recover from insurer. 
Defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment granted. 
1. Insurance <s=»606(10) 
Insurer's ability to recover from driver 
of automobile involved in accident with in-
sured or to recover from driver's insurer 
was dependent entirely upon insured's 
right; thus, by foreclosing her own right to 
sue by signing covenant not to sue, insured 
abrogated insurer's rights. 
2. Insurance <£= 603.1 
Where agreement not to sue executed 
by insured constituted "settlement" in vio-
lation of uninsured motorist provisions of 
liability policy, whether agreement was 
characterized as release or covenant not to 
sue, insured could not recover from insurer 
under uninsured motorist provisions of poli-
cy. 
Joseph E. Roberts, Cothren, & Pittman, 
Jackson, Miss., for plaintiff. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
TOM S. LEE, District Judge. 
This cause is before the court on the 
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the 
defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company (State Farm). After 
consideration of the memoranda with at; 
tachments submitted by the parties, this 
court is of the opinion that the defendant's 
motion is well taken and should be granted. 
The plaintiff, Linda Shepherd, was in-
jured when the vehicle which she was driv-
ing was struck from the rear by a car 
operated by Mohammad Esmail Amini. 
She allegedly sustained severe injuries to 
the head, neck, cervical spine and shoulders 
and required treatment by an orthopedic 
surgeon for several months. The automo-
bile driven by Amini was insured by Stone-
wall Insurance Company (Stonewall). Lin-
da Shepherd was the named insured of an 
insurance policy issued by State Farm with 
a policy limit of $10,000 and her mother, 
Juanita Atkins, also held a policy issued by 
State Farm with a policy limit of $25,000. 
After the accident, Stonewall paid Shep-
herd $10,000.00 on behalf of Amini and, in 
return, Shepherd executed a covenant not 
to sue by which she agreed not to sue or 
"make any claim against Mohammad Es-
mail Amini, Stonewall Insurance Company, 
or Dixie Insurance Company " The 
agreement further provided that "the exe-
cution of this Covenant Not to Sue . . . does 
not in any way prejudice the rights of the 
undersigned to assert or make a claim 
against the undersigned's automobile liabil-
ity insurance carrier, State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company ". 
Shepherd alleges that her damages ex-
ceed the $10,000.00 paid to her by Amini's 
insurer and that she is entitled to recover 
from State Farm pursuant to the provisions 
of policies issued to her and her mother and 
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the Mississippi uninsured motorist stat-
utes.1 
State Farm asserts that it is entitled to 
summary judgment because Shepherd's ex-
ecution of the covenant not to sue without 
the consent of State Farm was in violation 
of the uninsured motorist provisions of the 
policy which state in part: 
This insurance does not apply: (a) to 
bodily injury to an insured . . . with re-
spect to which such insured . . . shall, 
without written consent of the company, 
make any settlement with any person or 
organization who may be legally liable 
therefor 
The covenant not to sue, according to State 
Farm, furthermore abrogated its subroga-
tion rights against Amini.2 
In United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Company v. Hillman, 367 So.2d 914 (Miss. 
1979), Hillman, the insured, had sustained 
injuries when a truck, driven by an unin-
sured motorist, collided with Hillman's 
automobile. Without the knowledge of 
U.S.F. & G., Hillman executed a release of 
the uninsured motorist The U.S.F. & G. 
policy stated that the uninsured motorist 
coverage did not apply "to bodily injury to 
an Insured with respect to which such in-
sured . . . shall, without written consent of 
[U.S.F. & G.], make any settlement with 
any person or organization who may be 
legally liable therefor". The court held 
that, since Hillman had violated an unam-
biguous provision of the policy and had, in 
releasing the uninsured motorist, foreclos-
1. Section 83-11-103, MissXode Ann., defines an 
uninsured motor vehicle as, inter alia, "An in-
sured motor vehicle, when the liability insurer 
of such vehicle has provided limits of bodily 
injury liability for its insured which are less 
than the limits applicable to the injured person 
provided under his uninsured motorist cover-
age." Although the automobile driven by Amini 
was covered by an insurance policy, it is an 
uninsured motor vehicle for purposes of the 
statutes because Shepherd alleges her damages 
exceeded the amount of coverage. 
2. MissXode Ann. § 83-11-107 (1972) provides 
in part: 
An insurer paying a claim under the endorse-
ment or provisions required by section 83-11-
101 shall be subrogated to the rights of the 
insured to whom such claim was paid against 
ed U.S.F. & G.'s subrogation rights guaran-
teed by Mississippi's uninsured motorist 
statutes, recovery from U.S.F. & G. must 
be denied. Id. at 922. 
[1,2] The plaintiff has attempted to dis-
tinguish the release in Hillman from the 
covenant not to sue executed by her. 
Shepherd contends that the covenant not to 
sue is personal to her and not prejudicial to 
the subrogation rights of the defendant. 
Subrogation, however, "is the substitution 
of one person in place of another . . . so 
that he who is substituted succeeds to the 
rights of the other in relation to the debt or 
claim, and to its rights, remedies or securi-
ties". Indiana Lumberman *s Mutual In-
surance Co. v. Curtis Mathes Mfg. Co., 
456 So.2d 750, 754 (Miss.1984) (quoting 
Lyon v. Colonial United States Mortgage 
Co., 129 Miss. 54, 91 So. 708 (1922)). State 
Farm's ability to recover from Aminn or his 
insurer is dependent entirely on Shepherd's 
rights. By foreclosing her own right to 
sue, Shepherd has also abrogated State 
Farm's rights. Furthermore, since the cov-
enant not to sue executed by Shepherd 
constitutes a "settlement" in violation of 
the policy, the court finds that the legal 
distinctions between a release and covenant 
not to sue are immaterial., 
For the reasons stated herein, it is the 
court's opinion that the defendant's motion 
for summary judgment should be granted. 
A separate judgment shall be submitted in 
accordance with the local rules. 
the person causing such injury, death, or dam-
age to the extent that payment was made, 
including the proceeds recoverable from the 
assets of the involvent insurer. 
3. In Dancy v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co., 324 F.Supp. 964 (S.D.Ala.1971), 
the insured executed a covenant not to sue in 
favor of a man against whom he had a tort 
claim, as well as the man's insurance company, 
and then sought recovery under the uninsured 
motorist provision of his policy with State 
Farm. The court, in granting summary judg-
ment for the insurer, found that the covenant 
not to sue, like a release, breached the policy 
provision prohibiting settlement without the in-
surer's consent and interfered with the insurer's 
subrogation rights. Id. at 965. 
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1017, 1020, involved a claim of improper 
examination of witnesses in a probation 
revocation hearing. The trial judge exam-
ined three female witnesses about their em-
ployment, education, drinking, drug use 
habits, receipt of public aid and association 
with various types of men. In addition the 
trial judge characterized some of the de-
fendant's witnesses as "hippie-dippies." 
The conduct of the judge in BuIIard is strik-
ingly different from that of the trial judge 
here. There is a total absence of any 
branding characterization of the defendant 
in this case or any concern with the life 
style and association of the defendant as 
remote from the offense charged as the 
inquiry into the life styles and associations 
of the three witnesses was in BuIIard. 
For the reasons stated above, the convic-
tion of defendant of attempt murder is 
affirmed. 
The defendant raises an additional issue 
regarding his sentencing. On two separate 
occasions during these proceedings, the trial 
judge observed that the minimum term of 
imprisonment for attempt murder was 4 
years. At the time of sentencing, Illinois 
appellate courts had ruled inconsistently on 
whether the term for attempt murder was a 
4-year minimum term. (See People v. Ma-
cRae (1977), 47 Ill.App.3d 302, 314, 5 Ill.Dec. 
362, 370, 361 N.E.2d 685, 693.) But, shortly 
after the imposition of sentence in this case, 
the supreme court ruled that the Illinois 
statutes do not specify a minimum term for 
attempt murder. 
[4] In view of the trial judge's mistaken 
belief that a minimum sentence of 4 years 
was required as a matter of law, this mat-
ter must be remanded for a new sentencing 
proceeding. In reaching this conclusion we 
have considered People v. Eddington (1979), 
77 IU.2d 41, 48, 31 Ill.Dec. 808, 811-812, 394 
N.E.2d 1185, 1188-89, but we believe that 
what took place when the defendant was 
sentenced was more comparable to what 
happened in People v. Moore (1978), 69 
I11.2d 520, 524, 14 Ill.Dec. 470, 472, 372 
N.E.2d 666, 668. There is nothing in the 
record to indicate that had the trial judge 
not held a mistaken belief about the mini-
mum length of the sentence the defendant 
still would have received the same sentence. 
Clearly there is no indication by the trial 
judge, as there was in Eddington, that he 
did not consider the matter before him a 
"minimal kind of situation." Eddington, 77 
I11.2d at 48, 31 Ill.Dec. at 812, 394 N.E.2d at 
1189. 
The conviction of the defendant for at-
tempt murder is affirmed, but the sentence 
imposed upon the defendant is vacated and 
this matter is remanded for a new sentenc-
ing proceeding. 
McNAMARA and RIZZI, JJ., concur. 
83 Ill.App.3d 590 
39 Ill.Dec. 150 
Jeffrey ACKERMANN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND CASU-
ALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 79-632. 
Appellate Court of Illinois, 
First District, Third Division. 
April 23, 1980. 
Insurer appealed from declaratory 
judgment rendered in the Circuit Court, 
Cook County, Arthur L. Dunne, J., holding 
that its subrogation rights under an unin-
sured motorist clause extended only to pro-
ceeds due from the uninsured motorist. 
The Appellate Court, McGillicuddy, P. J„ 
held that the insurer was entitled to be 
subrogated, to the extent of payment made 
under the uninsured motorist coverage, to 
any proceeds received by the insured from 
either the uninsured motorist or any other 
tort-feasor. 
Reversed and remanded. 
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Insurer was entitled to be subrogated, 
to extent of payment made under uninsured 
motorist coverage, to any proceeds received 
by insured from either uninsured motorist 
or any other tort-feasor. S.H.A. ch. 73, 
§ 755a. 
McKenna, Storer, Rowe, White & Farrug, 
Robert Soderstrom and Richard Clark, Chi-
cago, for defendant-appellant. 
Schwartzberg, Barnett & Cohen, Heller & 
Morris, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee. 
McGILLICUDDY, Presiding Justice: 
On October 2, 1976, the plaintiff, Jeffrey 
Ackermann, was a passenger in an automo-
bile operated by Paul Short which collided 
with a vehicle driven by William Wallete. 
At the time of the collision, Wallete was 
insured by Allstate Insurance Company 
(Allstate) under an automobile casualty in-
surance policy which provided for public 
liability coverage in the amount of $25,000. 
Short and the vehicle he was operating 
were uninsured. The plaintiff was insured 
by the defendant, Prudential Property and 
Casualty Insurance Company (Prudential), 
and his policy included coverage for person-
al injuries resulting from a collision involv-
ing an uninsured vehicle. 
The plaintiff pursued his claim for dam-
ages against Wallete and sought uninsured 
motorist benefits from Prudential. Subse-
quently, Allstate offered the plaintiff $20,-
000 in settlement of his claim against Wal-
lete. Prudential asserted its right to subro-
gation against the settlement offer in ac-
cordance with the terms of its policy which 
provided in pertinent part that: 
"Trust Agreement. In the event of pay-
ment to any person under this Part: (a) 
the company shall be entitled to the ex-
tent of such payment to the proceeds of 
any settlement or judgment that may 
result from the exercise of any rights of 
recovery of such person against any per-
son or organization legally responsible for 
the bodily injury because of which such 
payment is made; (b) such person shall 
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hold in trust for the benefit of the compa-
ny all rights of recovery which he shall 
have against such other person or organi-
zation because of the damages which are 
the subject of claim made under this 
Part; 
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a complaint 
for declaratory judgment which requested 
that the court declare that he was entitled 
to recovery under the uninsured motorist 
provisions of his policy and that Prudential 
was entitled to subrogation rights only as to 
any assets of the uninsured motorists but 
not as to any assets of any other insured 
co-tort feasor. In response, Prudential filed 
a motion to strike the complaint and dismiss 
the cause of action, asserting that the plain-
tiff was not entitled to the relief sought as 
a matter of law. After hearing argument 
concerning the motion the trial court en-
tered an order declaring that, 
"[AJssuming but not deciding that Plain-
tiff is an insured under Coverage J—Un-
insured Motorist of the insurance policy 
referred to in the Complaint and is other-
wise entitled to make a claim under said 
coverage, the rights of the Defendant 
under the paragraph of said coverage en-
titled Trust Agreement', are 
limited to the pursuit of rights against 
and to the pursuit of the assets of the 
allegedly uninsured motorist Paul Short 
only and may not be pursued against 
William Wallete, Allstate Insurance Com-
pany as Wallete's insurer, or against any 
other person or organization not defined 
in said policy as an uninsured motorist." 
It is from this order that Prudential ap-
peals. 
Prudential contends that the trial court 
erred in failing to grant its motion to strike 
and dismiss. It asserts that the language 
of the trust agreement provision in the 
policy clearly provides that Prudential is 
entitled to reimbursement from the pro-
ceeds received by the plaintiff from "any 
person or organization legally responsible 
for the bodily injury." It contends that 
there is no distinction in this provision be-
tween proceeds received from an insured 
tortfeasor or an uninsured tortfeasor. 
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Moreover, Prudential contends that the 
wording of the trust agreement closely par-
allels the language of section 143(a) of the 
Illinois Insurance Code concerning unin-
sured motorist insurance. This section 
states: 
"In the event of payment to any person 
under the coverage required by this Sec-
tion and subject to the terms and condi-
tions of such coverage, the insurer mak-
ing such payment shall, to the extent 
thereof, be entitled to the proceeds of any 
settlement of judgment resulting from 
the exercise of any rights of recovery of 
such person against any person or organi-
zation legally responsible for the bodily 
injury or death for which such payment is 
made, including the proceeds recoverable 
from the assets of the insolvent insurer. 
" IH.Rev.SUt., 1975, ch. 73, par. 
755a(3). 
This issue was decided by the Supreme 
Court in Glidden v. Farmers Automobile 
Insurance Association (1974), 57 I11.2d 330, 
312 N.E.2d 247. In that case Glidden's 
wife, a pedestrian, was struck and killed by 
an uninsured motorist. In addition to his 
uninsured motorist claim against the de-
fendant insurance company, Glidden filed 
suit against a dram shop defendant. The 
Supreme Court specifically held that the 
insurer was entitled to be subrogated, to 
the extent of payment made under the un-
insured motorist coverage, to any proceeds 
received by the plaintiff from both the un-
insured motorist and the dram shop defend-
ant. 
The plaintiff argues that the recent deci-
sion of Wilhelm v. Universal Underwriters 
Insurance Co. (1978), 60 Ill.App.3d 894, 17 
Ill.Dec. 872, 377 N.E.2d 62, supports the 
trial court's order. In Wilhelm an insur-
ance policy contained a provision purporting 
1. The Code required every automobile liability 
policy to contain uninsured motorist coverage 
in an amount not less that the limits set forth in 
the Financial Responsibility Act 111 Rev Stat., 
1975, ch. 73, par 755a(l) 
2. Although the Wilhelm court invalidated the 
setoff clause, it also noted that the Insurance 
Code provides "that the insurer having paid the 
claim, is entitled to recover, to the extent of 
to allow the insurer to set off from its 
liability under an uninsured motorist clause 
any amounts received from any person 
jointly liable for an accident. The court 
held that this provision was invalid to the 
extent it would reduce the uninsured mo-
torist coverage to an amount lower that 
that required by the Insurance Code.1 The 
court noted that the purpose of the cover-
age requirement is to place the policyholder 
in substantially the same position he would 
occupy if the uninsured driver possessed the 
required minimum liability insurance. 
The plaintiff argues that the effect of the 
subrogation clause in Prudential's policy is 
identical to the effect of the setoff clause 
invalidated in Wilhelm.2 He contents that 
his damages are in excess of the $20,000 
offered by Allstate. The plaintiff asserts 
that if Prudential is entitled to subrogation 
rights against the Allstate settlement, he 
will be in a worse position than if Short had 
been insured. If Short had complied with 
the Financial Responsibility Act (111.Rev. 
Stat., 1975, ch. %Vz, par. 7 203) the plaintiff 
would have been compensated by at least 
$10,000 from Short's insurer3 and $20,000 
from Allstate. If Prudential is entitled to 
subrogation rights against the Allstate set-
tlement, the plaintiff will recover only $20,-
000. 
The plaintiff cites Capps v. Klebs (Ind. 
App.1978) 382 N.E.2d 947, in which the 
court found such a result unfair. The court 
stated. 
' i f Trinity's [the insurer] interpreta-
tion of the subrogation provision were 
adopted in this case, Trinity would, in 
effect be allowed to avoid its statutory 
obligation to provide a minimum of $30,-
000 to compensate its insured for losses 
caused by the uninsured motorist, al-
though the policyholder remains uncom-
such payment, out of the proceeds of any set-
tlement or judgment against any person legally 
responsible for the injury " 60 111 App.3d at 
899-900, 17 111 Dec. at 876, 377 N E 2d at 66 
3. Public Act 81-1202 has increased the mini-
mum amount of insurance required to $15,000, 
effective March 1, 1980 
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pensated for such losses. The statute 
was designed to diminish this type of 
uncompensated loss up to the limits of 
the required policy provision. Pro tanto 
subrogation would effectively nullify the 
coverage ostensibly provided by the poli-
cy. The Capps would be in a worse posi-
tion than they would have been in had 
Klebs been insured. . . . To allow 
subrogation when the Capps have not 
been fully compensated places them in 
the same position as if Klebs was unin-
sured and there was no uninsured motor-
ist statute in effect. Under such circum-
stances there would be no advantage to 
paying premiums for uninsured motorist 
protection in such joint tortfeasor situa-
tions. We cannot ascribe such an intent 
to the legislature. The only purpose of 
the subrogation provision that is consist-
ent with the statutory framework of min-
imum coverages required by law is to 
prevent double recovery." 
See also Security National Insurance Com-
pany v. Hand (1973), 31 Cal.App.3d 227, 107 
Cal.Rptr. 439; Milbank Mutual Insurance 
Co. v. Kluver (1974), 302 Minn. 310, 225 
N.W.2d 230; Craig v. Iowa Kemper Mutual 
Insurance Co. (Mo.App.1978) 565 S.W.2d 
716. 
InjGlidden the Supreme Court decided 
the issue of subrogation in connection with 
the uninsured-motorist clauses of insurance 
policies. Therefore, even though the plain-
tiff's argument and the authorities he cites 
are persuasive, under the Glidden decision 
we find that Prudential is entitled to reim-
bursement from the plaintiff to the extent 
that it makes payment to him for uninsured 
motorist coverage, if he recovers from ei-
ther tortfeasor. 
For the foregoing reasons the order of 
the Circuit Court of Cook County, which 
denied Prudential's motion to strike and 
dismiss and held that Prudential could seek 
reimbursement only from the monies paid 
by the insured motorist, is reversed. The 
case is remanded to the Circuit Court for 
further proceedings consistent with the 
views expressed herein. 
Reversed and remanded. 
McNAMARA and SIMON, JJ., concur. 
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83 IU.App.3d 594 
39 Ill.Dec. 153 
Jose FRANCISCO, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v, 
Concepcion FRANCISCO, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
No. 79-954. 
Appellate Court of Illinois, 
First District, Third Division. 
April 23; 1980. 
Wife filed motion to vacate divorce 
judgment. The Circuit Court, Cook Coun-
ty, Charles J. Fleck, J., vacated judgment 
and allowed wife time to answer complaint, 
and husband appealed. The Appellate 
Court, First District, Simon, J., held that: 
(1) husband, by failing to file any report of 
proceedings, had waived all points which 
Court could only review if it knew what 
happened at such proceedings, and Court 
had to presume that Circuit Court's find-
ings were supported by the evidence; (2) 
where wife never received notice of com-
plaint for divorce or the divorce judgment 
and there was an "inference of fraud," 
judgment was void ab initio for lack of 
jurisdiction, and such judgment could be 
challenged by a petition for relief from 
judgment and could be attacked at any 
time without regard to two-year limitation 
and without any showing of diligence or a 
meritorious defense; and (3) wife's failure 
to file special and limited appearance did 
not foreclose her from attacking judgment 
on ground that it was entered without jur-
isdiction. 
Order affirmed; cause remanded. 
1. Divorce <3=»183, 184(4) 
Husband, by failing to file any report 
of proceedings in which judgment of di-
vorce was vacated and wife was allowed 
time to answer complaint for divorce, had 
waived all points which Appellate Court 
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Robert GLIDDEN, Indiv. and as admr., 
Appellant, 
v. 
The FARMERS AUTOMOBILE INSUR-
ANCE ASSOCIATION, Appellee. 
No. 45990. 
Supreme Court of Illinois. 
May 29, 1974. 
Insuiei brought declaratory judgment 
action against his insurer to determine lim-
its of liability under three automobile pol-
icies. The Circuit Court, Winnebago Coun-
ty, Albert S. O'Sullivan, J., determined all 
issues adversely to plaintiff, and plaintiff 
appealed. The Appellate Court, 11 Ill.App. 
3d 81, 296 N.E.2d 84, affirmed in part, re-
versed in part, and remanded, and plaintiff 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Davis, J., 
held that where insured whose wife, while 
a pedestrian, was struck and killed by an 
uninsured motorist, had purchased three 
distinct automobile policies from one in-
surer, each providing uninsured motorist 
coverage in amount of $10,000 per person, 
and medical payment coverage in amount 
of $2,000 per person, "other insurance" 
clauses, which were ambiguous as to wheth-
er they were effective to reduce insured's 
-recovery to what he would have obtained 
under one policy, were to be construed in 
favor of insured so as to permit a recovery 
up to $30,000 under the three uninsured mo-
torist coverages, and $6,000 under the three 
medical payment provisions, but not to 
exceed total damages sustained It was 
further held that setoffs were to apply only 
where necessary to prevent double expo-
sure for medical payments, that insurer was 
subrogated to any moneys recovered by in-
sured from uninsured tort-feasor and 
«om an independent dram shop action, 
and that insured was. not entitled to attor-
ney's fees. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded. 
BILE INSURANCE ASS'N III. 2 4 7 
'.E.2d 247 
t. insurance <§=53t.3 
Provisions in automobile policies that, 
if there was "other insurance," coverage 
was "excess insurance" over similar cover-
age if insured was occupying a nonowned 
automobile were not applicable in situa-
tion where insured was a pedestrian and not 
occupying an automobile at time she was 
struck and killed by an uninsured motorist. 
2. Insurance <3=467.5I 
Public policy expressed by uninsured 
motorist statute is that insured be provided 
coverage which would compensate him, in 
event of injury by an uninsured motorist, 
to at least same extent as had he been in-
jured by a motorist who was insured in 
compliance with Financial Responsibility 
Law. S.H.A. ch. 73, § 755a(l). 
3. Insurance @=3|52*2 
An insurance policy is not to be inter-
preted in a factual vacuum. 
4. Insurance £=> 146.5(5) 
Apparent purpose of "other insurance" 
clauses is to make certain that one com-
pany does not pay a disproportionate 
amount of the loss which is to be shared 
with another company; such clauses have 
no meaningful purpose when applied to cov-
erage issued by one company to one insured. 
5. Insurance <§=M46.7(I) 
Ambiguities within an insurance policy 
should be construed in favor of insured. 
6. Insurance <§=*53l.2, 531.3 
Where insured, whose wife, while a 
pedestrian, was struck and killed by an un-
insured motorist, had purchased three dis-
tinct automobile policies from one insurer, 
each providing uninsured motorist coverage 
in amount of $10,000 per person, and medi-
cal payment coverage in amount of $2,000 
per person, "other insurance" clauses, which 
were ambiguous as to whether they were 
effective to reduce insured's recovery to 
what he would have obtained under one 
policy, were to be construed in favor of in-
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sured so as to permit a recovery up to $30,-
000 under the three uninsured motorist cov-
erages, and $6,000 under the three medical 
payment provisions, but not to exceed total 
damages sustained. S.H.A. ch. 73, § 755a 
(1). 
7. Insurance <§=»532 
Where total proven or undisputed dam-
ages incurred by insured are greater than 
combined total of uninsured motorist and 
medical coverage, crediting provision can-
not apply; setoffs are to apply only where 
necessary to prevent double exposure for 
medical payments. S.H.A. ch. 73, § 755a 
(1). 
8. Insurance @=>606(l, 4) 
Where plaintiff, whose wife, while a 
pedestrian, was struck and killed by an 
uninsured motorist, and plaintiff's insurer 
was found liable for full amount of unin-
sured motorist and medical payment cov-
erage under each of three policies issued to 
plaintiff, insurer was subrogated to any 
moneys recovered by plaintiff from unin-
sured tort-feasor and from an independent 
dram shop action. 
9. Costs C=>I72 
Insured was not entitled to an award 
of attorney's fees in declaratory judgment 
action brought against insurer where in-
surer was within its rights in refusing to 
arbitrate issues of liability and damages pri-
or to question of coverage being settled 
by courts. S.H.A. ch. 73, § 767. 
Yalden & Ridings, Rockford (Craig A. 
Ridings, Rockford, of counsel), for appel-
lant. 
Maynard & Brassfield, Rockford (Eu-
gene E. Brassfield, Rockford, of counsel), 
for appellee. 
DAVIS, Justice. 
The plaintiff, Robert Glidden, sued in the 
circuit court of Winnebago County for a 
declaratory judgment against the defend-
ant, The Farmers Automobile Insurance 
Association, his insurer, to construe the 
limits of coverage under three certain auto-
mobile liability insurance policies issued to 
the plaintiff, covering three separate ve-
hicles. Part IV of each policy offered un-
insured-motorist coverage in the amount 
of $10,000 per person and $20,000 per ac-
cident, and Part II of each policy provid-
ed medical-payment coverage in the amount 
of $2,000 per person. The plaintiff's wife, 
while a pedestrian, was struck and killed by 
an uninsured motorist. 
It is the plaintiff's contention that he is 
entitled to recover up to $30,000, i. e., $10,-
000 under the uninsured-motorist provisions 
of each policy, without limitation by reason 
of the "other insurance" provisions, and 
also that he is entitled to recover up to 
$6,000 under Part II, the medical-payment 
provision of the three policies. The de-
fendant contends that under the provisions 
of the three policies the plaintiff is limited 
ro a total recovery of $10,000 under Part 
IV of his coverage, and $2,000 under Part 
II, the medical-payment provision under 
the three policies. The defendant further 
contends that payments made under the 
medical-payment provisions, Part I I , must 
be set off against the payments to be made 
under the uninsured-motorist coverage un-
der Part IV. 
The defendant also contends that it is 
entitled to subrogation rights under the 
provisions of its policies applicable to pay-
ments made for uninsured-motorist cov-
erage. Lastly, the plaintiff contends that 
he is entitled to the recovery of attorney's 
fees from the defendant. 
The trial court determined all issues ad-
versely to the plaintiff. The appellate 
court (11 Ill.App.3d 81, 296 N.E.2d 84 
(1973)) held that the plaintiff is limited 
to a maximum recovery of $10,000 under 
Part IV of the uninsured-motorist provi-
sions of the three policies; that the plain-
tiff is not so limited with respect to the 
medical-payment coverage under Part II of 
the three policies, and that he could re-
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cover a total of $6,000 thereunder; that 
the monies paid out under the medical-pay-
ment provisions of Part II are not auto-
matically to be credited against the unin-
sured-motorist payments under Part IV; 
that the defendant is entitled to subroga-
tion from the proceeds of any settlement 
or judgment resulting from the exercise 
of rights of recovery of the insured against 
the person or organization responsible for 
the injury to the extent of payment made 
by the insurer to the insured; and that 
the plaintiff is not entitled to the recovery 
of fees. 
The primary issue of this appeal is 
whether the plaintiff is limited to a maxi-
mum recovery of $10,000 under Part IV 
of the three policies providing uninsured-
motorist coverage, or a total of $30,000. 
The policies contain the usual provisions: 
that if there is "other insurance" (1) the 
coverage is "excess insurance" over sim-
ilar coverage if the insured is occupying 
an automobile not owned by him, and (2) 
in all other situations the exposure is 
limited to the payment only of the pro 
rata portion of the loss represented by 
the ratio of the limits of uninsured-motor-
ist coverage provided by the particular 
policy to the total of all such coverage 
available to the insured, and the total 
damages are deemed to be no greater than 
the highest limit in an applicable policy. 
Specifically, the policies state: 
"Other Insurance: With respect to 
Bodily Injury to an insured while oc-
cupying an automobile not owned by 
the named insured, the insurance under 
Part IV shall apply only as excess in-
surance over any other similar insurance 
available to such insured and applicable 
to such automobile as primary insur-
ance, and this insurance shall then ap-
ply only in the amount by which the 
limits of liability for this coverage ex-
ceeds the applicable limit of liability 
of such other insurance. 
Except as provided in the foregoing 
paragraph, if the insured has other sim-
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ilar insurance available to him and ap-
plicable to the accident, the damages 
shall be deemed not to exceed the higher 
of the applicable limits of liability of 
this insurance and such other insurance, 
and the company shall not be liable for a 
greater proportion of any loss to which 
this coverage applies than the limit of 
liability hereunder bears to the sum of 
the applicable limits of liability of this 
insurance and such other insurance." 
[1] The first limitation, referring to 
"excess insurance," is not applicable here 
because the insured (plaintiffs wife) was 
not occupying an automobile at the time 
of the accident in question. The question 
which arises is the effect of the second 
paragraph of the above "other insurance" 
provision, in this factual setting. 
If the above clause is interpreted lit-
erally, it appears that the defendant's con-
tention is correct. Each policy states that 
if there is other insurance which also pro-
vides uninsured-motorist coverage, then 
the liability of the insurer is limited to its 
pro rata share of such coverage. Here, 
there are three policies, each providing 
$10,000 of such coverage, or a total of 
$30,000. The exposure under each policy 
would thus be one third of the $10,000 lim-
it, or $3,333.33. 
A majority of courts (see Annot. (1969), 
28 A.L.R.3d 551, at 559 et seq.) have re-
jected such a literal interpretation, pri-
marily under the theory that the result is 
contrary to the public policy expressed in 
the "Uninsured Motorist" statute of the 
particular State. Like the comparable stat-
ute in Illinois, those "Uninsured Motorist" 
statutes generally have provided that no 
automobile liability insurance policy shall 
be issued unless it provides uninsured-mo-
torist coverage in the limits expressed in 
the Financial Responsibility Law ($10,000 
per person, $20,000 per accident). 
These courts have stated that the statu-
t o r y language of the "Uninsured Motor-
ist" statutes is plain, unambiguous and 
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mandatory in providing that no insurance 
"policy * * * shall be renewed or de-
livered or issued * * * unless coverage 
is provided therein * * * in limits 
* * * set forth [in the Financial Re-
sponsibility Law]." (See Ill.Rev.Stat. 
1969, ch. 73, par. 755a(l).) This line of 
authority concludes that each policy must 
contain the specified coverage; and that 
the proration provisions of the uninsured-
motorist clauses, being contrary to the 
policy expressed in the controlling statutory 
language, must be judicially rejected. Van 
Tassel v. Horace Mann Insurance Co. 
(1973), 296 Minn. 181, 207 N.W.2d 348; 
Blakeslee v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insur-
ance Co. (1972), 388 Mich. 464, 201 N.W.2d 
786; Protective Fire & Casualty Co. v. 
Woten (1970), 186 Neb. 212, 181 N.W.2d 
835; Sellers v. United States Fidelity & 
Guaranty Co. (Fla.1966), 185 So.2d 689; 
Alliance Mutual Casualty Co. v. Duerson 
(Colo.App.1973), 510 P.2d 458. 
[2] However, there is a clear division 
of authority on this question. (See Annot. 
(1969), 28 A.L.R.3d 551.) We are not 
compelled to follow the majority view, 
and under the facts in the following cases, 
we have rejected the rationale expressed 
by that view. (Morelock v. Millers' Mutual 
Insurance Association (1971), 49 I11.2d 234, 
274 N.E.2d 1; Putnam v. New Amsterdam 
Casualty Co. (1970), 48 I11.2d 71, 269 N.E. 
2d 97.) In both Morelock and Putnam 
we held that the public policy expressed 
by our uninsured-motorist statute is that 
the insured be provided coverage which 
would compensate him, in event of injury 
by an uninsured motorist, to at least the 
same extent as had he been injured by a 
motorist who was insured in compliance 
with the Financial Responsibility Law. 
In Morelock, 49 I11.2d at page 239, 274 
N.E.2d at page 3, we stated that "the 
'other insurance* clause does not frustrate 
the legislative purpose and thereby violate 
public policy * * *." 
[3] There is, however, a distinguishing 
factor in this case. Here one insurer is-
sued three different policies on three sep-
arate vehicles to one insured. Each policy 
provided separate uninsured-motorist cov-
erage under Part IV, and medical-payments 
coverage under Part II, and a separate 
premium was accepted by the insurer from 
the insured for those coverages. An in-
surance policy is not to be interpreted in 
a factual vacuum; it is issued under given 
factual circumstances. What at first blush 
might appear unambiguous in the insurance 
contract might not be such in the particu-
lar factual setting in which the contract 
was issued. Jensen v. New Amsterdam 
Insurance Co. (1965), 65 Ill.App.2d 407, 
415, 213 N.E.2d 141. 
[4-6] When an insured purchases 
three distinct policies from an insurer, each 
providing the specified coverage, and pays 
a separate premium for each, does he 
reasonably contemplate that the "other in-
surance" clauses therein are effective to 
reduce his recovery to what he would have 
obtained under one policy? We think not. 
The apparent purpose of "other insurance" 
clauses is to make certain that one com-
pany does not pay a disproportionate 
amount of a loss which is to be shared with 
another company. There is no purpose in 
proration unless the "other insurance" is 
written by another company. The clause 
has no meaningful purpose when applied 
to coverage issued by one company to one 
insured. In this situation its meaning is 
ambiguous, and the clause should be con-
strued in favor of the insured. United 
Services Automobile Association v. Dokter 
(1970), 86 Nev. 917, 920, 478 P.2d 583, 585; 
Sturdy v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co. 
(1969), 203 Kan. 783, 457 P.2d 34; see also 
Deterding v. State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Co. (1966), 78 Ul.App.2d 
29, 36, 222 N.E.2d 523. 
It is true that an insured might end up 
in a case such as -this in a better situation 
than if the wrongdoer had been insured 
to the minimum requirements of the Fi-
nancial Responsibility Law. That, how-
ever, is not material as long as he pays 
for the coverage. The insured is better 
off because he paid additional premiums. 
If there is to be a "windfall" in this situa-
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tion, it should be to the insured, who paid 
the several premiums, rather than to the 
insurer, which collected them. (See Wid-
iss, Perspectives on Uninsured Motorist 
Coverage, 62 Nw.U.L.Rev. 497, 523 
(1967).) We conclude that the plaintiff 
is entitled to recover up to $30,000 under 
the three uninsured-motorist coverages, not 
to exceed, however, the total damages sus-
tained. 
Regarding the medical-payment provi-
sions and the question of whether the plain-
tiff may recover up to $6,000 under all 
three policies, or be limited to the $2,000 
coverage of one policy, the "other insur-
ance" clause under this coverage provides: 
"If there is other automobile medical 
payments insurance against a loss cov-
ered by Part II of this policy the com-
pany shall not be liable under this policy 
for a greater proportion of such loss than 
the applicable limit of liability stated in 
the declarations bears to the total ap-
plicable limit of liability of all valid and 
collectible automobile medical payments 
insurance; provided, however, the in-
surance with respect to a temporary sub-
stitute automobile or non-owned auto-
mobile shall be excess insurance over any 
other valid and collectible automobile 
medical payments insurance." 
The above comments with respect to the 
uninsured-motorist "other insurance'* pro-
vision are equally applicable to the med-
ical-payment coverage. The plaintiff also 
paid three separate premiums for the medi-
cal-payment coverage in each policy. It 
would be unconscionable to permit the sin-
gle insurer to issue the three coverages to 
the insured, collect the premiums therefor, 
and contend the "other insurance" clause 
bars recovery of more than the limit ex-
pressed in one policy. We also note that 
this "other insurance" clause is only a pro 
rata clause and does not expressly limit the 
total recovery to the highest limit in any 
one policy. The plaintiff may recover up 
to $6,000 under the three policies, not to 
exceed, however, the total damages sus-
tained. 
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[7] As to the question of whether the 
payments made under the medical-payment 
provisions of a policy are to be set off 
against the payments to be made under the 
uninsured-motorist provisions, the appellate 
court held that its decision in Melson v. 
Illinois National Insurance Co. (1971), 1 
Ill.App.3d 1025, 274 N.E.2d 664, was to 
be followed. In that case, at page 1028, 
274 N.E.2d at page 666f the appellate court 
stated that "where the total proven or un-
disputed damages incurred by the insured 
are greater than the combined total of 
uninsured motorist and medical coverage, 
the crediting provision cannot apply." Set-
offs are to apply only where necessary to 
prevent double exposure for medical pay-
ments. We agree with that conclusion. 
If the crediting provisions were to ap-
ply in all situations, including those where 
the total damages suffered 'by the insured 
exceed the combined total uninsured-mo-
torist and medical-payment coverages, the 
net result would be that the uninsured-
motorist coverage under the policy would 
not assure compensation comparable to that 
available if the insured had been injured 
by one insured in compliance with the Fi-
nancial Responsibility Law. Such an in-
terpretation would run afoul of the mini-
mum coverage required under our decisions 
in Morelock v. Millers' Mutual Insurance 
Association (1971), 49 I11.2d 234, 274 N.E. 
2d 1, and Putnam v. New Amsterdam Cas-
ualty Co. (1970), 48 I11.2d 71, 269 N.E.2d 
97. 
[8] The uninsured-motorist clauses of 
the policies provide that to the extent the 
company makes any payments thereunder, 
it is subrogated to the rights of the insured 
to any proceeds recovered from one legally 
responsible for the injury. The appellate 
court held that the insurer was entitled 
to such subrogation, and cited Remsen v. 
Midway Liquors, Inc. (1961), 30 Ill.App. 
2d 132, 174 N.E.2d 7. In the instant case, 
the plaintiff had pending an independent 
dramshop action. The trial court held that 
the defendant company, to the extent of 
payments made under the uninsured-motor-
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ist coverage, was subrogated to any monies 
recovered by the plaintiff in that action. 
We believe that the insurer should be sub-
rogated to any monies recovered from the 
uninsured tortfeasor and under the dram-
shop action. 
[9] As to the plaintiffs right to attor-
ney's fees, we believe the appellate court 
correct in holding that the defendant was 
within its rights in refusing to arbitrate 
issues of liability and damages prior to the 
question of coverage being settled by the 
courts. (Flood v. Country Mutual Insur-
ance Co. (1968), 41 I11.2d 91, 242 N.E.2d 
149.) The questions of coverage in this 
case were complex. The conduct of the 
defendant was not vexatious or without 
reasonable cause (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1969, ch. 73, 
par. 767), and the refusal to allow fees was 
proper. 
The judgments of the trial court and of 
the appellate court are affirmed in part 
and reversed in part, and this cause is re-
manded to the trial court for further pro-
ceedings not inconsistent herewith. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part 
and remanded. 
O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
37 I11.2d 318 
La SALLE NATIONAL BANK, Trustee, 
Appellant, 
v. 
The COUNTY OF COOK et a!.f Appellees. 
OAK PARK TRUST AND SAVINGS 
BANK, Trustee, Appellant, 
v. 
The COUNTY OF COOK et al., Appellees. 
Nos. 45988, 46139. 
Supreme Court of Illinois. 
May 29, 1974. 
Suits seeking injunction prohibiting 
assessment, levy and collection of real es-
tate taxes and declaratory judgment that 
certain assessment procedures are invalid. 
The Circuit Court, Cook County, Walter P. 
Dahl, J.f dismissed the suits, and taxpayers 
appealed. The appeals were consolidated. 
The Supreme Court, Ryan, J., held that ad-
equate remedy at law existed by means of 
payment of taxes under protest and that 
county assessors assessments were valid. 
Affirmed. 
1. Declaratory Judgment €=»4I 
Injunction G=>I6 
Existence of an adequate remedy at 
law prohibits injunctive relief but existence 
of another remedy does not preclude de-
claratory relief. 
2. Declaratory Judgment <£=>2I6 
Relief should not be afforded by way 
of declaratory judgment in case challeng-
ing validity of tax assessment if case 
would not merit relief by way of injunc-
tion; same principles prohibiting granting 
of injunction prohibit granting declaratory 
relief in such cases. S.H.A. ch. 110, § 57.1. 
3. Taxation @=>2, 494(1) 
Taxation of property is a legislative 
and not a judicial function and courts will 
not review assessments of property upon 
which taxes are based unless assessments 
are fraudulent or constructively fraudulent. 
4. Declaratory Judgment C=2I6 
Taxation <§=*498, 608(9) 
Even though taxpayers alleged in com-
plaint that the failure of Revenue Act to 
provide them with right of judicial review 
while providing review to taxpayers out-
side county violated their rights of due 
process and equal protection, where com-
plaint in actuality simply complained that 
property had been assessed at excessively 
high value, legal remedy by way of pay-
ment of real estate taxes under protest fol-
lowed by objections to application for 
judgment for delinquent taxes provided ad-
equate remedy at law, so that taxpayers 
did not have grounds for relief by way of 
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Rerosen v. Midway Liquors, Inc./ 30 Ill.App.2d 132, 
174 N.E.2d 7 (1961) 
REMSEN v. MIDWAY LIQUORS, INC. I1L 1 
Cite as 174 N.E.2d 7 
30 Ill.App.2d 132 
Delbert E. REMSEN, Administrator of the 
Estate of George W. Remsen, Deceased, 
and Elizabeth N. Remsen, Plaintiffs-Appel-
lants, 
v. 
MIDWAY LIQUORS, INC., a corporation, 
and Town Hall Tavern, Inc., a corpora-
tion, Defendants^ 
and 
Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Com-
pany of Wisconsin, Intervenor-Appeilee. 
Gen. No. 11428. 
Appellate Court of Illinois. 
Second District, Second Division. 
April 19, 1961. 
Suit involving the distribution of the 
settlement proceeds for injuries in loss of 
support in an action under the Liquor Con-
trol Act. An insurer was granted leave 
to intervene. From a judgment of the 
Circuit Court, Winnebago County, Albert 
S. O'Sullivan, J., the plaintiffs appealed. 
The Appellate Court, Spivey, J., held that 
a trust agreement was one of subrogation 
and not a prohibited assignment of an ac-
tion for injuries to the body and that the 
trial court properly allocated the attorneys' 
fees among the various claimants to the 
proceedings in the Dram Shop action. 
Affirmed. 
1. Subrogation <©=>l 
Subrogation is founded on principles of 
justice and equity and its operation is gov-
erned by equitable principles and rests on 
the principle that substantial justice 
should be attained regardless of form. 
2. Assignments €=31 
Subrogation <§=H 
"Subrogation" presupposes an actual 
payment and satisfaction of the debt or 
claim to which the party is subrogated, al-
though the remedy is kept alive in equity 
for the benefit of the one who made the 
payment under circumstances entitling him 
to contribution or indemnity, while "as-
signment" necessarily contemplates the 
continued existence of the debt or claim 
assigned. 
See publication Words and Phrases, 
for other judicial constructions and defi-
nitions of "Assignment" and "Subroga-
tion". 
3. Assignments «S=31 
"Assignment" has a comprehensive 
meaning and is a transfer or making over 
to another of the whole of any property, 
real or personal in possession, or in action, 
or of an estate, or right therein. 
4. Assignments <§=24(2) 
The release and trust executed by ad-
ministrator of deceased-insured under fam-
ily automobile policy and by his injured 
wife, providing that their claims were 
transferred to insurer only to extent of 
insurer's payment and were repayable only 
in the event of its recovery from anyone 
liable for injury was agreement of "subro-
gation" and not forbidden assignment of 
injury cause. 111.Rev.Stat. 1957, c. 43, §§ 
135, 136; S.H.A. ch. 110, § 26.1(1) (c). 
See publication Words and Phrases, 
for other judicial constructions and defi-
nitions of "Subrogation". 
5. Insurance <§=3606(l) 
An advance by insurer of the amount 
of insurance to insured under a loan agree-
ment reciting that the amount is received 
as a loan to be repaid only from such re-
covery as might be had from a third per-
son is not an "assignment" of the insured's 
cause of action. 
6. Subrogation <§=»! 
Doctrine of subrogation is a favorite 
of the law and applies where one person, 
not acting as a mere volunteer or intruder, 
pays a debt for which another is primarily 
liable and which in equity and good con-
science should have been discharged by the 
latter. 
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7. Subrogation €=>l 
There is no public policy forbidding 
subrogation of bodily injury cases. 
8. Insurance <^452, 530 
"Uninsured motorist coverage" is not 
likened to medical payments protection 
which are limited to $500 for each person 
injured without regard to liability whereas 
"uninsured motorist coverage" compensates 
only when there is liability on part of an-
other for injury, and the recovery there-
under, in addition, provides for loss of 
wages and income, loss of support, and pain 
and suffering, which might properly be com-
pensable by the person causing the injury. 
See publication Words and Phrases, 
for other judicial constructions and defi-
nitions of "Uninsured Motorist Cover-
age". 
9. Contracts <§=*I59 
The term "proceeds" in written instru-
ments has many meanings and the subject 
matter and purpose of the contract must 
be considered, and it means gross proceeds 
and net proceeds. 
See publication Words and Phrases, 
for other judicial constructions and defi-
nitions of "Proceeds". 
10. Insurance C=al46(3) 
A policy is construed most favorable 
to the named insured and others who are 
covered by it. 
I!. Insurance €=>607 
Within automobile policy and trust 
agreement executed between insurer and 
insured-decedent's administrator and wid-
ow providing that insurer having made 
payments would be entitled, to . extent of 
payments, to "proceeds" of any settlement 
or judgment, "proceeds" meant what liti-
gant would actually receive after reason-
able costs of proceeding including attor-
neys' fees so that subrogors were entitled 
to attorney fees paid in connection with 
settlement by them of a dram shop action 
with portion of the proceeds of the settle-
ment of which insurer was subrogated. 
Ill.Rev.Stat.1957, c. 43, §§ 135, 136; S.H.A. 
ch. 110, §26.1(1) (c). 
See publication Words and Phrases, 
for other judicial constructions and defi-
nitions of "Proceeds". 
Miller, Thomas, Hickey & Collins, Rock-
ford, for appellants. 
Foltz, Haye & Keegan, Rockford, for 
appellee. 
SPIVEY, Justice. 
This appeal involves an order of the 
Circuit Court of Winnebago County dis-
tributing the settlement proceeds for inju-
ries in loss of support in an action under 
Art. VI, Sect. 14 of the Liquor Control 
Act, Chap. 43, Sect. 135, Ill.Rev.Stat.1957. 
George W. Remsen was insured under a 
family automobile insurance policy issued 
by the intervenor, Employers Mutual Lia-
bility Insurance Company of Wisconsin. 
In addition to the usual and customary cov-
erage provided, Remsen obtained and paid 
an additional premium for what is termed-
"Family Protection Against Uninsured Mo-
torists", said coverage affording liability 
limits of $10,000 for each person and $20,-
000 for each accident. 
On September 29, 1957, Remsen and his 
wife, Elizabeth, were involved in an au-
tomobile collision with one John Reynold 
Carlson who carried no liability insurance 
on his automobile. As a result of the oc-
currence, Remsen received injuries from 
which he subsequently died and his wife, 
Elizabeth, was seriously injured in her per-
son. 
Subsequently, on September 23, 1958, 
Delbert E. Remsen, as administrator of the 
estate of George W. Remsen, and Elizabeth 
N. Remsen, individually, instituted a dram 
shop action under the provisions of Art. 
VI, Sect. 135 of the Liquor Control Act 
against Midway Liquors, Inc. and Town 
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Hall Tavern, Inc. alleging that they caused 
the intoxication of Carlson in whole or 
part. 
Count I of the complaint is an action by 
the administrator for the benefit of the de-
pendents of George W. Remsen, his widow, 
Elizabeth, and their five minor children, 
for injury in their means of support. 
Count II is an individual action by Eliza-
beth N. Remsen, the widow, for injuries 
to her person. The appeal presents no 
issue as to the liability of either dram shop 
defendant. 
Following the filing of the dram shop 
action (date not disclosed by the record), 
the suit was settled by the administrator 
and Elizabeth Remsen individually with 
Midway Liquors, Inc. and a covenant not 
to sue executed. By the terms of this set-
tlement Midway Liquors, Inc. paid to the 
administrator the sum of $6,250 for injury 
to means of support and to Elizabeth N. 
Remsen the sum of $6,250 for her personal 
injuries. On November 18, 1959, by stipu-
lation of the administrator and Elizabeth 
Remsen, an order dismissing the cause of 
action as to Midway Liquors, Inc. was en-
tered. 
Thereafter (date not disclosed by the 
record), the administrator entered into a 
settlement agreement with the defendant 
Town Hall Tavern; by the terms of said 
agreement the administrator was paid the 
sum of $13,250 for injury to means of 
support. On March 7, 1960, Elizabeth Rem-
sen dismissed Count II of the complaint. 
The record is absent of any order dismiss-
ing Count I as to the defendant Town Hall 
Tavern. »i 
Pursuant to a previous order of July 21, 
1959, all settlement funds were deposited 
with the Clerk of the Court pending fur-
ther order of distribution. This fund 
amounted to $26,500 which included $6,625 
received by Elizabeth Remsen for her per-
sonal injuries, and $19,875 received by the 
administrator for the loss of means of sup-
port alleged to have been sustained by the 
174 N.E .2d—1% 
dependents of George W. Remsen, deceas-
ed. 
On February 19, 1960, Employers Mu-
tual Liability Insurance Company of Wis-
consin was granted leave to intervene and 
file an intervening petition as provided by 
Chap. 110, Sect. 26.1(1) (c), Ill.Rev.Stat. 
1959. 
In their intervening petition, Employers 
allege they have been subrogated to $19,500 
of the settlement proceeds of the dram 
shop action and ask that they be reim-
bursed in that amount out of the funds in 
the hands of the Clerk of the Court. The 
petition further alleges that Employers had 
paid pursuant to its insuring agreement 
rider for family protection against an un-
insured motorist the sum of $10,000 to 
Delbert E. Remsen as administrator and 
$9,500 to Elizabeth N. Remsen. 
In consideration of these payments Del-
bert E. Remsen as administrator of the 
estate of George W. Remsen, and Eliza-
beth N. Remsen each executed identical in-
struments (except as to amount) to Em-
ployers styled "Policy Release and Trust 
Agreement" each dated October 22, 1958. 
These instruments were prepared by a rep-
resentative of Employers and provided as 
follows: 
"Know All Men By These Presents: that 
for and in consideration of the payment to 
me of * * * by Employers Mutual Lia-
bility Insurance Company of Wisconsin, 
hereinafter called the Company, the receipt 
of which is hereby acknowledged, I do here-
by fully and forever release and discharge 
the Company from any and all claims and 
demands, actions and causes of action, 
which I may have against the Company 
under the "Family Protection Against Un-
insured Motorists'' endorsement attached to 
Policy No. 0237-00-024257, because of the 
death of George W. Remsen, resulting or to 
result from that certain accident on or 
about the 29th day of September, 1957, at 
or near the intersection of Route 173 and 
Collins Road, County of Winnebago, State 
of Illinois. 
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"I have not made any settlement with or 
prosecuted to judgment any action against 
any person or organization who may be le-
gally liable for bodily injury on account of 
which the Company is making this payment. 
Such person or organization, wherever 
mentioned in this Release and Trust Agree-
ment, shall include John Reynold Carlson 
and also any person or organization who 
may be liable for said bodily injury under 
Section 14 or 15 of Article VI of An Act of 
the General Assembly of the* State of Illi-
nois entitled 'An Act Relating to Alcoholic 
Liquors/ in force February 1, 1934, or any 
law amendatory thereof. 
"I agree that this settlement is in full 
compromise of a doubtful and disputed 
claim both as to the question of liability and 
that the payment is not to be construed as 
an admission of liability. 
"I further agree that in consideration of 
this payment: 
"(a) any amount which I may be entitled 
to recover from any person who is an in-
sured under the bodily injury liability cov-
erage of said policy shall be reduced by the 
amount of this payment; 
"(b) that the Company shall be entitled to 
the extent of this payment of $10,000 to the 
proceeds of any settlement or judgment that 
may result from the exercise of any rights 
of recovery I may have against any person 
or organization legally responsible for the 
bodily injury because of which this payment 
is made; 
"(c) that I shall hold in trust for the 
benefit of the Company all rights of recov-
ery to the extent of the payment of * * * 
which I shall have against such other per-
son or organization because of the damages 
which are the subject of claim made under 
the 'Family Protection Against Uninsured 
Motorists' endorsement; 
"(d) that I shall do whatever is proper 
to secure and shall do nothing after loss to 
prejudice such rights; 
"(e) that if requested in writing by the 
Company, I shall take, through any repre-
sentative designated by the Company, pro-
vided the Company pays all attorney's fees, 
costs and expenses, such action as may be 
necessary or appropriate to recover such 
payment as damages from such other per-
son or organization, such action to be taken 
in my name; in the event of a recovery, 
the Company shall be reimbursed out of 
such recovery for expenses, costs and at-
torneys' fees incurred by it in connection 
therewith; 
"(f) that I shall execute and deliver to 
the Company such instruments and papers 
as may be appropriate to secure my rights 
and obligations and those of the Company 
established by this provision." 
The provisions of the policy endorsement 
covering Family Protection Against Unin-
sured Motorists (Bodily Injury Liability) 
as amended, insofar as they are germane 
provide: 
"I . Damage for Bodily Injury Caused 
by Uninsured Automobiles. 
"To pay all sums which the insured or his 
legal representative shall be legally entitled 
to recover as damages from the owner or 
operator of an uninsured automobile be-
cause of bodily injury, sickness or disease, 
including death resulting therefrom, herein-
after called 'bodily injury', sustained by the 
insured, caused by accident and arising out 
of the ownership, maintenance or use of 
such uninsured automobile; provided, for 
the purpose of this endorsement, determina-
tion as to whether the insured or such rep-
resentative is legally entitled to recover 
such damages, and if so the amount thereof, 
shall be made by agreement between the in-
sured or such representative and the com-
pany or, if they fail to agree and the in-
sured so demands, by arbitration." 
"4. Limits of Liability, (a) The limits 
of liability stated in the schedule as appli-
cable to 'each person' is the limit of the 
company's liability for all damages, includ-
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ing damages for care or loss of services, be-
cause of bodily injury sustained by one per-
son as the result of any one accident and, 
subject to the above provision respecting 
each person the limit of liability stated in 
the schedule as applicable to 'each accident' 
is the total limit of the company's liability 
for all damages, including damages for care 
or loss of services, because of bodily injury 
sustained by two or more persons as a re-
sult of any one accident." 
"7. Trust Agreement. In the event of 
payment to any person under this endorse-
ment : 
"(a) the company shall be entitled to the 
extent of such payment to the proceeds of 
any settlement or judgment that may result 
from the exercise of any rights of recovery 
of such person against any person or or-
ganization legally responsible for the bodily 
injury because of which such payment is 
made; 
"(b) such person shall hold in trust for 
the benefit of the company all rights of re-
covery which he shall have against such 
other person or organization because of the 
damages which are the subject of claim 
made under this endorsement; 
"(c) such person shall do whatever is 
proper to secure and shall do nothing after 
loss to prejudice such rights; 
"(d) if requested in writing by the com-
pany, such person shall take, through any 
representative designated by the company, 
such action as may be necessary or appro-
priate to recover such payment as damages 
from such other person or organization, 
such action to be taken in the name of such 
person; in the event of a recovery, the com-
pany shall be reimbursed out of such recov-
ery for expenses, costs and attorneys' fees 
incurred by it in connection therewith; 
"(e) such person shall execute and de-
liver to the company such instruments and 
papers as may be appropriate to secure the 
rights and obligations of such person and 
the company established by this provision." 
"8. Payment of Loss by the Company. 
Any amount due hereunder is payable (a) 
to the insured, or (b) if the insured be a 
minor to his parent or guardian, or (c) if 
the insured be deceased to his surviving 
spouse, otherwise (d) to a person author-
ized by law to receive such payment or to 
a person legally entitled to recover the 
damages which the payment represents; 
provided, the company may at its option pay 
any amount due hereunder in accordance 
with division (d) hereof." 
The court by its judgment order appealed 
from, in addition to making certain findings 
of fact consistent with the facts set out in 
this opinion, found, that the sum of $26,500 
now in the hands of the Clerk must be dis-
tributed to resolve the claims of Deibert E. 
Remsen, administrator, Elizabeth N. Rem-
sen and Employers; that plaintiff's attor-
neys had rendered legal services of the fair 
value of $8,800 which they are entitled to 
recover from the aggregate sum of $26,500; 
that Employers is entitled to the sum of 
$10,000.00; recovered by the administrator, 
said sum to be deducted from the share of 
the proceeds after attorney's fees are de-
ducted which amounts to $17,700; that 
from the balance then remaining of $7,000, 
the plaintiff, Elizabeth N. Remsen shall 
have deducted from her share of the re-
covery ($6,625) for her personal injuries 
the sum of $4,400 to be paid to Employers; 
and that the balance then remaining of $3,-
300 be distributed to the dependents of 
George W. Remsen, deceased, for their loss 
of means of support. The judgment order 
then ordered, adjudged, and decreed that 
the Clerk pay Employers the sum of $10,-
000 from the proceeds obtained under 
Count I ; pay Employers the sum of $4,400 
from the proceeds obtained under Count 
I I ; pay plaintiff's attorneys the sum of 
$8,800; and pay unto the dependents of 
George W. Remsen for their loss of means 
of support, the sum of $3,300 to be appor-
tioned to the widow and five children each 
the sum of $550. 
Insurance for protection against bodily 
injury as a result of the wrongful acts of 
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an uninsured motorist is of relative recent 
origin. The purpose is to provide some 
form of compensation for innocent victims 
of accidents. 
Under the uninsured motorists endorse-
ment the insurance company agrees to pay 
the insured all sums that he shall be legally 
entitled to recover as damages for bodily 
injury sustained by accident arising out of 
ownership, maintenance and use of an un-
insured automobile. 
In the event of payment to any person 
under the subject endorsement the policy 
provides by its endorsement conditions en-
titled "Trust Agreement" that the company 
shall be entitled to the extent of such pay-
ment to the proceeds of any settlement or 
judgment that may result from the exercise 
of any right of recovery of such person 
against any person or organization legally 
responsible for the bodily injury because 
of which such payment is made, and fur-
ther provides that the person receiving pay-
ment shall execute and deliver to the com-
pany such instruments as may be appropri-
ate to secure the rights and obligations of 
such person and the company. 
Appellants contend that the Policy Re-
lease and Trust Agreements executed by 
the administrator and Elizabeth Remsen 
amounted to an assignment of an action 
for injuries to the body and as such are 
prohibited in Illinois. If as appellants urge 
they constitute an assignment of an action 
for injuries to the body they are void. 
North Chicago Street Railway Co. v. Ack-
ley, 171 111. 100, 49 N.E. 222, 44 L.R.A. 
177; and Wilcox v. Bierd, 330 111. 571, 162 
N.E. 170. 
Appellee on the other hand suggests that 
this instrument is a subrogation agreement 
and only an assignment of the proceeds of 
any recovery or a part thereof. 
Counsel for both parties state and our 
research confirms, the character of the 
Trust Agreement has not been construed 
by any reviewing court in the United 
States. 
Basically, subrogation arises in two man-
ners, legal subrogation out of a condition 
or relationship by operation of law and 
conventional subrogation by act of the par-
ties. 
[1] Subrogation is founded on princi-
ples of justice and equity, and its opera-
tion is governed by principles of equity. It 
rests on the principle that substantial jus-
tice should be attained regardless of form, 
that is, its basis is the doing of complete, 
essential and perfect justice between the 
parties without regard to form. 83 CJ .S . 
Subrogation § 2a. People ex rel. Nelson 
v. Phillip State Bank and Trust Company 
et al., 307 Ill.App. 464, 30 N.E.2d 771. 
In S3 CJ .S . Subrogation § 16, it is said, 
"As a general rule, any person who, pursu-
ant to a legal obligation to do so, has paid, 
even indirectly, for a loss or injury result-
ing from the wrong or default of another 
will be subrogated to the rights of the cred-
itor or injured person against the wrong-
doer or defaulter, persons who stand in the 
shoes of the wrongdoer, or others who, as 
the payor, are primarily responsible for 
the wrong or default." 
[2] Subrogation presupposes an actual 
payment and satisfaction of the debt or 
claim to which the party is subrogated, al-
though the remedy is kept ahve in equity 
for the benefit of the one who made the 
payment under circumstances entitling him 
to contribution or indemnity while assign-
ment necessarily contemplates the continued 
existence of the debt or claim assigned. 
Subrogation operates only to secure con-
tribution and indemnity, whereas an assign-
ment transfers the whole claim. 6 CJ .S . 
Assignments § 2b(12). 
[3] "The word 'assignment' has a com-
prehensive meaning, and in its most gener-
al sense is a transfer or making over to 
another of the whole of any property, real 
or personal, in possession or in action, or of 
an estate or right therein." 6 CJ .S . Assign-
ments § l a ; Siegel v. People, 105 111. 89, 
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and Talty v. Schoenholz, 323 111. 232, 154 
N.E. 139. 
In New York Casualty Co. v. Sinclair 
Refining Co., 10 Cir., 108 F.2d 65, 71, it 
was stated ' T h e doctrines of subrogation 
and a constructive trust are analogous. 
The creditor is regarded as holding his 
claim against the principal debtor and his 
securities therefor in trust for the sub-
rogee." 
[4] Based upon the general principles 
we have set out, we conclude that the Trust 
Agreement is one of subrogation and not an 
assignment of an action for injuries to the 
body. It meets all of the characteristics 
of subrogation in that the debt was paid 
under a legal obligation for the wrong of 
another. It does not transfer the entire 
claim but only to the extent of the insurer's 
payment and is repayable only in the event 
of subrogor's recovery from any person lia-
ble for the injury. 
An analogous proposition is found in Na-
tional Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Johnson, 
317 Mass. 485, 58 N.E.2d 849. In that case 
a claim was made by the insured under a 
policy of forgery insurance. The insur-
ance carrier made payments to the defraud-
ed insured under the terms of the policy and 
the insured in consideration for such pay-
ment executed and delivered a loan receipt 
for the amount paid. The receipt provided 
that the loan was repayable only to the ex-
tent of any net recovery that insured might 
obtain on account of such loss from the 
forgeries and as security for the payment 
the insured pledged the recovery to the car-
rier and insured agreed to commence and 
prosecute at the expense and under the 
control of the carrier an action against the 
one liable for the forgeries. 
The court concluded that it was doubt-
less the law that the right to litigate a 
fraud is not assignable at law or equity 
being contrary to public policy but that the 
instrument in question was not an assign-
ment of the claim. 
[5] 46 C.J.S. Insurance § 1209(1) (c), 
states, "An advance by insurer of the 
amount of insurance to insured, under a 
loan agreement reciting that the amount 
was received as a loan to be repaid only 
from such recovery as might be had from a 
third person, does not constitute an assign-
ment of insured's cause of action." See 
also Katz v. Hotel Murida, 194 Misc. 741, 
90 N.Y.S.2d 760; Kelley, Maus & Co. v. 
Newman, 79 Ill.App. 285; Hibernian Bank-
ing Association v. Davis, 295 111. 537, 129 
N.E. 540; Farmers' State Bank, McNabb, 
111. v. Kidd, 313 IlLApp. 132, 39 N.E.2d 
394. 
Concluding as we have that the instant 
case presents a case of conventional subro-
gation, should we, under the facts in this 
case, extend that doctrine to injuries to the 
body and would its application promote 
justice and equity ? 
The application of subrogation will not 
create the conditions giving rise to the un-
derlying reasons announced in all of the 
Illinois decisions, including the Ackley and 
Bierd cases, for holding an assignment of 
an action for injuries to the body to be 
against public policy. 
[6] The doctrine of subrogation has 
been steadily expanding, is a favorite of 
the law and has been nurtured and en-
couraged. It is broad enough as now ap-
plied to include every instance in which one 
person not acting as a mere volunteer or in-
truder pays a debt for which another is 
primarily liable, and which in equity and 
good conscience should have been dis-
charged by the latter. Smith v. Clavey 
Ravinia Nurseries, Inc., 329 Ill.App. 548, 
69 N.E.2.d 921. Cited with approval in 
Dworak for Use of Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Tempel, 18 Ill.App.2d 225, 152 N.E.2d 197, 
affirmed 17 I11.2d 181, 161 N.E.2d 258; 
Geneva Construction Company et al. v. 
Martin Transfer & Storage Company, 4 111. 
2d 273, 122 N.E.2d 540; and Standard 
Industries, Inc. v. Thompson, 19 Ill.App.2d 
319, 152 N.E.2d 500. 
Common law subrogation has been recog-
nized and applied to injuries to the bod^ 
under the Workmen's Compensation Act of 
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Illinois. Geneva Construction Company 
et al. v. Martin Transfer & Storage Com-
pany cited above. 
Our attention has not been called to any 
authority to the effect that subrogation, as 
opposed to an assignment, of injuries to the 
body is against public policy and not per-
missible. 
[7] Finding no public policy reasons for 
forbidding subrogation of bodily injury cas-
es, we find it was proper in this case for 
the same reasons they have been found 
proper in dram shop actions involving prop-
erty damage as announced in the Dworak 
case cited above. 
Appellants contend the court erred in al-
lowing intervention to impress a subroga-
tion claim in a loss of means of support 
dram shop action. 
By the plain terms of the contract of in-
surance the carrier's right to repayment 
may be had "against any person or organ-
ization legally responsible for the bodily 
injury." (Emphasis supplied.) 
The dram shop operators were legally lia-
ble for the damages and we held that subro-
gation under the uninsured motorists clause 
is proper. 
It is argued that the full amount recov-
ered shall be for the exclusive benefit of the 
person or persons injured in loss of support. 
The recovery less the subrogation claim 
was so distributed. 
This subrogation will not deprive a re-
covery to those entitled to loss of means of 
support or damages because the funds in 
the hands of the administrator paid by Em-
ployers is available for distribution to the 
widow and next of kin under the Injuries 
Act for pecuniary injuries resulting from 
the death of George W. Remsen. 
[8] Appellants further contend that the 
uninsured motorists protection should be 
likened to medical payments protection. 
With this suggestion we are unable to 
agree. 
Payments under the medical payment 
clause are limited to $500 for each person 
injured without regard to liability. They 
are limited to reasonable expenses incurred 
by the injured person for medical, hospital, 
nursing and funeral services. They stand 
in the same category as any contract for 
accident insurance. Nor is there any 
agreement to repay. 
On the other hand, uninsured motorists 
coverage compensates only when there is 
liability on the part of another for the in-
jury. (Also hit and run). The recovery 
under the uninsured motorists clause in 
addition provides for loss of wages and 
income, loss of support, and pain and suf-
fering which might properly be compensa-
ble by the person causing the injury. Re-
covery under the uninsured motorists clause 
would not preclude recovery under the 
medical payments clause. 
We have considered the other reasons 
advanced by appellants in support of their 
assignments of error and find they are 
without merit. 
Intervenor-appellee filed a cross appeal 
and assigned as cross-error the court's 
awarding attorneys' fees out of the funds 
paid in settlement of the dram shop action. 
No claim is made that the attorney fees 
are unreasonable. 
Appellee contends they are entitled to 
full reimbursement up to the amount of the 
proceeds paid the administrator and Eliza-
beth Remsen in the dram shop action, be-
fore attorneys' fees in that action may be 
deducted from the proceeds. In particular 
Employers say that it is entitled to the full 
$6,625 of the proceeds paid Elizabeth Rem-
sen for the injuries to her person rather 
than $4,400 representing the $6,625 less 
attorneys' fees. 
The policy and the trust agreement both 
provide that the company shall be entitled, 
to the extent of their payments, to the pro-
ceeds of any settlement or judgment. We 
must decide what the word "proceeds" im-
plies. 
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[9] In Gould v. Lewis, 267 Ill.App. 569, 
the court said, " * * * 50 Corpus Juris 
427, expresses 'a broad middle ground* in 
the interpretation of the term 'Proceeds/ 
Not a word of any fixed or definite mean-
ing, but of varying and loose significance, 
employed with different meanings, of equiv-
ocal import and great genuality. * * * 
Its meaning in case each depends on its 
context, depends very much on the connec-
tion in which it is employed and the sub-
ject matter to which it is applied. The 
same authority also states (at pages 429, 
430) : 'In contracts and written instru-
ments, the word "proceeds" has many 
meanings and varied usages and is in many 
instances of doubtful meaning. The sub-
ject matter and purpose of a contract must 
be considered in order to determine the 
meaning of the word as used by the par-
ties. As used, the word has been various-
ly defined, * * *; it has been held to 
mean gross proceeds and net proceeds/ 
From a review of the many authorities cited 
in Corpus Juris it is clear that the state-
ment therein contained that 'the word "pro-
ceeds" has many meanings and varied 
usages and is in many instances of doubt-
ful meaning,' is fully justified. In 23 Am. 
& Eng.Ency. of Law, 195, it is stated that 
'the term (proceeds) is one of equivocal 
import. Its construction depends much 
upon the context and the subject matter 
to which it is applied. * * * The gen-
eral rule that where the terms of a con-
tract are ambiguous and uncertain their 
meaning may be determined from extrinsic 
evidence, also applies to the instant con-
tract/ " 
[10] A policy of insurance is construed 
most favorable to the named insured and 
others who are covered by it. Western 
States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Standard Mutual 
Ins. Co., 26 Ill.App.2d Z7&, 167 N.E.2d S33; 
Rashinski v. Travelers Casualty Ins. Co., 
312 Ill.App. 260, 38 N.E.2d 362; and Scott 
v. Inter-Insurance Exchange of Chicago 
Motor Club, 267 Ill.App. 105, affirmed 352 
111. 572, 186 N.E. 176. 
The same rule of construction has oft 
times been applied against the scrivener of 
any instrument of contract. 
As in the instant case, it is the practice 
of plaintiff's attorneys to make a charge 
for their services and should be well known 
to the scrivener of both the policy and the 
trust agreements. 
[11] We feel that the only equitable 
construction to place on the word "pro-
ceeds" is that it means what the litigant 
would actually receive after the reasonable 
costs of the proceeding including attorneys' 
fees. 
We find another compelling reason for 
this conclusion. The contract of insurance 
and the trust agreement permits the in-
sured to institute proceedings against any 
person liable for their injuries. It is fair 
to foresee instances wherein the recovery 
might be equal to or less than the subroga-
tion rights and after applying that deduc-
tion, it would leave the insured to pay his 
attorney out of his own separate funds. 
This very situation has been recognized in 
the Workmen's Compensation Act of New 
Jersey. 
Cross-appellant cites the case of Manion 
v. Chicago, R. I. P. R. Co., 2 Ill.App.2d 
191, 119 N.E.2d 498, wherein this court held 
that an employer who had paid an injured 
employee under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act was entitled to reimbursement 
pursuant to Section 29 (now Section 5 of 
the Workmen's Compensation Act) out of 
any recovery by the employee in a com-
mon law action against any negligent third 
party, without bearing a share of costs 
and attorney fees incurred in the common 
law action. Worthy of note is the fact 
that following this decision Section 5 was 
amended to provide for the employer shar-
ing in the costs and attorneys' fees in the 
third party common law action. 
We do not feel that the Manion opinion 
will be in conflict in any way with our 
holding. That decision was based upon 
statutory subrogation, whereas we are deal-
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ing with conventional subrogation based 
upon contract. 
The Manion case hinged upon an inter-
pretation of the statute as did the three 
cases cited therein. When the Manion case 
was decided the statute was silent as to 
attorneys' fees and the court properly con-
cluded that it was the obvious intention 
of the legislation that the employer be fully 
reimbursed without regard to attorneys' 
fees. 
We conclude that the trial court prop-
erly allocated the attorneys' fees among the 
various claimants to the proceedings of the 
dram shop action. 
The order of the Circuit Court of Win-
nebago County is affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
CROW, P. J., and WRIGHT, J., concur. 
O I KEY NUMBER SY$TEM> 
30 111 App.2d 167 
Joseph R. ROSBOROUGH, Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
V. 
CITY OF MOLINE, a Municipal Corporation, 
Defendant-Appellee, 
and 
Moline Heating and Construction Company, 
a corporation, Defendant. 
Gen. No. 11494. 
Appellate Court of Illinois. 
Second District, Second Division. 
April 21, 1961. 
Suit by property owner for judgment 
declaring whether cost of repair and re-
placement of water service pipe in city 
street connecting water main to the prop-
erty was chargeable to the owner or the 
city. The Circuit Court, Rock Island 
County, A. J. Scheineman, J., rendered a 
judgment for the city, and the owner ap-
pealed. The Appellate Court, Crow, P. J., 
held that the owner, whose application and 
guarantee of water bill, which provided 
that acceptance of application by city 
should constitute contract and be subject 
to all existing and future regulations adopt-
ed by water department, was accepted by 
city, was liable for the cost under ordi-
nance. 
Affirmed. 
!. Waters and Water Courses 0203(1) 
Owner's application and guarantee of 
water bill, which stated that acceptance 
of application by city constituted contract 
subject to regulations adopted by city for 
wrater department was admissible as mate-
rial, on issue of liability for cost of re-
placing service pipe, although owner's mo-
tion to strike city's defense that owner 
had agreed to be subject to the regulation 
was allowed. S.H.A. ch. 110, § 57.1. 
2. Municipal Corporations C=>I22(I) 
Ordinance of which court may or 
must take judicial notice need not be 
stated in pleading. S.H.A. ch. 51, § 48a. 
3. Evidence C=32, 330 
Ordinance stating that service pipes 
from water main to premises shall be in-
stalled and maintained at expense of prop-
erty owner was properly admitted in evi-
dence, or properly judicially noticed, and 
was material in suit by owner against city 
for judgment determining whether owner 
or city was liable for cost of repair to serv-
ice pipe. S.H.A. ch. 51, § 48a. 
4. Municipal Corporations <§=>3, 57, 59 
Cities are of statutory creation, and 
their powers are limited to those which 
are expressly granted by General Assembly 
or are necessarily implied from such as 
are granted. 
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SHEEHY, Justice, dissenting: 
I dissent. This plaintiff is entitled to 
have a jury determine whether the defend-
ant was liable for her fall on the business 
premises of the defendant. 
It is clear from the evidence here, and it 
is admitted in the defendant's brief on ap-
peal that the color of the carpet on the 
raised portion of the business premises 
blended with the linoleum on the lower 
portion of the business premises. The ma-
jority have interpreted the plaintiffs state-
ment that she "just didn't see it," as an 
indication that she did not look to deter-
mine the stair was there. It is as easy to 
interpret the statement to mean that hav-
ing looked she could not see it because the 
carpet blended with the linoleum. 
The majority decides, as the District 
Court decided that because the plaintiff 
had passed over the same step when she 
went in the opposite direction 45 minutes to 
one hour earlier, that she had knowledge of 
the step and therefore knew of its exist-
ence on the return trip. That interpreta-
tion establishes a test that goes beyond 
what migH be expected of a reasonably 
prudent, ordinary person; it is a test for 
superhumans. I doubt that any of us could 
remember in detail the elevations in a 
strange business premises one hour after 
we had passed over the same for the first 
time. 
This woman rose from the hair dryer, 
and returned to the step at the beckoning 
of the attendant in the business. She sus-
tained a dangerous fall which injured her 
and resulted in a fracture to a bone in her 
ankle because she "just did not see" that 
the carpet was blended with the linoleum, 
and actually was 6 inches higher than the 
linoleum. It should be a jury decision as to 
whether she was trapped by these innocent 
looking premises. 
This case should be submitted to the jury 
on the issue of whether the business opera-
tor of the premises should have anticipated 
the danger lurking in the coloration of the 
linoleum and the carpet so as the raise a 
duty to wrarn customers or alter the premis-
es. 
s[GE v. CHRISTENSON Mont. 1319 
19 (Mont. 1984) 
One jieed only read the majority opinion 
to realize that a fact issue exists in this 
case. Most of the majority opinion is an 
interpretation of the facts, and always 
against the plaintiff. Interpretation of 
facts is jury business, not court business. 
The probability that plaintiff will not pre-
vail at trial is no justification for granting 
summary judgment. It may appear that 
recovery is very remote, but that is not the 
test. If there is a genuine issue of materi-
al fact, summary judgment is not appropri-
ate. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P. 
WEBER, Justice, dissenting: 
I respectfully dissent from the majority 
opinion. I agree with Justice Sheehy that 
because there are genuine issues of materi-
al fact, summary judgment is not appropri-
ate under Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P. 
SHEA, Justice: 
I join in the dissent of Mr Justice 
Sheehy. 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Mark Allen CHRISTENSON, Roland J. 
Christenson and Karense M. Christen-
son, Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 83-177. 
Supreme Court of Montana. 
Submitted March 2, 3^34. 
Decided July 12, l i i4 . 
Uninsured motorist and his parents 
sought to vacate default judgment in action 
brought against them by injured party's 
uninsured motorist carrier. The District 
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Court, Thirteenth Judicial District, in and 
for the County of Yellowstone, William J. 
Speare, J., denied motion, and defendants 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Harrison, 
J., held that uninsured motorist carrier can 
make payment to insured, and when in-
sured settles his claim or obtains judgment 
against third party, carrier can subrogate 
and collect back amount paid to insured; 
furthermore, uninsured motorist carrier 
can require that action be instituted in 
name of insured against uninsured motor-
ist in order to effectuate subrogation inter-
est of uninsured motorist carrier, but ac-
tion must not impair, diminish or jeopardize 
insured's ability to recover any damages in 
excess of subrogation amount. 
Affirmed. 
Morrison, J., and Weber, J., filed spe-
cially concurring opinions. 
Sheehy, J., filed dissenting opinion. 
Shea, J., dissented and will file opinion. 
Insurance <s=>601.25, 607.1(2) 
Uninsured motorist carrier can make 
payment to insured, and when insured set-
tles his claim or obtains judgment against 
third party, carrier can subrogate and col-
lect back amount paid to insured; further-
more, uninsured motorist carrier can re-
quire that action be instituted in name of 
insured against uninsured motorist in order 
to effectuate subrogation interest of unin-
sured motorist carrier, but action must not 
impair, diminish or jeopardize insured's 
ability to recover any damages in excess of 
subrogation amount, and if subrogation oc-
curs, uninsured motorist carrier must, in 
good faith, seek for insured any other dam-
ages that he may not have received in his 
payment from carrier; limiting Allstate v. 
Reitler, 628 P.2d 667. (Per Harrison, J., 
with two Justices concurring and two Jus-
tices concurring in result.) 
Lloyd E. Hartford argued, Billings, for 
defendants and appellants. 
Crowley Law Firm; Ronald Lodders ar-
gued, Billings, for plaintiff and respondent. 
HARRISON, Justice. 
This is an appeal from an order denying 
a motion to vacate a default judgment and 
stay of execution. The defendants sought 
to vacate a default judgment by claiming 
the judgment to be void The District 
Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, in 
and for the County of Yellowstone, denied 
the defendants' motion 
On June 6, 1981, defendant Mark A. 
Christenson apparently caused an accident 
by improperly operating a motor vehicle. 
Kristine N. Hinckley, a passenger in the 
vehicle, sustained injuries as a result of the 
accident. Both Christenson and Hinckley 
were minors at the time of the accident. 
Christenson had no insurance on the vehi-
cle when the accident occurred. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers) 
insured Hinckley and paid $7,000 on her 
claim arising out of the injuries she sus-
tained in the accident. Farmers paid this 
under an uninsured motorist provision in 
the Hinckley insurance policy. As required 
in the policy, the Hinckleys assigned their 
personal injury action to Farmers as part 
of a subrogation clause. 
On February 10, 1982, Farmers filed an 
action against Christenson and his parents 
for $7,000 paid on the personal injury 
claim. The Christensons received proper 
service of the complaint and summons. 
The Christensons failed to answer or take 
any action to defend against this action. 
On April 1, 1982, Farmers filed a motion 
for default judgment and on July 29, 1982, 
the court granted said motion. 
On January 11, 198S the Christensons 
filed a motion to vacate the default judg-
ment and stay the execution. They assert-
ed the judgment was void because Farmers 
was an improper party in the action. The 
Hinckleys lacked the ability to assign their 
personal injury action via the subrogation 
clause to Farmers. Following a hearing on 
their case, the court found that the subro-
§1-
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gation occurred properly and that the de-
fault judgment was entered properly. 
Appellants raise two issues on appeal: 
(1) Can an insured party subrogate a 
personal injury action to an insurance com-
pany following the payment of claims aris-
ing out of a policy protection against unin-
sured motorist? 
(2) Was the default judgment void if 
Farmers was an improper party to the ac-
tion? 
Appellants contend the District Court 
erred in determining that respondent re-
ceived a valid subrogation interest from 
Kristine Hinckley. They contend that an 
injured party cannot subrogate a personal 
injury claim to an insurance company. 
Such subrogation is invalid. Therefore, the 
insurance company is not a real party in 
interest in the suit and cannot sue the 
tortfeasor. 
Appellants rely heavily on Allstate v. 
Reitler (Mont.1981), 628 P.2d 667, 38 St. 
Rep. 821, for the proposition that the in-
sured cannot subrogate personal injury 
claims to an insurance company Reitler 
involved a woman, Welton, who suffered 
an injury in an automobile accident caused 
by Reitler. Welton received $2,000 from 
Allstate for her medical expenses, but that 
amount failed to cover the total expenses. 
She then settled with Reitler's insurance 
company (Farmers Insurance Exchange) 
and signed a release of claims against 
them. Allstate then claimed a right to 
subrogation and tried to recover the $2,000 
it paid to Welton from Reitler. This Court 
held that subrogation clauses on medical 
insurance policies are invalid, and went on 
to say the insured could not subrogate 
their personal injury claim to the insurance 
company. 
Appellants also cite Cody v. Cogswell 
(1935), 100 Mont. 496, 50 P.2d 249, to sup-
port their claim that personal injury claims 
cannot be assigned. That case involved a 
writ of attachment on a personal injury 
cause of action before a judgment was 
rendered. This Court held that personal 
<GE v. CHRISTENSON Mont. 1321 
[9 (Mont. 1984) 
injury suits were not subject to writs of 
attachment. 
Respondent distinguishes Reitler in that 
it involved medical payment coverage and 
not uninsured motorist coverage. It dis-
misses the broad statements against as-
signment of personal injury claims as dicta. 
Justice Morrison, the author of Reitler, 
carefully limited the holding to medical 
payments subrogation clauses: 
"We hold that medical payment subroga-
tion clauses are invalid. In doing so, we 
are mindful that this Court is joining a 
minority of jurisdictions so holding. 
However, the public policy considerations 
militate in favor of such a result.'' 628 
P.2d at 670, 38 St.Rep. at 824. 
This is not to say we approve of the 
wording of the clause in this contract 
which in our opinion could be abused by the 
insurance company. The clause reads: 
"Subrogation. In the event of any pay-
ment under this policy, the company shall 
be subrogated to all the insured's right 
of recovery therefore, against any per-
son or organization, and the insured 
shall execute and deliver instruments 
and papers and do whatever else is nec-
essary to secure such rights. The in-
sured shall do nothing after loss to preju-
dice such rights." (Emphasis added.) 
In our opinion under this clause it could 
be possible that the insurance company 
could collect an amount in excess of what 
was paid out to the insured. That will not 
be permitted. The insurance company can 
only be permitted to be subrogated for the 
amount paid out to insured. 
Respondent asserts that equity dictates 
the need for subrogation. It cites Skauge 
v. Mountain States Tel & Tel. (1977), 172 
Mont. 521, 565 P.2d 628, to support this 
claim. In Skauge, this Court permitted 
subrogation of a claim fcr damages to per-
sonal property that resulted from defend-
ant's negligence. We said subrogation 
may occur after the insured has been made 
whole for his entire loss. 
Respondent argues that public policy re-
quires subrogation in this case. If this 
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Court precluded subrogation of claims 
against uninsured motorists, then the unin-
sured motorist would probably benefit. 
Once the insured plaintiff receives the in-
surance compensation for the accident, it is 
less likely he will pursue litigation against 
the uninsured motorist. Therefore, subro-
gation enhances the chances that the unin-
sured motorist will pay for his wrongdoing, 
and promote the policy requiring motorists 
to carry insurance. 
As noted above, the controlling issue 
here is one of public policy. We hold that 
an uninsured motorist carrier can make 
payment to an insured, and when the in-
sured settles his claim or obtains a judg-
ment against a third party, the carrier can 
subrogate and collect back the amount paid 
to the insured. Further, the uninsured mo-
torist carrier can require that the action be 
instituted in the name of the insured 
against the uninsured motorist in order to 
effectuate the subrogation interest of the 
uninsured motorist carrier. But said action 
must not impair, diminish or jeopardize in-
sured's ability to recover any dam^es in 
excess of the subrogation amount. If a 
subrogation occurs, then the uninsured mo-
torist carrier must, in good faith, seek for 
the insured any other damages (general, 
special or punitive) that he may not have 
received in his payment from the carrier. 
While it is argued that this issue hinges 
on this Court's interpretation of Reitler, 
where we denied subrogation to medical 
payment coverage, we believe that public 
policy demands that our holding in that 
case is limited to medical payment cover-
age. 
Appellants' reliance on Cody, supra, also 
cited in Reitler for the proposition that 
Montana has long opposed assignment of 
personal injury claims, is unfounded. 
Cody never dealt with the issue of assign-
ment. That case only involved an issue of 
attachment. 
"In their briefs and argument on this 
question, counsel for both sides have de-
voted considerable time and space to the 
question of whether such a cause of ac-
tion is assignable, or whether it survives 
the death of the person in whom it repos-
es. As we view the case, these matters 
have no relevancy to the real issue 
presented here. The only question to be 
determined is whether a cause of action 
for personal injuries is subject to attach-
ment before judgment is rendered there-
on." 100 Mont at 500, 50 P.2d at 250. 
In the second issue, appellants claim that 
because subrogation cannot occur, then re-
spondent cannot be a real party in interest. 
They cite Rule 17(a), M.R.Civ.P, that 
"[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the 
name of the real party in interest . . . " 
The lack of a real party in interest renders 
the judgment void. A void judgment is 
always subject to collateral attack as pro-
vided in Rule 60(b)(4), M.R.Civ.P. 
Due to the fact we find the subrogation 
is proper, we will not treat the second issue 
due to mootness. 
The District Court properly found such 
judgment valid. We hereby affirm. 
HASWELL, C.J., and GULBRANDSON, 
J., concur. 
SHEA, J., dissents and will file opinion 
later. 
MORRISON, Justice, specially concur-
ring: 
I concur in the result but for a different 
reason. 
This action was initiated by Farmers In-
surance Exchange filing a complaint 
against Mark Allen Christenson, Roland J. 
Christenson and Karense M. Christenson 
seeking to recover damages in the sum of 
$7,000. The record reflects that proper 
service was had upon defendants and they 
failed to appear. A default judgment was 
entered on July 29, 1982. Defendant's mo-
tion to vacate judgment was not filed until 
January 11, 1983, some 166 days later. 
Defendants acknowledge that the default 
judgment cannot be set aside upon any 
grounds other than that the judgment is 
void. 
Christensons argue that the damages 
sought bv Farmers Insurance Exchange 
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resulted from an unlawful assignment of & 
personal injury claim belonging to Farmers 
assignor. This argument was urged in the 
District Court and the District Court ruled 
against Christensons. The District Court 
based its ruling on the merits of the legal 
argument. The District Court held that 
Farmers' claim rested on a valid subroga-
tion interest. 
The District Court should not have 
reached the merits. There simply is no 
basis for arguing that the judgment en-
tered July 29, 1982 was void. The District 
Court clearly had jurisdiction of both the 
subject matter of the action and of the 
parties personally. When a court has juris-
diction then a judgment can only be collat-
erally attacked if the court's action in-
volves a "plain usurpation of power." 1 
Moore's Federal Practice, § 60.25[2]. 
HfcYfc \t \s> dfcfcY that the )\idgrc\eY\t of the 
District Court cannot be collaterally at-
tacked. Christenson's motion to set aside 
the default judgment is not timely. This 
Court cannot reach the merits involving 
validity of Farmers' subrogation interests-
I vote to affirm. 
WEBER, Justice, specially concurs as 
follows: 
I concur in the result reached in the 
majority opinion for the reasons set forth 
in the foregoing special concurrence of Jus-
tice Morrison. I therefore vote to affirm. 
SHEEHY, Justice, dissenting: 
I dissent. 
The ancients tell us that Aeneas descend-
ed with the Sibyl to the melancholy regions 
of the dead. He was shown, near the rivet 
of oblivion, a place of torment for one who 
perverts the law, making it say one thing 
today and another tomorrow. 
I am not implying that by this decision 
the members of the majority will go to 
Hades. That is not in my jurisdiction. I 
am implying that the members of the ma-
jority should look over their shoulders to 
the past and their earlier pronouncements. 
JGE v. CHRISTENSON Mont. 1323 
9 (Mont. 1984) 
On May 28, 1981, we stated it was invalid 
in Montana to assign a personal injury 
claim against a tortfeasor to a subrogee. 
Today, in 1984, we permit such assignment. 
The Court today is approving the assign-
ment, in the name of subrogation, of a 
personal injury claim so the insurer can sue 
as the real party in interest. No statute 
supports the Court's action. 
The facts of the case must first be under-
stood. On June 6, 1981, Mark Allen Chris-
tenson, 17 years old, was operating a 1968 
Ford motor vehicle owned by Eric T. Chris-
tenson. Mark's passenger in the automo-
bile was Kristine N. Hinckley, a minor at 
the time. The automobile overturned on a 
county road in Yellowstone County and 
Kristine suffered personal injuries. 
Mark Allen Christenson, the driver, was 
the minor son of Roland J. and Karense M. 
Christenson. Mark's parents, in compli-
ance with Montana law, had agreed to as-
sume Mark's liability so that he could get a 
driver's license. These parents undoubted-
ly did not realize, and I am sure that most 
parents do not realize, that m Montana, 
when they assume full liability for the is-
suance of a driver's license to a minor 
person, they are on the legal hook for 
absolute liability without limit if the minor 
person is driving an uninsured^ vehicle 
which injures someone, or if their own poli-
cy of liability insurance does not follow the 
minor when he drives a non-owned automo-
bile. 
In this case, the minor was driving an 
automobile owned by Eric T. Christenson, 
a brother, and not owned by his parents. 
It is quite possible (we have no record on 
this point) that the parents here had a 
policy of liability insurance, which would 
follow Mark and provide him coverage, un-
less the automobile Mark was driving was 
owned by a member of the same household, 
but was not insured under the parents' 
policy. In that situation, the parents' poli-
cy of insurance coverage does not follow 
the minor driver. 
Because of this unfortunate situation, 
the net result to the parents of Mark Allen 
Christenson is that they will probably be 
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called upon to pay the judgment required 
now by the majority of this Court. While 
the parents were always at risk to Kristine, 
if she were injured through Mark's driving 
an uninsured vehicle, the parents were nev-
er at risk to her insurer until the majority 
opinion of this Court. 
At the time of the collision, Kristine N. 
Hinckley was insured by Farmers Insur-
ance Exchange, probably through a policy 
of automobile liability insurance owned by 
her parents, Dan K. and Rae D. Hinckley. 
The policy of insurance owned by the 
Hinckleys with the Farmers Insurance Ex-
change provided uninsured motorists cover-
age as is required in Montana. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, without suit, entered 
into a settlement agreement with the par-
ents of Kristine Hinckley for the sum of 
$7,000. It should be remembered that 
when an automobile accident occurs to 
which an uninsured motorist coverage ap-
plies, the insurance company becomes an 
adversary of its own insured, taking the 
part jf the uninsured motorist as against 
its insured in negotating a settlement. 
On February 10, 1982, Dan K. Hinckley, 
as the father and conservator of the estate 
of Kristine and Rae D. Hinckley as her 
mother, entered into a release agreement 
with Farmers Insurance Exchange for the 
sum of $7,000, which release contains the 
following language. 
"NOW THEREFORE the undersigned, 
individually, as father of Kristine Hinck-
ley and as conservator of the estate of 
Kristine N. Hinckley, protected person, 
in consideration of the payment of Seven 
Thousand Dollars ($7,000.00) received by 
him, does hereby forever release and dis-
charge Farmers Insurance Exchange and 
Farmers Insurance Group, its agents, 
and employees, of and from any and all 
claims and causes of actions of every 
kind and character arising out of the 
injuries to Kristine Hinckley on or about 
June 6, 1981. The parties expressly 
agree, in the event that Kristine Hinck-
ley or Dan K. Hinckley, as her guardian, 
successfully pursue any claim against 
the driver of the automobile, Mark Allen 
Christenson, Farmers Insurance Ex-
change shall become subrogated to and 
entitled to indemnity for the payment 
made, namely Seven Thousand Dollars 
($7,000.00)." 
Note please that the language in the 
release instrument does not constitute a 
transfer of the cause of action, but instead 
is a conditional provision for indemnity in 
the event that either Kristine or her guardi-
an presses a claim against the uninsured 
motorist. No mention is made in the re-
lease of a suit by the insurance company, 
acting for itself, against the parents of 
Mark Allen Christenson. 
This is not the first release that the 
Hinckley's signed for Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, but I will discuss that later in 
this dissenting opinion. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange, instead of 
following the language of its release, 
above, and allowing Kristine Hinckley or 
her guardian to pursue the personal injury 
claim against Mark and his parents, chocc 
instead to file its action in its own name 
directly in the District Court for the $7,000 
it paid on Kristine's claim. It took a de-
fault judgment. Some nine months after 
the default judgment was entered, the fi-
nancial responsibility division of the Mon-
tana Highway Patrol suspended the driv-
er's license of the father of Mark Christen-
son. It was this unlooked-for incident that 
triggered the motion of the parents of 
Mark to set aside the default judgment 
obtained against them in favor of Farmers 
Insurance Exchange on the ground that the 
assignment of a personal injury claim is 
invalid in Montana. 
The assignment of a personal injury 
claim based on tort in Montana is indeed 
invalid, or was until now. That a personal 
injury claim could not be assigned was 
established in Caledonia Insurance Co. v. 
Northern Pacific Railroad Co. (1905), 32 
Mont. 46, 79 P. 544. There Judge Hollo-
way noted the distinction that a right of 
action growing out of a violation of proper-
ty rights was assignable, but a right of 
action growing out of the violation of a 
purely personal right was not. As recently 
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as May 28, 1981, this was the law in Mon-
tana. This Court affirmed that position in 
All-State Insurance Co. v. Reitler and 
Farmers Insurance Exchange (Mont. 
1981), 628 P.2d 667, 6?0, 38 St.Rep. 821, 
824-25 (authored by Morrison, J., and con-
curred in by Haswell, C.J., Harrison, Shea, 
and Weber, J.). In that case it is stated: 
"Montana has long opposed the assign-
ment of personal injury claims (citing a 
case). Whether an insurance policy pro-
vides for subrogation [as in this case] or 
provides that the carrier has a lien on the 
proceeds of an insured's third party re-
covery, that policy has the effect of as-
signing a part of the insured's right to 
recovery against a third party tortfeasor. 
We hold that such an assignment is in-
valid." (Material in brackets added.) 
As I have pointed out above, the release 
agreement does not permit Farmers Insur-
ance Exchange to sue in its own name 
against the tortfeasor, since the release 
agreement is one for indemnity between 
the insurance company and its insured. If 
Farmers Insurance Exchange has an inde-
pendent right of subrogation at all it must 
come from its insurance policy issued to 
the Hinckleys which includes the following 
clause: 
"Subrogation. In the event of any pay-
ment under this policy, this company 
shall be subrogated to all the insured's 
right of recovery therefor, against any 
person or organization, and the insured 
shall execute and deliver instruments 
and papers and do whatever else is nec-
essary to secure such rights. The in-
sured shall do nothing after loss to preju-
dice such rights." 
This is the clause on which Farmers In-
surance Exchange claims the right to sue 
as the real party in interest against the 
tortfeasor for the insured's right of recov-
ery, and against all persons or organiza-
tions from whom recovery might be ob-
tained, including the parents of the unin-
sured driver. That constitutes a transfer 
of the personal injury claim of Kristine 
Hinckley. The clause appears in the gener-
al provisions of the insurance policy, and 
*GE v. CHRISTENSON Mont. 1325 
19 (Mont. 1984) 
not on the insured motorist endorsement 
itself. I recognize that a general subroga-
tion clause is necessary in an insurance 
policy because the company has a right of 
subrogation for property damage payments 
for which it might make. There is no quar-
rel in Montana about that. Applying the 
clause however to personal injury claims 
paid for under the endorsement was invalid 
at the time of the issuance of the policy 
because of this Court's long standing posi-
tion that personal injury claims could not 
be assigned or subrogated. It is this 
clause upon which Farmers Insurance Ex-
change right of action must stand or fall. 
The majority members are injudicious in 
permitting Farmers' action here on at least 
the following grounds: 
(1) The Court has no statutory authority to 
permit it; (2) The Court fails to distinguish 
between subrogation proper and assign-
ment; (3) Farmers' action is not a bar to 
further suits by the Hinckleys against the 
tortfeasor; and (4) The insurer's action is 
improper when the insured is not fully com-
pensated; and (5) There will be no accom-
panying reduction in the premiums Montan-
ans pay for uninsured motorist coverage. 
(1) Lack of Statutory Authority 
In the absence of statutory authority 
permitting subrogation of uninsured motor-
ist coverage claims we should scruple to 
permit subrogation. Other states have 
adopted such permitting legislation. An 
analysis of cases rising in other states, 
under permissive statutes, reveals a num-
ber of incidental questions relating to sub-
rogation that require legislation to solve. 
Waiting for legislative direction in the field 
would undoubtedly help close the avenues 
to some needless litigajon in our state 
opened up by the majority. 
In examining the statutes of other states 
within the Pacific Digest system, we find 
Arizona (Section 20.259.01 Ariz.Stat), Colo-
rado (Colo.Rev.Stat. § 10-4-609), Hawaii 
(Section 431-448 HRS), and Utah (Section 
41-12-21.1 UC) have provisions nearly the 
same as ours (Section 33-23-201, MCA). 
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No hint of subrogation is found in those 
statutes. 
The California legislature has adopted 
the following provision (Section 11 580.-
2(7)(g)): 
"Subrogation. The insurer paying a 
claim under an uninsured motorist in-
dorsement or coverage, shall be entitled 
to be subrogated to the rights of the 
insured to whom such claim was paid 
against any person causing such injury 
or death to the extent that the payment 
was made . . . " 
Note that the California provision pro-
vides for subrogation not only against the 
uninsured motorist but against "any per-
son causing such injury or death." This 
means that joint and several tortfeasors 
can be made to respond in subrogation to 
an insurer who has made a payment under 
the uninsured motorist coverage. 
In California, however, the right of the 
subrogating insurer to collect from others 
in sublimated to the right of the injured 
party to be made whole. Thus, if the in-
jured party is not fully compensated by the 
recovery of the limits of the uninsured 
motorist coverage, and has an action 
against other joint tortfeasors, the insurer 
making payment under the uninsured mo-
torist coverage has no right of subrogation 
until the injured party has been made 
whole from the other tortfeasors. United 
Pacific-Reliance Insurance Companies v. 
Kelly (1983), 140 Cal.App.3d 72, 189 Cal. 
Rptr. 323; Security National Insurance 
Co. v. Hand (1973), 31 Cal.App.3d 227, 107 
Cal.Rptr. 439. The majority opinion in this 
case ignores this restrictive provision pro-
tecting insureds. 
In the case we are deciding here, the 
general grant of authority for subrogation 
by the majority of this Court to the insurer 
does not take into account the result as to 
joint tortfeasors. I submit the legislature 
should decide such issue. 
Here is the other side of the joint tort-
feasor coin: In Washington, section 48.22.-
040(3), R.C.W., provides: 
"In the event of payment to an insured 
under the coverage required by this 
chapter and subject to the terms and 
conditions of such coverage, the insurer 
making such payments shall, to the ex-
tent thereof, be entitled to the proceeds 
of any settlement or judgment resulting 
from the exercise of any rights of recov-
ery of such insured against any person 
or organization legal responsible for the 
bodily injury for which such payment 
made, . . . " 
In Hawaiian Insurance and Guaranty 
Company v. Mead (1975), 538 P.2d 865, 
869, the Washington Appellate Court held 
that the statute provided subrogation only 
against the uninsured motorist, the per-
son causing the damage, and no right of 
recovery existed against other parties. 
The Washington decision recites that four 
states, Mississippi, Michigan, Missouri, and 
Georgia have held likewise. The majority 
in this case permit suit by the insurance 
company against the parents of the unin-
sured driver 
Subrogation is founded upon the equita-
ble theory that one who pays the legal 
obligation of another should stand in the 
shoes of the payee to recover the payment 
from the one who should have made pay-
ment. That makes equitable sense. The 
five states which limit the right of recovery^ 
in subrogation against the uninsured mo-
torist, and no others, recognize that the 
theory on which subrogation is founded 
should not be extended to grant a right of 
recovery against parties who have not par-
ticipated in the condition of being unin-
sured. Again the majority has deficiently 
considered the implications of its majority 
decision in this case with respect to third 
parties, other than the uninsured motorist. 
In section 743.795 ORS, tne state of Ore-
gon is careful to keep the light of action in 
the insured, not the company, in the event 
of payment under an uninsured motorist 
coverage. Its statute sets out clauses to 
be included in the policy of motor vehicle 
insurance including 11(a) "the insurer shall 
be entitled to the extent of such payment 
to the proceeds of any settlement or judg-
ment that may result from the exercise of 
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any rights of recovery of such person 
against any uninsured motorist . . . " 
Clause 11(b) provides that "such person 
shall hold in trust for the benefit of the 
insurer all rights of recovery which he may 
have against the uninsured person . . . " 
Clause 11(c) allows recovery to be made 
from joint tortfeasors. Clause 11(e) pro-
vides the insured shall bring action against 
the uninsured motorist or other parties if 
the insured is requested to do so by the 
insurer. 
Clearly Oregon still observes the com-
mon law sanction against assignment of 
personal injury claims. 
The statutes of Kansas (Kan.Stat.Ann. 
§ 40-287), Idaho (Idaho Code § 41-2505), 
Washington (Wash.Rev.Code § 48-22-030), 
and Wyoming (Wyo.Stat. § 31-10-104) 
point to another interesting result. In 
those states where the statutes are nearly 
the same, it is provided that the insurer 
making a payment on the uninsured motor-
ist coverage, "shall, to that extent, be enti-
tled to the proceeds of any settlement or 
judgment resulting from the exercise of 
any right of recovery" against a respon-
sible party. Each of those statutes goes on 
to provide that the insurer shall have a 
direct right of action only if the insurer is 
required to make an uninsured motorist 
payment by virtue of the insolvency of the 
motorist. It may be deduced from the 
terms of these statutes that the right to 
sue remains in the insured, subject to reim-
bursement of the insurer making payment 
after judgment or settlement, but a direct 
right of action to the insurer is given where 
the responsible motorist is insolvent 
against his insolvent estate. 
From the foregoing, it can be seen that 
the issue is not simply should the Court 
without statutory authority, allow subroga-
tion of uninsured motorist coverage pay-
ments and direct action therefore by the 
insurer. The related problems are too com-
plex to be answered by a court in a single 
case and the whole subject should be decid-
ed by the legislature. 
JGE v. CHRISTENSON Mont. 1327 
9 (Mont. 1984) 
(2) The majority failed to distinguish 
between subrogation and assignment. 
The gist of the issue in this case is 
whether Farmers can bring a direct action 
against the uninsured motorist and his 
guarantors. This Court noted in Allstate 
Insurance Co. v. Reitler, supra, that a 
subrogation which results in a transfer of 
the cause of action to the insurer, is in 
effect an assignment and not subrogation. 
The distinction should be kept clearly in 
mind. There is, of course, no reason why 
Farmers should not be able to recover to 
the extent it made payment its settlement 
under the uninsured motorist coverage 
clause, if that recovery is made by the 
insureds. Certainly that is what the re-
lease which Farmers took from the Hinck-
leys contemplated. I would agree if the 
majority held that the subrogation clause 
on an automobile policy merely asserted a 
r\ght to YembuYseYTiertt, w>ritY\bution OY in-
demnity, but I cannot agree that the insur-
er became the owner of the cause of action. 
Idaho, in Rinehart v. Farm Bureau Mutu-
al Insurance Co. (1974), 96 Idaho 115, 524 
P.2d 1343, was careful to riuce that distinc-
tion. 
If Farmers according to its release was 
simply seeking to recover here to the ex-
tent of its payment from any judgments or 
settlement received in the name of the 
Hinckleys, I would have no quarrel with its 
right to such recovery. When it insists on 
the right to sue directly, in its own name, 
as a real party in interest, its subrogation 
becomes an assignment. In Fifield Manor 
v. Finsten (1960), 54 Cal.2d 632, 7 Cal.Rptr. 
377, 354 P.2d 1073, the California Supreme 
Court was careful to preserve the distinc-
tion and to refuse subrogation where no 
statutory authority for the assignment of 
the cause of action existed. 
(3) Farmers action against the unin-
sured motorist is not a bar to further 
action by the Hinckley's. 
An excellent reason for refusing at this 
juncture, in the absence of legislative ac-
tion, to permit direct suit by insurers who 
have made payments under uninsured mo-
torist coverage is that such direct suits do 
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not bar further action by the injured par-
ties against the same uninsured motorist or 
his guarantors. Thus, the cause of action 
is split, which goes against the grain of all 
jurisprudential sense and finality. 
This case is an excellent illustration. At-
tached as an appendix is a copy of the 
release obtained by Farmers in this case. 
In the second "whereas" clause, it is noted 
that the policy issued to the Hinckleys in-
cluded uninsured motorist and medical pay-
ments coverages. In view of those cover-
ages, it is curious that the release also 
includes the following paragraph: 
"In this regard, the parties agree that 
the original release, dated September 16, 
1981, was incorrect so far as the recita-
tions therein concerning the insurance 
provisions under which the $7,000 pay-
ment was made. It is now expressly 
understood that the sum of $7,000 was 
paid pursuant to the uninsured motorist 
coverage." 
The release goes on to say, however, that 
the $7,000 payment is full and final pay-
ment of every kind of claim against Farm-
ers Insurance Group by the Hinckleys, pre-
sumably including medical coverage pay-
ments. 
Two possibilities exist with respect to the 
release: (1) payment was made exclusively 
under the uninsured motorist coverage, and 
no payment was made to the Hinckleys 
under the medical payment provision. In 
such case, Hinckleys have the right to re-
cover medical expenses against the unin-
sured motorist or his guarantors. Thus, 
permitting Farmers to recover on the unin-
sured motorist coverage and the Hinckleys 
to recover on the medical payments ex-
penses constitutes a splitting of the cause 
of action. (2) Or, the medical payments 
were subsumed by Farmers in the single 
payment of $7,000. In that event, Farmers 
is suing for medical benefits paid, under 
medical payments coverage, which, under 
our holding in Reitler, is invalid in Mon-
tana. 
Of course, the statute of limitations may 
now have run as far as the Hinckley suit 
against the uninsured motorist is con-
cerned, but at the time of the taking of the 
release here in question, only seven months 
had elapsed. Again, this Court should con-
sider the rule in California, quoted above, 
that the insurer has no right of subroga-
tion where an insured has not been fully 
compensated. I would hope that we would 
continue the rule adopted in Skauge v. 
Mountain States Tel and Tel Co. (1977), 
172 Mont, 521, 565 P.2d 628, 632, to the 
effect that when an insured has sustained a 
loss in excess of the reimbursement by the 
insurer, the insured is entitled to be made 
whole for his entire loss and any cost of 
recovery including attorneys fees before 
the insurer can assert its right of legal 
subrogation against the insured or the tort-
feasors. 
(4) Action by the insurer would be im-
proper where the insured is not fully 
compensated. 
We have cited the California cases above, 
and Skauge, our case, indicating that sub-
rogation is not available to an insurer un-
less the insured is fully compensated. 
When, as in this case, a right is granted to 
an insured to bring direct action, there will 
be a race to the courthouse between the 
insurer and the insured to achieve a first 
recovery. That is the inevitable result of 
splitting a cause of action. 
It should be a matter of embarrassment 
to this Court, and to the law firm involved, 
that the arguments made in this case, and 
the stance adopted by this Court, are exact-
ly opposite to the arguments and stances 
adopted in Reitler, supra. In Reitler, the 
same law firm then representing Farmers 
Insurance Exchange filed a brief in this 
case in which it urged upon this Court that 
we had expressly recognized the rule that 
causes of action against personal injury are 
not assignable. It cited in support of that 
proposition Coty v. Cogswell (1935), 100 
Mont. 496, 50 P.2d 249; Toole v. Paumie 
Parisian Dye House (1935), 101 Mont. 74, 
52 P.2d 162; Baker v. Tullock (1938), 106 
Mont. 375, 77 P.2d 1035; Caledonia Insur-
ance Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (1905), 
32 Mont. 46, 79 P. 544; and 40 A.L.R.2d 
480, relating to assignability of claims for 
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personal injury, and the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts § 547. 
Now, three years later, the same law 
firm and the same insurance company take 
an opposite stance, and in the name of 
public policy, ask this Court to reverse 
without statutory authority our longstand-
ing position with respect to the non-assign-
ability of personal injury claims. Farmers 
argued and the majority swallowed, that 
public policy in providing insurance on all 
motor vehicles in the state is enhanced by 
allowing insurers to bring direct actions 
against uninsured motorists! It should be 
evident to all of us that Farmers is not 
going to sue uninsured motorists who are 
judgment-proof. It is only because in this 
case the parents signed a liability form for 
Mark that suit had been brought in this 
case. Insurance companies are not elee-
mosynary institutions. There are no more 
apt to chase good money after bad than 
any other party. 
(5) There will be no accompanying re-
duction in premiums Montanans pay for 
uninsured motorist coverage. 
The right of subrogation granted by the 
majority in this case is complete gravy to 
the insurance company. Subrogation is not 
a factor used by insurance companies in 
determining the rate of premiums charged. 
Arizona took note of this fact in refusing to 
make any distinction between assignment 
and subrogation with respect to the right 
of the insurer to recover. It held in All-
state Insurance Co. v. Durke (1978), 118 
Ariz. 301, 576 P.2d 489, 492: 
"Also, to require an injured policy holder 
to return to his insurer the benefits for 
which he has paid premiums is to deny 
him the benefits of his thrift and fore-
sight. In terms of public policy the only 
justification for allowing an insurance 
company to recoup the benefits it con-
tracted to pay out in exchange for the 
receipt of premium payments which are 
presumably actuarially adequate would 
be the lowering of premium rates as the 
result of such a recoupment. This is 
generally not the case: 
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" 'Subrogation is a windfall to the insur-
er, it plays no part in the rate schedules 
(or only a minor one), and no reduction is 
made in insuring interest . . where the 
subrogation right will obviously be worth 
something.' Patterson, Essentials of In-
surance Law at 151-152 (2d ed. 1957) 
(citing authority)." 576 P.2d at 492. 
Thus, although the majority has opened 
up to insurance companies a right of subro-
gation to sue in its own name wherever it 
might make recovery, not only against un-
insureds, but against other parties, no ac-
companying benefit will accrue in the form 
of reduced premiums to be paid by Montan-
ans for their uninsured motorist coverage. 
The insurers will collect the same amount 
of money from us for that coverage wheth-
er or not we permit subrogation. 
Insurers can rejoice in that. Subrogation 
is not factored in by insurers when they set 
the premiums for uninsured motorist cover-
ages. The loss cost is spread among the 
policy holders without regard to subroga-
tion. Montanans won't see a drop in unin-
sured motorist coverage premiums because 
of this decision. The> w\\\ see a prolifera-
tion of lawsuits by insurers "enforcing 
public policy" as the majority believes, to 
collect that gravy. 
The term "law" can be defined as that 
group of principles and precedents which, it 
may be fairly predicted, a court will apply 
to a given set of facts. Predicability is of 
the essence. A court which swings unpre-
dictably from one end of the spectrum to 
the other, not pausing at any shades be-
tween, is not applying law. It is acting as 
no more than an ad hoc committee. 
I would reverse and dismiss. 
APPENDIX 
PLAINTIFFS EXHIBIT B 
RELEASE 
WHEREAS, on June 6, 1981, Kristine 
Hinckely received injuries when the auto-
mobile in which she was riding as a passen-
ger, which automobile was operated by 
Mark Allan Christenson, on County Road 
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L745 near the junction with Fly Creek 
Road went out of control, left the road, and 
overturned. Said automobile driven by 
Mark Allan Christenson was uninsured; 
and 
WHEREAS, the undersigned Dan K. 
Hinckley holds a policy of insurance issued 
by Farmers Insurance Exchange which in-
cludes uninsured motorist coverage and a 
medical payment provision; and 
WHEREAS, the undersigned Dan K. 
Hinckley was appointed conservator of the 
estate of Kristine Hinckley, and in his indi-
vidual capacity as father and as conserva-
tor of the estate of Kristine Hinckley, his 
minor daughter, has now agreed upon a 
full and final settlement with Farmers In-
surance Exchange and Farmers Insurance 
Group; 
NOW, THEREFORE, the undersigned, 
individually, as father of Kristine Hinckley, 
and as conservator of the estate of Kristine 
Hinckley, protected person, in considera-
tion of the payment of Seven Thousand and 
no/100 Dollars ($7,000.00), received by him, 
does hereby forever release and discharge 
Farmers Insurance Exchange and Farmers 
Insurance Group, its agents, and employ-
ees, of and from any and all claims and 
causes of action of every kind and charac-
ter arising out of the injuries to Kristine 
Hinckley on or about June 6, 1981. The 
parties expressly agree, in the event that 
Kristine Hinckley or Dan K. Hinckley, as 
her guardian, successfully pursue any 
claim against the driver of the automobile, 
Mark Allan Christenson, Farmers Insur-
ance Exchange shall become subrogated to 
and entitled to indemnity for the payment 
made, namely $7,000.00. 
In this regard, the parties agree that the 
original release, dated September 16, 1981, 
was incorrect so far as the recitations 
therein concerning the insurance provisions 
under which the $7,000 payment was made. 
It is now expressly understood that the 
sum of $7,000 was paid pursuant to the 
uninsured motorist coverage. 
It is the intent hereof that all claims of 
every kind and character against Farmers 
Insurance Group and Farmers Insurance 
Exchange be hereby fully and finally com-
promised and settled. 
This release is given pursuant to an or-
der of the District Court of the Thirteenth 
Judicial District of the State of Montana, in 
and for the County of Yellowstone. 
Dated this 10 day of February, 1982. 
/ s / Dan K. Hinckley 
Dan K. Hinckley, individually as 
father, and as conservator of the 
estate of Kristine Hinckley, pro-
tected person. 
/ s / Rae D. Johnson Hinckley 
Rae D. Johnson Hinckley, mother 
of Kristine Hinckley, protected 
person. 
Molly STRONG, Petitioner 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Billy Ray WEAVER, Respondent 
and Respondent. 
No. 83-424. 
Supreme Court of Montana. 
Submitted on Briefs April 18, 1984. 
Decided July 23, 1984. 
Mother appealed an order of the Dis-
trict Court, Flathead County, Michael 
Keedy, J., modifying previous child custody 
order. The Supreme Court, Shea, J., held 
that since there was no visitation hearing, 
no finding in order that modification was in 
the "best interest" of the child, and no 
findings and conclusions to support order, 
remand was necessary. 
Vacated and remanded. 
1. Infants <®=>19.3(5) 
Ultimate finding of trial court that 
modification of custody decree would be in 
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Lyon v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, 
480 P.2d 739 (Utah 1971) 
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The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
David Craig CARLSEN, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 11876. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 5, 1971. 
Defendant was convicted before the 
First District Court, Cache County, Lewis 
Jones, J., of attempted second-degree bur-
glary, and he appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Tuckett, J., held that where trial court 
directed clerk to furnish defendant true 
and complete copy of documents, minute 
entries and transcript of proceedings with-
out cost to him and where defendant was 
notified that transcript filed in Supreme 
Court would be made available to him for 
purpose of aiding him in appeal, convic-
tion for attempted second-degree burglary 
was not improper on ground that trial 
court failed to furnish defendant without 
cost copies of minute entries and transcript 
of proceedings of his trial. 
Affirmed. 
Criminal Law <§=>I077 
Where trial court directed clerk to 
furnish defendant true and complete copy 
of documents, minute entries and transcript 
of proceedings without cost to him and 
where defendant was notified that tran-
script filed in Supreme Court would be 
made available to him for purpose of aid-
ing him in appeal, conviction for attempt-
ed second-degree burglary was not improp-
* * on ground that trial court failed to fur-
bish defendant without cost copies of min-
ute entries and transcript of proceedings of 
n
»s trial. 
David Craig Carlsen, pro se. 
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Lauren 
N
- Beasley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake 
^-
lty, for plaintiff and respondent. 
D INDEMNITY COMPANY Utah 7 3 9 
P.2d 739 
TUCKETT, Justice: 
The defendant was found guilty of at-
tempted second-degree burglary, and from 
the verdict and the judgment of the court 
sentencing the defendant to a term in the 
Utah State Prison he has appealed. The 
sole basis of the defendant's appeal is 
that the trial court failed to furnish him 
without cost copies of minute entries and 
a transcript of the proceedings of his trial. 
The record belies defendant's contention 
in that it shows that the court below did in 
fact make an order directing the clerk to 
furnish the defendant a true and com-
plete copy of the documents, minute entries 
and a transcript of the proceedings with-
out cost to the defendant. The record also 
shows that the defendant was notified that 
the transcript filed in this court would be 
made available to him for the purpose of 
aiding him in this appeal. 
It appears that the defendant's conten-
tions before this court are without merit 
and the verdict and judgment of the court 
below are affirmed. 
CALLISTER, C. J., and HENRIOD, 
ELLETT and CROCKETT, JJ., concur. 
O J KEY NUMKR SYSTEM> 
25 Utah 2d 311 
Barbara LYON, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNI-
TY COMPANY and Yosemite Insurance 
Company, Defendants and Appellant. 
No. (2068. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 9, 1971. 
Injured passenger, after obtaining 
judgment against uninsured motorist and 
another for injuries sustained in motor ve-
hicle collision, brought action to recover 
benefits under uninsured motorist coverage 
of two policies. The Third District Court, 
9 J 
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Salt Lake County, Gordon R. Hall, J., en-
tered judgment for the passenger. Her in-
surer appealed, and she cross-appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Callister, C. J., held 
that where policy contained uninsured mo-
torist endorsement with limit of $20,000 
per person but contained provision that the 
endorsement applied only in amount by 
which limit of liability exceeded applicable 
limit of liability of other similar insurance 
and where the passenger recovered under 
another policy containing $10,000 unin-
sured motorist endorsement, the former 
policy's excess-escape clause was effective 
and the passenger was only entitled to re-
cover on the former policy the difference 
between limits of the policies' endorse-
ments notwithstanding uninsured motorist 
statute, but that the passenger was entitled 
to interest on judgment on the policies only 
from time that judgment was rendered 
against uninsured motorist and another. 
Judgment reversed and cause remand-
ed with order to render judgment in ac-
cordance with opinion. 
withstanding uninsured motorist stati 
U.C.A.1953, 41-12-5, 41-12-21.1. ,r
 f$ 
3. Insurance <§=>532 
Where insured's damages exceed! 
policy limits under uninsured motorist c§ 
erage and insurer was not subject to dol 
ble exposure for the insured's medicaid 
penses, the insurer was not entitled toll 
off amount that it had paid under medi| 
payment coverage against amount thai 
was deemed liable to pay under uninsur 
motorist coverage under provision of<i 
cy which stated that insurer was not^ bbu 
gated to pay under uninsured motorist CQ 
erage that part of damage which represe. 
ed expenses for medical services. " ;VKij 
4. Insurance <§=>606(4) 
Where insured remained uncompensL 
ed for her total damages, her insurer^" 
not entitled to receive $2,000 paid-in 
court by insurer of judgment debtor on 
sis of former insurer's right of subrogat 
for medical payments. 
Henriod, J., did not participate herein. 5. Insurance <§=>607.!(8) 1
 i 1«H 
entitled 
1. Insurance @=>53l.3 
Purpose of uninsured motorist statute 
is to provide protection only up to mini-
mum statutory limits for bodily injuries 
and not to provide insured with greater in-
surance protection than would have been 
available had he been injured by insured 
motorist. U.C.A.1953, 41-12-5, 41-12-21.1. 
2. Insurance <©=>53l.3 
Where one policy contained uninsured 
motorist endorsement with limit of $20,000 
per person but contained provision that the 
endorsement applied only in amount by 
which limit of liability exceeded applicable 
limit of liability of other similar insurance 
and where passenger recovered under an-
other policy containing $10,000 uninsured 
motorist endorsement the former policy's 
excess-escape clause was effective and the 
passenger was only entitled to recover on 
the former policy the difference between 
limits of the policies' endorsements not-
Where insurer was not 
award from another insurer based on^ SU 
rogation rights for medical paymc 
judgment for $500 attorneys' fees as fot| 
er insurer's share of expenses in^repov 
ing the medical payments could not Jjejf 
tained. \ '$£$ 
* JH. 
6. Interest <S==39(2) 
Where insurer's obligation to perlj 
under expressed terms of contract, d*||§ 
arise until there was legal determinatjo 
liability of uninsured motorist andjjW 
of damages sustained, insured was r^ftj 
to interest on judgment against the ii) 
under uninsured motorist provision^ 
from time that judgment was^renj 
against uninsured motorist and another^ 
7. Insurance <§=>602.l * 
Insured was not entitled to dama| 
insurer's failure to bargain with nf£j$ 
tie her claim in connection with unins 
motorist. 
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^ j j a r o l d G. Christensen, of Worsley, 
Snow & Christensen, Salt Lake City, for 
^defendants-appellant. 
f
 Robert M. McRae, of Hatch, McRae, 
Richardson & Kinghorn, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff-respondent. 
"David B. Dee and Leonard W. Bur-
r llingham, Salt Lake City, Utah, Utah Trial 
?£awyers Assn., for amicus curiae. 
\r CALLISTER, Chief Justice: 
l
c
 rfrPlaintiff sustained serious injuries in a 
motor vehicle collision. She was a passen-
ger in the automobile of one Martinez; 
Yosemite Insurance Company had issued a 
liability policy upon this vehicle which con-
tained an uninsured motorist endorsement 
in accordance with Sec. 41-12-21.1, U.C. 
A.1953, as amended 1967. In a separate 
action plaintiff was granted a jury verdict 
of $70,830.75 against the operators of two 
other motor vehicles, who were deemed 
jointly and severally liable. One driver, 
Robert G. Butcher, was insured with All-
state, his coverage conformed to the statu-
tory minimum as provided in Sec. 41-12-5, 
$10,000 for bodily injury or death to one 
person. The other driver, Scott G. Nickel, 
was an uninsured motorist. 
Plaintiff was an insured under a policy 
issued to her father by Hartford Accident 
and Indemnity Company, which contained 
an uninsured motorist endorsement with a 
declared limit of $20,000 per person. In 
addition, plaintiff was covered under a 
medical expense provision. At the conclu-
sion of the plaintiff's tort action, Allstate, 
the insurer of Butcher, tendered $10,000, 
the limit of its coverage. Plaintiff re-
ceived $8,000; the other $2,000 was paid to 
the clerk of the court because Hartford as-
serted subrogation rights to the $2,000 that 
rt had paid plaintiff under the medical ex-
penses coverage. 
Plaintiff initiated the instant action to 
recover the benefits under the uninsured 
Motorist coverage of both the Yosemite 
and Hartford policies. The trial court 
I. 18 Utah 2d 157, 
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awarded judgment to plaintiff against 
Hartford for $20,000, the face amount of 
the uninsured motorist coverage in the pol-
icy it had issued in which plaintiff was a 
named insured. Plaintiff was awarded 
judgment against Yosemite for $10,000, the 
maximum coverage contained under its un-
insured motorist endorsement. In addition, 
plaintiff was awarded $500 for reasonable 
attorneys' fees incurred in assisting Hart-
ford in the recovery of $2,000 medical pay-
ments from Allstate. Hartford was 
awarded the $2,000 under its subrogation 
rights for medical payments. The trial 
court awarded plaintiff interest from the 
day of her original judgment except for 
the $500 attorneys' fees. Hartford appeals, 
and plaintiff cross-appeals. 
On appeal, Hartford asserts that under 
the terms of its policy its obligation to 
plaintiff cannot exceed $10,000, under its 
uninsured motorist coverage, which is the 
difference between the policy limits of 
Yosemite and Hartford. The Hartford 
policy provides: 
With respect to bodily injury to an in-
sured while occupying an automobile not 
owned by the named insured, the insur-
ance under Coverage D—Uninsured Mo-
torists shall apply only as excess insur-
ance over any other similar insurance 
available to such insured and applicable 
to such automobile as primary insurance, 
and this insurance shall then apply only 
in the amount by which the limit of lia-
bility for this coverage exceeds the ap-
plicable limit of liability of such other 
insurance. 
In Russell v. Paulson *• this court upheld 
the validity of an excess-escape ciause con-
tained in an uninsured motoric provision, 
wherein the insurer was obligated to pay 
only that amount by which the limits of its 
policy exceeded the limits of all other 
available insurance. In other words, 
where the insured is injured in a non-
owned vehicle upon which there has been 
issued an uninsured motorist endorsement, 
L7P.2d658 (1966). 
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the coverage to the insured under his poli-
cy constitutes excess insurance. 
Subsequent to the decision in Russell v. 
Paulson, the legislature enacted Sec. 4 1 -
12-21.1, U.C.A.1953, as amended 1967, 
which provides: 
Commencing on July 1, 1967, no auto-
mobile liability insurance policy insuring 
against loss resulting from liability im-
posed by law for bodily injury or death 
or property damage suffered by any per-
son arising out of the ownership, mainte-
nance or use of a motor vehicle, shall be 
delivered, issued for delivery, or renewed 
in this state, with respect to any motor 
vehicle registered or principally garaged 
in this state, unless coverage is provided 
in such policy or a supplement to it, in 
limits for bodily injury or death set 
forth in section 41-12-5, under provi-
sions filed with and approved by the 
state insurance commission for the pro-
tection of persons insured thereunder 
who are legally entitled to recover dam-
ages from owners or operators of unin-
sured motor vehicles and hit-and-run 
motor vehicles because of bodily injury, 
sickness or disease, including death, re-
sulting therefrom. * * * 
Plaintiff convinced the trial court that 
Sec. 41-12-21.1 indicated a legislative in-
tent to overrule the holding in Russell v. 
Paulson; she successfully contended that 
this excess-escape clause limited the pro-
tection afforded the insured in a manner 
contrary to the policy expressed by the leg-
islature and was therefore invalid. Plain-
t i ffs argument is sustained by case author-
ity, for there has been a marked diver-
gence of opinion among the judiciary as to 
the proper interpretation jof these unin-
sured motorist statutes. '''The two views 
are succinctly expressed in 28 A.L.R.3d 
551, 554 Anno: Uninsured Motorists— 
"Other Insurance": 
A number of courts have held that 
"other insurance" provisions, whether in 
the form of a "pro rata," "excess iristif-1 
ance," "excess-escape," or other similafi 
clause, are invalid as a part of uninsuriSl 
motorist protection, on the ground that! 
the statute requiring every liability polill 
cy to provide this type of protection wittl 
not permit the insurer to provide in any! 
way that the coverage will not appljjl 
where other insurance is also "availaSl 
ble," despite the fact that the i n s u r e r 
may thus be put in a better position thalp 
he would be in if the other motorislj 
were properly insured. Other couriP 
have stated, however, that the design an i l 
purpose of uninsured motorist statute§| 
are to provide protection only up totlS*! 
minimum statutory limits for bodily in)t$J 
ries, and not to provide the insured witKj 
greater insurance protection than wouldj 
have been available had he been injured! 
by an insured motorist, and have helflf 
such "other insurance" provisions "ar 
valid where they do not reduce coverag 
below the minimum statutory limits. 
[1] The latter view appears to be^ij 
accord with this State's statutory scheme 
Section 41-12-21.1 is part of the Mot 
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act;_st 
minimum limits of uninsured motorist coy! 
erage are correlated with the minimuj 
limits of coverage required for an autoind 
bile liability policy under Sec. 41-12-5^ 
C .A.1953^
 ; . ; 4 | 
In Tindall v. Farmers Automobile Ma 
agement Corp.2 the court rejected plwj 
tiff's argument that an excess-escaj 
clause contained in an uninsured motor 
provision violated the Illinois uninsu| 
motorist statute (paragraph 755(a) ,•(-
143a) of Chap. 75, Ill.Rev.Stat. (IH.J 
Code)). The court observed that the^stf 
utory provision was designed to Pr0J*SL 
and encourage protection complementary^ 
that afforded by the financial responsiw| 
ty act, thereby affording coverage'ftO; 
same extent as would have been in*ef 
if the tort-feasor had complied withj 
2. 83 Ill.App.2d 165, 226 N.E.2d 397, 28 A.L.R.3d 546 (1967). 
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guarantee a
 #source fiom which an in-
sured could recover his damages up to 
limits of $15,000/$30,000/$5,000 with re-
spect to any accident 
* * * * * * 
By their application of the Uninsured 
Motorist Act, the courts in many in-
stances have placed the innocent victim 
of an uninsured motorist in a superior 
position to that which he would have oc-
cupied if his wrongdoer had had liability 
coverage The pendulum has made the 
full swing Before the enactment of the 
Uninsured Motorist Act, one who had 
taken pains to protect the public against 
the effect of his own negligence by 
carrying insurance was himself left un-
protected against the effect of the negli-
gence of an uninsured motorist Toda> 
the same person, through his uninsured 
motorist endorsement, is usually better 
protected and procedurally is in a better 
position if the wrongdoer is uninsured 
/ [2] A careful review of the case law 
reveals that the better reasoned cases give 
effect to an excess-escape clause contained 
in an uninsured motorist endorsement In 
the instant action, the trial court erred by 
its refusal to apply such a clause in Hart-
ford's policy \Plaintiff is entitled to re-
cover onlythe difference between the lim-
its of the policies issued b> Hartford and 
Yosemite, 1 e , $10,000 
Defendant, Hartford, further contends 
that it is entitled to set off the $2,000 that 
it has paid under the medical payments 
coverage against the amount that it is 
deemed liable to pay plaintiff under the 
uninsured motorist coverage Hartford 
cites the following provision in its policy 
The company shall not be obligated to 
pay under Coverage D—Uninsured Mo-
contra, More^ock ^ Milleis Mutual Ins 
Assn , 125 111 App 2d 2S3, 260 N E 2d 
477 (1970), wherein the court, Appellate, 
5th District, declined to follow the hold 
ings of the other Illinois Appellate Courts 
4 22 Utah 2d 415, 417, 454 P 2 d 294 
(1969) 
i m l i m requirements of the financial re-
sponsibility act 3 
In Martin v Chnstensen,4 this court 
held that the provisions of Sec 41-12-21 1 
did not preclude the application of a clause 
providing that if the company had issued 
inore than ore policy to the insured, the in-
surer would be liable only up to the maxi-
mum coverage of its highest limit of any 
one policy for any one accident or loss 
This court cited as authority M. F A Mu-
tual Ins Co v Wallace5 in its rejection of 
the argument of insured, that the statute 
fixed the minimum coverage under each 
policy separately, and, therefore, the in-
sured was entitled to the maximum amount 
under both policies 
)] In 52 Virginia Law Review 538, 554-557 
/(1966), there is an incisive critique of the 
recent judicial trend of permitting the 
stacking of policies, 1 e , the courts have 
allowed recovery up to the combined limits 
of each policy available to the injured in-
sured b> ruling that "excess" or "other in-
surance" clauses were invalid The author 
asserts that the Uninsured Motorist Acts 
are not being applied in a manner which 
places the victim of an uninsured motorist 
upon an equal footing with the victim of 
an insured motorist In reference to the 
Virginia Act, the author states 
In these cases the courts have looked 
only to the number of policies available 
to pay the judgment obtained against the 
uninsured motorist No thought has 
been given to the fact that the act was 
intended merely to fill, not overflow, an 
insurance vacuum Surely the General 
Assembly did not intend to foster a 
scheme whereby the innocent victim of 
an insured motorist may be penalized 
It seems more logical that it intended to 
3 Also see II i n is v Southern Farm Bu 
lean Casualty Ins Co, Ark , 448 S W 2d 
052 (1970), M F A Mutual Ins Co \ 
Wallace, 245 Ark 230, 431 S W 2d 742 
(19G8) , Jackson v State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Ins Co, La App , 235 So 
2d 621 (1970) , Long ^ Lnited States 
Fire Ins Co, La App , 236 So 2d 521 
(1970), M a n land Casualty Co v. Howe, 
106 X H 422, 213 A 2d 420 (1965) , 
5 Note 3, supra 
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torists that part of the damage which the 
insured may be entitled to recover from 
the owner or operator of an uninsured 
highway vehicle which represents ex-
penses for medical services paid or pay-
able under Coverage B—Medical Ex-
pense. 
A similar provision was interpreted by 
the court in Taylor v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Ins. Co.6 as follows: 
* * * we consider it to be designed 
to protect the insurance company from 
double exposure for medical payments. 
Thus, it prevents an insured whose medi-
cal expenses have been paid under the 
Medical Payments Coverage from col-
lecting for those medical expenses once 
again, in the event that a judgment for 
general damages in his favor and against 
the insurance company under its t/nin-
sured Motorist Coverage falls below the 
policy limits of that coverage. However, 
in a case such as Mr. Taylor's where the 
award for general damages exceeds the 
policy limits on Uninsured Moton^r Cov-
erage, the insurance company must pay 
its insured the full limits of the policy, 
in this case $5,000 regardless of what it 
has paid him under the Medical Pay-
ments Coverage. We are fortified in 
our interpretation of this amendment by 
the fact that this is the only just mean-
ing that it could have. Mr. Taylor paid 
two separate premiums for two separate 
coverages. * * * To interpret the 
amendment as the company would have 
us do, would make the Medical Payment 
Coverage useless except in cases where 
the insured suffered physical injury as a 
result of his own negligence. * * * 7 
[3] In the instant action, plaintiff's 
damages exceeded the policy limits under 
the uninsured motorist coverage, and Hart-
6. La.App., 237 So.2d 690, 693 (1970). 
7. Also see Hutchison v. Hartford Acci-
dent & Indemnity Co., 34 A.D.2d 1010, 
312 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1970). 
8. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. v. Farmers 
Exchange, 22 Utah 2d 183, 184, 450 P. 
2d 458 (1969). 
ford was not subject to double exposufii 
for plaintiffs medical expenses. Und 
such circumstances, Hartford was not -
tied to offset the medical payments again 
the uninsured motorist coverage. 
Plaintiff in her cross-appeal asserts't! 
the trial court erred in its award to Har 
ford the $2,000 paid into the court by" 
state under Hartford's right of subrog 
tion for medical payments, when plaintiff 
damages far exceed her recovery theref<§ 
Subrogation springs from equity c<§n 
eluding that one having been reimburse 
for a specific loss should not be entitle 
to a second reimbursement therefo 
This principle has been accepted in""| 
insurance field with respect to proper 
damage, and with respect to medic 
costs by an impressive weight of author!? 
J-y % * * g 
The Hartford policy provides: 
In the event of any payment unde 
Coverage B—Medical Expense of thil 
policy, the company shall be subrogatea| 
to all the rights of recovery therefdf 
which the injured person or anyone } 
ceiving such payment may have again 
any person or organization and such^ 
son shall execute and deliver instrument] 
and papers and do whatever else isi.ne 
essary to secure such rights. SuchJ j 
son shall do nothing after loss to prej 
dice such rights. 
Since subrogation is an offspring oi£ 
uity, equitable principles apply, even w_| 
the subrogation is based on contract,^ 
cept as modified by specific provision^ 
the contract. In the absence of exgre 
terms to the contrary, the insured isrej] 
tied to be made whole before *he insg* 
may recover any portion of che recoy£ 
from the tort-feasor.9 If the one respons 
ble has paid the full extent of the loss^, 
9. Providence Washington Insurance Co. 
Hogges, 67 N.J.Super. 475, 171 A.2d 120^ 
124 (1961) ; First National Bank ^  
Lafayette v. Stovall, La.App., 128 '» 
2d 712, 717 (1961) ; 46 C.J.S. Insurano 
§ L209, p. 155. 
98 
KNUCKLES v. METROPOLITAN LI 
Cite as 4; 
^insured should not claim both sums, and 
t'the insurer may then assert its claim to 
'subrogation.10 
; - [4,5] In the instant action, there are 
no terms in this general subrogation clause 
which would support Hartford's subroga-
tion claim to the $2,000, while plaintiff re-
mains uncompensated for her total dam-
ages. Furthermore, since Hartford is not 
entitled to the award, the judgment for 
$500 attorneys' fees as Hartford's share 
\f expenses in recovering the medical pay-
,ents cannot be sustained. 
Plaintiff further asserts that since this is 
an action in contract between an insured 
and an insurer, she is entitled to interest 
from the date of her loss, the date of the 
accident, and not from the date she was 
granted judgment against the tort-feasors. 
The insurance contract provides: 
The company will pay all sums which 
the insured shall be legally entitled to re-
~ cover as damages from the owner or op-
erator of an uninsured motor vehicle. 
* * * [Emphasis added.] 
[6] Since Hartford's obligation to per-
form, under the express terms of its con-
tract with the insured, did not arise until 
there was a legal determination of the lia-
bility of the uninsured motorist and the ex-
tent of the damages sustained, the insured, 
plaintiff, is entitled to interest only from 
the time that judgment was rendered 
against the tort-feasors. 
* [7] Finally, plaintiff contends that the 
trial court should have awarded her dam-
ages for Hartford's failure to bargain with 
her or settle her claim. She concedes that 
there is no case in point but asserts that 
this court should analogize her situation to 
that where a liability insurer refuses in 
bad faith to settle a claim with third parties 
Within the policy limits and a judgment in 
e
*cess of the policy limits is rendered 
against the insured.11 She reasons that by 
,0
- McConneli v. Conaway, 62 Ohio App. 
335, 23 X.E.2d 970. 971 (1939). 
'• Ammerman v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 
!9 Utah 2d 261, 430 P.2d 576 (1967). 
480 P 2d—47V2 
lE INSURANCE COMPANY Utah 745 
P.2d 745 
Hartford's failure to bargain, she was 
compelled to incur legal expenses for 
which she is entitled to be compensated. 
Plaintiff's analogy is untenable because 
of the distinction HI the relationship be-
tween a liability insurer arid its insured 
and that between the insurer and its in-
sured in connection with an uninsured mo-
torist. In the former situation, the insurer 
must act in good faith and be as zealous in 
protecting the interests of the insured as it 
would be in regard to its own.12 In the 
latter situation, the insured and the insurer 
are, in effect and practically speaking, 
adversaries.13 
The judgment of the district court is re-
versed, and this cause is remanded with an 
order to render judgment in accordance 
with this opinion. Each party should bear 
its own costs. 
TUCKETT, ELLETT and CROCK-
ETT, JJ., concur. 
HENRIOD, J., does not participate 
herein. 
O jj KEY NUMBER SYSTEM, 
25 Utah 2d 319 
James P. KNUCKLES, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a corporation, De-
fendant and Appellant. 
No. 12254. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 5, 1971. 
Action by insured against insurer for 
benefits under policy for loss of sight. 
The Seventh District Court, Grand County, 
12. Ammerman v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 
note 11, supra. 
13. 7 Appleman, Insurance Law and Prac-
tice, 1970 Supp., § 4331, p. 128. 
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Admittedly, damages for inconvenience, sought to 
annoyance, discomfort and mental distress 
are not capable of precise calculation, al-
though those elements may reflect direct, 
immediate, and real injury. In this case the 
jury had evidence before it to justify the 
award of substantial damages of the type 
under consideration. The Branches testi-
fied to the emotional distress caused Jeanne 
Branch which culminated in her leaving her 
husband for a period of three or four 
months. In addition to that, the Branches 
were forced to truck water onto their prop-
erty and to take numerous other steps to 
counter the nuisance created by Western. 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 
judgment of the trial court in all respects 
except with respect to the striking of the 
award of damages for mental distress, an-
noyance, and discomfort and remand for 
the re-entry of that award in the amount 
specified by the jury. 
Utah 279 
intervene as of right as party 
defendant in tort action between its insured 
and uninsured motorist tort-feasor. Th^ 
Second District Court, Weber County, Ron-
ald 0« Hyde, J., denied intervention, and 
carrier appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Stewart, J., held that carrier could inter-
vene. 
Reversed. 
1. Parties <s=*40(7) 
Automobile liability insurance carrier 
providing uninsured motorist coverage may 
intervene as of right as party defendant in 
tort action between its insured and an unin-
sured motorist tort-feasor. Rules Civ.Proc, 
Rule 24; U.C.A.1953, 41-12-21.1. 
HALL, C.J., and OAKS and HOWE, JJ., 
concur. 
DURHAM, J., does not participate herein. 
Barbara LIMA, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Earl CHAMBERS, Defendant 
and Respondent, 
v. 
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY & CASUAL-
TY INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Intervenor and Appellant. 
No. 17622. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 26, 1982. 
Automobile liability insurance carrier 
providing uninsured motorist coverage 
2. Parties <&=*41 
In determining whether intervention as 
of right is mandated, adequacy of represen-
tation generally turns on whether there is 
identity or divergence of interest between 
potential intervenor and original party and 
on whether that interest is diligently repre-
sented. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 24, 24(a), 
(aX2). 
3. Parties <&=>41 
In determining whether intervention as 
of right is mandated, representation is con-
sidered to be inadequate if original party is 
not diligent in prosecution or defense of 
action or allows default judgment to be 
entered. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 24, 24(a), 
(a)(2). 
4. Parties @=>41 
Rule governing intervention as of right 
should be Rurally construed to achieve pur-
pose of eli T Jnating unnecessary duplication 
of litigation. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 24. 
5. Parties <s=>40(7) 
Because applicable section requires in-
surers to assume financial responsibility for 
judgments obtained by their insureds 
against uninsured motorist tort-feasors and 
because of insurer's contractual obligation 
which embodies that statutory requirement, 
insurer "is or may be bound" by tort judg-
101 
280 Utah 657 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
ment within meaning of rule providing for 
intervention of parties as of right. Rules 
Civ.Proc., Rule 24; U.C.A.1953, 41-12-21.1. 
6. Parties <s=»48 
When intervention is permitted, inter-
venor must accept pending action as he 
finds it; his right to litigate is only as broad 
as that of other parties to the action. 
7. Trial <s=>127 
Identity of intervening insurance com-
pany should be made known to jury in tort 
action between insured and uninsured mo-
torist tort-feasor, and intervening insurer 
must disclose to its insured that their re-
spective interests may be conflicting. 
8. Witnesses <s=>196 
Intervening insurer in tort action be-
tween insured and uninsured motorist tort-
feasor must not be allowed to use against 
its insured any information whatsoever 
gained by reason of insurer-insured rela-
tionship. 
9. Attorney and Client <s=>20 
If intervening insurer in tort action 
between insured and uninsured motorist 
tort-feasor has obligation to defend insured, 
for example as a defendant on counterclaim 
by uninsured motorist, insured should be 
allowed to choose his own independent 
counsel who must then be compensated by 
insurer. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 24; U.C.A. 
1953, 41-12-21.1. 
Timothy R. Hanson, Salt Lake City, for 
intervenor and appellant. 
David Bert Havas, pro se. 
STEWART, Justice: 
[1] On this appeal we decide whether an 
automobile liability insurance carrier pro-
viding uninsured motorist coverage may in-
tervene as of right as a party defendant in 
a tort action between its insured and an 
uninsured motorist tortfeasor. The trial 
court denied intervention; we reverse. 
The facts are not in dispute. In July of 
1977 plaintiff, Barbara Lima, was involved 
in an automobile collision with defendant 
Earl Chambers, an uninsured motorist. 
Lima brought a negligence action against 
Chambers, an answer was filed, and dis-
covery ensued* Thereafter, Chambers' at-
torney withdrew from the case. The fol-
lowing day Chambers executed an affidavit 
prepared by plaintiff's attorney acknowl-
edging that he was uninsured and admit-
ting that he had caused the collision with 
plaintiff Lima. On the basis of that admis-
sion, plaintiff moved for and obtained a 
summary judgment on the issue of defend-
ant's liability, leaving the question of dam-
ages to be decided at trial. Thereafter, 
plaintiff's liability insurer, Prudential Prop-
erty & Casualty Insurance Company (Pru-
dential), which is contractually liable for a 
judgment against an uninsured motorist, 
moved to intervene as a party defendant in 
the litigation of the damages issue. Appar-
ently considering our prior decision in Kes-
ler v. Tate, 28 Utah 2d 355, 502 P.2d 565 
(1972), to be controlling, the trial court de-
nied the motion to intervene. 
Prudential appeals, urging that we over-
rule Kesler and allow intervention because 
(1) it will be bound by a judgment against 
the uninsured motorist and denial of inter-
vention therefore violates its constitutional 
right to due process; and (2) Rule 24, UtaTi A 
R.Civ.P., governing intervention, entitles it 
to intervene as of right. Plaintiff Lima 
counters that Kesler was decided correctly, 
that Prudential has only a potential con-
tractual obligation to plaintiff with no in-
terest in the pending tort action, and there-
fore, that neither due process nor Rule 24 
requires Prudential's intervention. 
I. 
Utah Code Ann., 1953, § 41-12-21.1 re-
quires that automobile liability insurance 
policies include coverage for accidents with 
uninsured motorists: 
[N]o automobile liability insurance policy 
insuring against loss resulting from liabil-
ity imposed by law for bodily injury or 
death or property damage suffered by 
any person arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, 
shall be delivered . unless coverage is 
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provided in such policy . . . for the pro-
tection of persons insured thereunder 
who are legally entitled to recover dam-
ages from owners or operators of unin-
sured motor vehicles and hit-and-run mo-
tor vehicles because of bodily injury, sick-
ness or disease, including death, resulting 
therefrom. [Emphasis added.] 
Thus, if an insured is injured by an unin-
sured motorist, the insured may recover 
damages from his own insurance company 
upon showing that he is "legally entitled" 
to recover those damages from the unin-
sured tortfeasor. This showing of legal en-
titlement typically entails a lawsuit against 
the uninsured tortfeasor to litigate the is-
sues of liability and damages. A judgment 
favorable to the insured fixes the insurer's 
contractual duty to satisfy that judgment, 
within the policy limits. The insurer is then 
left to pursue its subrogation remedy 
against the uninsured tortfeasor. 
Because of the direct effect of the tort 
litigation on the insurer's contractual duty, 
both insureds and insurers have sought, un-
der certain circumstances, to involve the 
insurer in the tort litigation. Insureds have 
pressed for intervention to make the tort 
judgment binding on the insurer, and insur-
ers have sought intervention to make cer-
tain the tort issues are fully and fairly 
litigated. Three different attempts have 
been made in this Court to involve an unin-
sured motorist insurance carrier in the tort 
litigation between the insured and the unin-
sured tortfeasor. 
The first attempt was in Christensen v. 
Peterson, 25 Utah 2d 411, 483 P.2d 447 
(1971). There we held that to avoid the 
disclosure of insurance coverage to the jury, 
to prevent the mixture of a, eontraet action 
with a tort action, and to avoid placing thj 
insurer in a position hostile to its own In-
sured, a plaintiff could not join its insurer 
as a party defendant in the tort action 
against the uninsured tortfeasor. The fol-
lowing year in Kesler v. Tate, 28 Utah 2d 
355, 502 P.2d 565 (1972), we addressed the 
precise issue raised again on this appeal: 
Whether the insurer may, on its own mo-
tion, intervene as a party defendant in the 
tort action between the insured and the 
uninsured tortfeasor. There we concluded 
that Christensen v. Peterson was control-
ling and, without discussing whether the 
requirements of Rule 24 were satisfied, held 
that the insurer could not intervene. Most 
recently, in Wright v. Brown, Utah, 574 
P.2d 1154 (1978), we held that the nonparty 
insurer lacked standing to appeal the de-
fault judgment entered in favor of the in-
sured against the uninsured tortfeasor. 
Thus, one-by-one we have closed all three 
doors to possible insurer participation in the 
tort litigation and have thereby effectively 
precluded the insurer from ensuring that its 
contractual obligation is properly and fairly 
invoked. As the law now stands, the insur-
er may not be joined, may not intervene, 
and may not appeal. We are here asked to 
open only the door of intervention. 
11. 
The overwhelming majority of courts 
have allowed an uninsured motorist insur-
ance carrier to intervene in a tort action 
between its insured and an uninsured tort-
feasor. See, e.g., Oliver v. Perry, 293 Ala. 
424, 304 So.2d 583 (1974); State Farm Mu-
tual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Brown, 114 Ga. 
App. 650, 152 S.E.2d 641 (1966); Wert v. 
Burke, 47 Ill.App.2d 453, 197 N.E.2d 717 
(1964); Indiana Ins. Co. v. Noble, 148 Ind. 
App. 297, 265 N.E.2d 419 (1970); Rawlins v. 
Stanley, 207 Kan. 564, 486 P.2d 840 (1971); 
Barry v. Keith, Ky., 474 S.W.2d 876 (1971); 
State v. Craig, Mo.App., 364 S.W.2d 343 
(1963), Dominiei v. State Farm Mut Ins. 
Co., 143 Mont. 406, 390 P.2d 806 (1964); 
Heisner v. Jones, 184 Neb. 602, 169 N.W.2d 
606 (1969); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Pietrosh, 85 
Nev. 310, 454 P.2d 106 (1969); Kirouac v. 
Healey, 104 N.H. 157, 181 A.2d 634 (1962); 
Xee) v. MFA Ins. Co., OM., 553 P.2d 153 
(1976); Glover v. Tennessee Farmers Mutu-
al Ins. Co., 225 Tenn. 306, 468 S.W.2d 727 
(1971). See also 7 Am.Jur.2d Automobile 
Insurance § 331 (1980); Annot, 95 A.L. 
R.2d 1330 (1964); Comment, Insurer Inter-
vention in Uninsured Motorist Cases, 55 
Ind.LJ. 717 (1980). The weight of these 
authorities is sufficient to persuade us to 
reevaluate our construction of Rule 24, 
upon which the outcome of this case rests. 
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Intervention of right is asserted in this 
case under Rule 24(aX2).x By the terms of 
that rule, an applicant must be allowed to 
intervene if four requirements are met: 1) 
the application is timely; 2) the applicant 
has an interest in the subject matter of the 
dispute; 3) that interest is or may be inade-
quately represented; and 4) the applicant is 
or may be bound by a judgment in the 
action. The timeliness of the application to 
intervene in the hearing on damages in this 
case has not been challenged and is deemed 
satisfied. The remaining requirements are 
discussed in order. 
1. To justify intervention, the party 
seeking intervention must demonstrate a 
direct interest in the subject matter of the 
litigation such that the intervenor's rights 
may be affected, for good or for ill. In 
State v. Craig, Mo.App., 364 S.W.2d 343 
(1963), the court stated: 
[The required] interest does not include a 
mere, consequential, remote or conjectu-
ral possibility of being in some manner 
affected by the result of the original ac-
tion. It must be such a direct claim upon 
the subject matter of the action that the 
intervenor will either gain or lose by di-
rect operation of the judgment to be ren-
dered. 
Id. at 346. See also State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Brown, 114 Ga.App. 
650, 152 S.E.2d 641, 646 (1966); Commercial 
Block Realty Co. v. United States Fidelity 
& Guaranty Co., 83 Utah 414, 28 P.2d 1081 
(1934). 
The court in State v. Craig, supra, held 
that an insurer providing uninsured motor-
ist insurance has such a direct and immedi-
ate interest because the insurer "should 
have the right to dispute the questions 
which make it liable on its contract." 364 
S.W.2d at 347. Heisner v. Jones, 184 Neb. 
602, 169 N.W.2d 606 (1969), relied on that 
same interest in allowing intervention: 
It is apparent that the questions litigated 
[in] the action between the insured and 
1. Rule 24(a) Intervention of Right Upon time-
ly application anyone shall be permitted to in-
tervene in an action (2) when the represen-
tation of the applicant's interest by existing 
the uninsured tort-feasor, for liability and 
damages, are the identical issues which 
determine liability of Protective under 
the insurance policy ar^ which give rise 
to Protective^ contractual duty to pay 
the insured. Protective has a direct in-
terest in the matter of litigation within 
the meaning of our intervention statute. 
169 KW.2d at 611. Vernon Fire and Casu-
alty Ins. Co v. Matney, 170 Ind.App. 45, 351 
N.E.2d 60 (1976), identified the interest in 
similar terms: 
Clearly the basis of the action by Mat-
ney [insured] against Vernon [insurer] is 
contractual. However, any action on the 
contract is inseparably tied to the legal 
liability of Thorns [uninsured tortfeasor]. 
Therefore, the initial action in which the 
liability of Thorns is determined is but the 
first link m an unbroken chain leading to 
the contractual liability of Vernon 
Id 351 N.E 2d at 64. See also Continental 
Ins. Co. v. Smith, 115 Ga.App. 667, 155 
S.E.2d 713, 715 (1967). In requiring the 
insurer to pay its insured what th»- Insured 
is "legally entitled" to recover from the 
uninsured tortfeasor, within the limits of 
the insured's policy, the legislature must 
have intended that the insurer would "take 
whatever legal steps were necessary and 
fitting . to insure that the judgment 
against the uninsured motorist . . . was 
rendered on legal and sufficient evidence." 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. 
Glover, 113 Ga.App. 815, 820, 149 S.E.2d 
852, 856 (1966). 
We agree with the reasoning of the au-
thorities cited and conclude that since the 
extent of Prudential's contractual liability 
to its insured will be determined by the 
amount of damages awarded to its insured 
in the tort action, Prudential stands to lose 
by the operation of that judgment, and 
therefore has sufficient interest in that ac-
tion to justify intervention. 
2. The next issue is whether Pruden-
tial's interest is or may be inadequately 
parties is or may be inadequate and the appli-
cant is or may be bound by a judgment in the 
action 
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represented by the existing parties. Since 
Prudential, if allowed, would intervene as a 
party defendant, the question is narrowed 
to whether the uninsured motorist, Cham-
bers, would adequately represent Pruden-
tial's interest in actively litigating the issue 
of damages. Prudential argues that its in-
terest is inadequately represented because 
Chambers lacks the assistance of counsel 
and proposes to litigate the damages issue 
pro se. Because of Chambers' ready admis-
sion of liability resulting in the summary 
judgment establishing Chambers' liability, 
Prudential has a reasonable basis for antici-
pating that the damages issue will not be 
fully and fairly litigated without Chambers' 
personal liability for the judgment provides 
sufficient incentive to keep the damages 
low. Lima also argues that the burden of 
proof placed ot\ him, coupled with the close 
supervision of the trial court, will ensure a 
just judgment. 
[2] Adequacy of representation general-
ly turns on whether there is an identity or 
divergence of interest between the poten-
tial intervenor and an original party and on 
whether that interest is diligently repre-
sented. Alsbach v. Bader, Mo.App., 616 
S.W.2d 147,151 (1981); Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 
1412 (1962). Generally, where the appli-
cant's interest is different from that of an 
existing party, the applicant's interest is 
not represented. While Prudential's inter-
est appears on the surface to be the same as 
Chambers', the interests are likely diver-
gent. Chambers' primary interest appears 
to be not in minimizing damages, but in 
bringing the whole matter to a close as soon 
as possible, with little regard for the 
amount of damages awarded. In this case, 
litigation of the damage issue by Chambers 
on a pro se basis does not provide adequate 
representation of Prudential's interest. Al-
though Chambers will be personally liable 
for the judgment and technically obligated 
to reimburse Prudential, that does not suf-
fice to assure adequate representation of 
Prudential's interest. 
[3] Closely related to the question of 
similarity of interests is whether the inter-
est of the applicant, even if assumed to be 
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represented, is represented diligently. Rep-
resentation is considered to be inadequate if 
the original party is not diligent in the 
prosecution or defense of the action or al-
lows a default judgment to be entered. 
Annot, 84 A.L.R.2d 1412 at § 5 (1962). 
The close cooperation between plaintiff and 
defendant in resolving the liability issue in 
this case evidences an absence of the ad-
verse relationship essential to a full and fair 
litigation of the damage issue. Moreover, 
whereas a disinterested attitude of counsel 
for an uninsured motorist may affect the 
diligence of representation, an absence of 
counsel for Chambers in the instant case 
creates a strong presumption against ade-
quate representation. Proper representa-
tion would undoubtedly be hampered fur-
ther by Chambers' apparent inability to 
read. 
Finally, we reject plaintiff Lima's argu-
ment that a fair result is ensured by her 
having to meet the burden of proof and by 
court supervision. Neither position has 
merit. The burden oi proof requirement is 
effective only when a case is actually and 
fairly litigated in a truly adversarial trial. 
As for court supervision, we need only re-
mark that it is not the role of a judge to be 
an advocate. Such a concept is fundamen-
tally contrary to the nature of our adver-
sary system. The court in State v. Craig, 
Mo.App., 364 S.W.2d 343 (1963), responded 
in like manner to the suggestion that the 
interests of a defaulting defendant (and 
hence the interests of the potential interve-
nor) were adequately protected by the 
court: 
We think the argument that relator's 
interest will be "adequately represented" 
in respect to Count I because the court 
will require proof of plaintiff's cause is 
specious. It is not the duty of the trial 
court to subpoena and interrogate wit-
nesses who might contradict the testimo-
ny of plaintiffs or those who might testi-
fy to compelling facts which show that 
plaintiff is not "legally entitled to recov-
er" the damages he claims. The court 
cannot, and should not, act as attorney 
for the defaulting defendants. Every 
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practicing lawyer knows that, in so far as 
the issues of fact are concerned, the de-
faulting defendants are not "adequately 
represented." 
Id. at 346 
We therefore conclude that Prudential's 
interest is not adequately represented. 
3. Finally, we must decide whether Pru-
dential is or may be bound by a judgment 
in the tort action. Prudential argues that it 
is "probably bound" by a judgment against 
the uninsured tortfeasor. Plaintiff Lima 
argues that a judgment binds only the de-
fendant Chambers, and not Prudential, 
whose contractual obligation is merely trig-
gered by the tort judgment. 
[4] A major conflict of authority exists 
on the meaning of the word "bound." An-
not, 84 A.L.R.2d 1412 at § 6 (1962). Some 
courts have applied a strict interpretation 
requiring a showing that the judgment 
would be res judicata as to petitioner for 
intervention, thus preventing the retrial of 
decided issues. Other courts have applied a 
more liberal construction requiring only a 
showing that the applicant would be bound 
in a practical sense. The federal interven-
tion rule and many states' rules have been 
amended to clear up this ambiguity by de-
leting the "bound" requirement and requir-
ing only that the judgment in some way 
impair the applicant's interest. This con-
struction is now applied in the majority of 
jurisdictions, either under expressly reword-
ed rules of intervention or through a liberal 
construction of the term "is or may be 
bound." We are of the opinion that Rule 24 
should be liberally construed to achieve the 
purpose of eliminating unnecessary duplica-
tion of litigation. Centurian Corp. v. 
Cripps, Utah, 577 P.2d 955 (1978); Bartholo-
mew v. Bartholomew, Utah, 548 P.2d 238 
(1976). The language of the rule requiring 
only that a petitioner show that he "may be 
2. We need not decide whether Prudential might 
be bound by the judgment under the doctrines 
of res judicata or estoppel That question can-
not arise until it is established that there is a 
right to intervene Presumably, a nonparty in-
surer could not be bound in a res judicata sense 
unless it had the right and opportunity to inter-
vene and chose not to See Wells v. Hartford 
bound," clearly contemplates that the rule 
should be construed broadly enough to fur-
ther both fairness and economy in judicial 
administration. 
[5] We hold that because section 41-12-
21.1 requires insurers to assume financial 
responsibility for judgments obtained by 
their insureds against uninsured motorist 
tortfeasors (within certain limits), and be-
cause of the insurer's contractual obligation 
which embodies that statutory requirement, 
the insurer "is or may be bound" by the tort 
judgment within the meaning of Rule 24.2 
Having concluded that the four require-
ments for intervention of right have been 
met, we hold that Prudential should be al-
lowed to intervene in the pending damages 
litigation between its insured and the unin-
sured tortfeasor. Having resolved the issue 
at hand on statutory grounds, we need not 
address Prudential's constitutional argu-
ment concerning denial of due process. 
In allowing intervention in this case, we 
necessarily overrule Kesler v. Tate, supra, 
and thereby partially fulfill Chief Justice 
Hall's foreshadowing comment m Wright v. 
Brown, supra at 1155, that "the time [could 
be] nigh to alter the course of the law as set 
forth in Christensen v. Peterson and Kesler 
v. Tate" 
III. 
We do not hold that in each and every 
uninsured motorist case intervention must 
be allowed. In each case it will be neces-
sary for the trial judge to make an assess-
ment of the adequacy of representation. If 
the defendant has counsel who actively liti-
gates the case, intervention may not be 
appropriate. 
[6-9] When intervention is permitted, 
the intervenor must accept the pending ac-
Accident and Indemnity Co, Mo , 459 S W 2d 
253 (1970), Alsbach v Bader, Mo App , 616 
SW2d 147 (1981), Domimci v State Farm 
Mut Ins Co, 143 Mont 406, 390 P 2d 806 
(1964), Allstate Ins Co v Pietrosh, 85 Nev 
310, 454 P2d 106 (1969), Indiana Ins Co v 
Noble, 148 Ind App 297, 265 N E 2d 419 (1970) 
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tion as he finds it; his right to litigate is 
only as broad as that of the other parties to 
the action. Kg., Beard v. Jackson, Mo. 
App., 502 S.W.2d 416, 419 (1973). The iden-
tity of the intervening insurance company 
should be made known to the jury, and an 
intervening insurer must disclose to its in-
sured that their respective interests may be 
conflicting.3 The insurer must not be al-
lowed to use against its insured any infor-
mation whatsoever gained by reason of the 
insurer-insured relationship. See Barry v. 
Keith, Ky., 474 S.W.2d 876 (1971). Finally, 
if the insurer has an obligation to defend 
the insured, for example as a defendant on 
a counterclaim by the uninsured motorist, 
the insured should be allowed to choose his 
own independent counsel who must then be 
compensated by the insurer. 
The order of the trial court denying inter-
vention is reversed and the case remanded 
for further proceedings. No costs. 
HALL, C.J., and OAKS, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
In the Matter of the Mental Condition 
of Lewis Lee GILES. 
No. 17976. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 29, 1982. 
Mental patient appealed from ruling of 
the Fourth District Court, Utah County, 
David Sam, J., ordering his involuntary hos-
pitalization. The Supreme Court, Howe, J., 
held that: (1) the action was not mooted by 
3. We recognize that some conflict of interests 
appears to be inevitable. However, the interest 
of fairness and judicial economy outweigh, in 
our view, the potential difficulties arising from 
a conflict of interest. See, e.g., Oliver v. Perry, 
293 Ala. 424, 304 So.2d 583 (1974). Vernon 
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defendant's release from the hospital, and 
(2) necessary elements for involuntary hos-
pitalization existed at time of patient's com-
mitment hearing. 
Affirmed. 
Stewart, J., concurred in result. 
1. Action @=»6 
Doctrine of collateral legal conse-
quences, which is chiefly applied in criminal 
cases where absence or presence of those 
consequences may determine a criminal's 
chance of rehabilitation or recidivism, is 
equally applicable to patients of mental hos-
pitals who face similar deprivations of liber-
ty and whose commitment and hospitaliza-
tion must stand scrutiny on the merits 
when challenged. 
2. Action <s=»6 
In light of collateral consequences that 
may have been imposed upon former men-
tal patient were he to have faced future 
confrontations with legal system, action 
challenging his involuntary civil commit-
ment was not mooted by his release from 
hospital. 
3. Mental Health e=>439 
In mental patient's action challenging 
his involuntary hospitalization, there was 
evidence from which trial court could have 
found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that, at 
time of his hearing, patient suffered from a 
mental illness as defined by statute, posed 
an immediate danger of physical injury to 
others or himself, and lacked ability to en-
gage in a rational decision-making process 
regarding acceptance of mental treatment, 
that nj less restrictive alternative existed 
to a coirt order of hospitalization, and that 
hospital could provide patient with treat-
ment that was adequate and appropriate to 
his conditions and needs. U.C.A.1953, 
64-7-28(1), 64-7-36X10). 
Fire and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Matney, 170 Ind. 
App. 45, 351 N.E.2d 60, 65 (1976); Alsbach v. 
Bader, Mo.App., 616 S.W.2d 147, 153-54 
(1981); Heisner v. Jones, 184 Neb. 602, 169 
N.W.2d 606, 612 (1969). 
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